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 “This initial book in an exciting new series looks at one of the key global 
issues with which religion is intimately involved:  the sustainable devel-
opment goals. This punchy, thoughtful and comprehensive overview of 
the relevant issues is a must- read for scholars, practitioners and univer-
sity students. It will help set the focus of debates on this issue. I warmly 
recommend it”. 
 Jeff rey Haynes , London Metropolitan University, UK 
 “The ‘Religion Matters’ series is a timely and accessible compendium con-
textualizing the role of religion within the critical issues of our time. The 
fi rst volume,  On the Signifi cance of Religion in Confl ict and Confl ict Resolution , 
demonstrates through careful analysis and illustrative case studies around the 
three Abrahamic traditions the real yet complex impact of religion in the 
global sphere, showing clearly the need for collaboration and understanding 
across sectors and religious traditions in confl ict resolution. Building upon 
the rich academic expertise and lived experiences of the authors, and situ-
ating itself within the broader religion and peacebuilding scholarship of 
recent decades, this volume raises to the forefront the ‘how’ and ‘why’ reli-
gion does indeed matter”. 
 Melissa Nozell , United States Institute of Peace, USA 
 “‘Does religion matter’ is a crucial question for billions of people around 
the world. Although in recent years, many governments and international 
organizations have begun considering the role of religion in policy, never-
theless these eff orts remain in their initial phase. This edited volume cre-
atively tackles this central issue in international politics. Combining several 
real and challenging cases, the Editors successfully dispel the myth that reli-
gion alone causes violent confl icts and is responsible for their solutions. The 
book also illustrates how the three Abrahamic traditions can be deployed 
eff ectively to positively contribute to confl ict resolution and peacebuilding 
in Israeli Palestinian, Pakistan, and Rwanda settings. The edited volume 
adds an important voice to the fi eld of interreligious peacebuilding. It also 
responds to the need for further engagement between policy makers and 
peacebuilding communities and practitioners”. 
 Mohammed Abu- Nimer , American University School, USA 
 “This volume is an important contribution to eff orts to bring religion back 
into the mainstream of confl ict resolution and peacebuilding. Analyzing 
religion’s role in confl ict and peace by applying a simple framework to sev-
eral rich case studies, the authors convincingly demonstrate that religion 
matters for anyone working in the fi eld of confl ict resolution today”. 
 Owen Frazer , Center for Security Studies, Zurich, Switzerland 
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 ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
RELIGION IN CONFLICT AND 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
 In this ground- breaking volume, the authors analyze the role of religion in 
confl ict and confl ict resolution. They do so from the perspectives of Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam, while bringing diff erent disciplines into play, including 
peace and confl ict studies, religious studies, theology, and ethics. With much 
of current academic, political, and public attention focusing on the confl ictive 
dimensions of religion, this book also explores the constructive resources of 
religion for confl ict resolution and reconciliation. 
 Analyzing the specifi c contributions of religious actors in this fi eld, their 
potentials, and possible problems connected with them, this book sheds light 
on the concrete contours of the oftentimes vague “religious factor” in processes 
of social change. Case studies in current and former settings of violent confl ict 
such as Israel, post- genocide Rwanda, and Pakistan provide “real- life” contexts 
for discussion.
Combining cutting- edge research with case studies and concrete implications 
for academics, policy makers, and practitioners, this concise and easily accessible 
volume helps to build bridges between these oftentimes separated spheres of 
engagement. 
 Christine Schliesser is a Senior Lecturer in Systematic Theology and Ethics 
at Zurich University, Switzerland, and a Research Fellow at Stellenbosch 
University, South Africa. 
 S. Ayse Kadayifci- Orellana is a Research Affi  liate at Georgetown Institute 
for Women, Peace and Security at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow 
at the Center for Global Policy, USA. 
 Pauline Kollontai is Professor of Higher Education in Theology and Religious 
Studies at York St John University, UK. 
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 Policy makers, academics and practitioners worldwide are increas-
ingly paying attention to the role of religion in global issues. This 
development is clearly noticeable in confl ict resolution, devel-
opment or climate change, to name just a few pressing issues of 
global relevance. Up to now, no book series has yet attempted to 
analyze the role of religion in current global issues in a coherent 
and systematic way that pertains to academics, policy makers and 
practitioners alike. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
serve as a dynamic frame of reference. “Religion Matters” provides 
cutting- edge scholarship in a concise format and accessible language, 
thereby addressing academics, practitioners and policy makers. 
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 FOREWORD 
 Religion Matters. All three of us share this common conviction, 
even though we come from diff erent religious traditions, disciplinary 
backgrounds, and geographical contexts. Religion matters, not only in 
private and personal lives, but also in the public sphere. This means that 
religion also matters when it comes to addressing today’s challenges, 
including confl ict and confl ict resolution, economic inequality, migra-
tion and climate change, to mention a few. While the role of religion 
in these contexts is being increasingly acknowledged by academics, 
policy makers, and practitioners, the “religious factor” often remains 
vague. How exactly does religion matter? What role do religious 
actors actually play? What are their specifi c potentials and problems? 
 It is the goal of this book series, titled “Religion Matters: On 
the Signifi cance of Religion in Global Issues”, of which this book, 
 On the Signifi cance of Religion in Confl ict and Confl ict Resolution is the 
fi rst volume to address precisely these questions. We realize that the 
complexity of today’s challenges— as expressed in the 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs)— requires the joint eff ort of diff erent 
religious and disciplinary voices, and the cooperation of all rele-
vant actors, including academics, policy makers, and practitioners. 
This series thus seeks to build bridges— between disciplines, reli-
gious traditions, and actors. For it is in the joint eff ort of all that the 
potentials for change are phenomenal. 
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 As this volume shows, today’s greatest challenges include con-
fl ict and confl ict resolution. SDG 16 thus expresses the need for 
“peace, justice and strong institutions”. If acknowledged at all, reli-
gion is oftentimes perceived in confl icts as part of the problem 
rather than as part of the solution. In this fi rst volume of “Religion 
Matters” we examine not only the confl ictive sides of religion, but 
also its potentials for overcoming violence and for reconciliation. 
Three diff erent case studies from the perspectives of three diff erent 
religions— Judaism, Christianity, and Islam— demonstrate how reli-
gious traditions have been used to both increase confl ict and foster 
confl ict resolution. 
 The idea for this volume, and series, evolved from an interdis-
ciplinary, interreligious, and international resident research seminar 
convened by the Center for Theological Inquiry (CTI) in Princeton 
on “Religion and Violence” in 2019 and led by CTI director Dr. 
William Storrar and associate director Dr. Joshua Mauldin. To that 
end, we wish to express our gratitude to everyone who played a part 
in making this volume a reality. We particularly want to thank the 
members of our research group for their encouragement, comments, 
and critique. We also extend our thanks to our international, 
interreligious, and interdisciplinary Series Advisory Board for their 
support. We are privileged to have found with Regina Baumann 
a visual artist, who not only shares our vision and commitment 
through her artwork but also inspires us through her powerful cover 
images. Thank you, Regina. 
 One of the goals of this series is to be as easily accessible as pos-
sible, which today means Open Access. We therefore would like to 
thank the Institute for Social Ethics (Zurich University), the Faculty 
of Theology (Zurich University), and Centre for Religion in 
Society (York St John University) for their fi nancial support of the 
Open Access version of this volume. A further thanks is extended to 
Dr. Lee- Anne Roux for her wonderful support with the editorial 
process. We also express our sincere thanks to Routledge, namely 
Rebecca Shillabeer and Dr.  Amy Doff egnies, for their excellent 
collaboration. 
 Zurich, Washington, DC, and York, November 2019 
 Christine Schliesser 
 S. Ayse Kadayifci- Orellana 
 Pauline Kollontai 
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 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR ACADEMICS, POLICY MAKERS, 
AND PRACTITIONERS  
 Christine Schliesser, 
S. Ayse Kadayifci- Orellana, 
and Pauline Kollontai 
 Religion matters in confl ict and confl ict resolution. Eff ective 
confl ict resolution is too complex an endeavor to forego the 
contributions of any relevant actor, religious or not. It is therefore 
vital to better understand the role of religion in confl ict and to 
strengthen religion’s positive contributions for confl ict resolution. 
It is in the joint collaboration of academics, policy makers, and 
practitioners, religious and secular, that the potential for change is 
astounding. 
 IMPLICATION 1: BRIDGING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN 
RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR 
 Eff ective confl ict resolution depends on both religious and secular 
actors. Each must overcome ignorance and prejudices in order to 
collaborate successfully. For secular actors in government, business, 
media, and higher education, this calls for strengthening religious 
literacy. For religious actors, this means endorsing a theology that 




 IMPLICATION 2: BRIDGING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN 
DIFFERENT FAITH TRADITIONS 
 Besides the necessity for bridging the religious– secular divide, there 
is a need for more and deeper cooperation between diff erent faith 
traditions in confl ict resolution. More often than not, ignorance 
and prejudices hinder interfaith cooperation. Interfaith dialogue 
and joint initiatives, however, can serve as powerful inspirations for 
overcoming violence not only within a particular confl ict but also 
far beyond it. 
 IMPLICATION 3: BRIDGING THE DIVIDE  
BETWEEN ACADEMICS, POLICY MAKERS, AND 
PRACTITIONERS 
 Eff ective confl ict resolution depends on the collaborative eff orts 
of all relevant actors— academics, policy makers, and practitioners. 
Joint and cross- over eff orts in higher education, governments, non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs), and faith- based organizations 
(FBOs) need to be supported. 
 IMPLICATION 4: MORE EVALUATION 
 Despite the increasing number of programs focusing on religious 
peacebuilding, there is a knowledge gap in the area of evaluation. 
Evaluation of religious peacebuilding generates better understanding 
of what is eff ective religious peacebuilding and supports evidence- 
based policy and practice. 
 IMPLICATION 5: BETTER INCLUSION OF WOMEN 
 Women are often marginalized in confl ict resolution processes, 
and consequently their perspectives and experiences are excluded. 
Recent studies show, however, that women are particularly eff ective 
agents of social change and confl ict resolution. 
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 IMPLICATION 6: BETTER INCLUSION OF THE YOUTH 
 At the same time, more attention in confl ict resolution theory 
and praxis must be directed towards the youth. The so- called 
“youth bulge” in many countries of the Global South has already 
given rise to concern about the potential destabilizing eff ect. 
The same goes for concerns about the growth of destablizing and 
anti-democratic ideologies such as racism, white supremacy, and 
Islamophobia amongst youth in the Global North. At the same 
time, the tremendous potential for confl ict resolution and recon-
ciliation within children and youth goes largely neglected. 
 IMPLICATION 7: BETTER ENGAGEMENT OF 
THE MEDIA 
 Confl ict resolution in general, and religious confl ict resolution 
in particular, need to become better in strategically engaging the 
media and social media. While there is no shortage of media outlets 
preaching religious hatred and intolerance, religious peacebuilders 
have to catch up in employing these powerful instruments for the 
means of peace, empathy, and acceptance of the other. 
 IMPLICATION 8: TAKING THE ISSUES OF 
PROSELYTIZATION AND INSTRUMENTALIZATION 
INTO ACCOUNT 
 Religious actors often face the charge that their main goal is to 
attract followers and convert others, which can constitute a ser-
ious impediment to peacebuilding between religious groups. At the 
same time, one needs to acknowledge that conversion is not an 
exclusively religious phenomenon as all development organizations 
aim to transform the way people act and think in terms of citizen-
ship for the common good. This sensitive subject should therefore 
be treated in a diff erentiated manner and framed under the aspects 
of transparency and equality. 
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 IMPLICATION 9: BETTER ENGAGEMENT OF 
INDIGENOUS AND NON- ABRAHAMIC RELIGIONS 
 With much of Western attention focusing on the Abrahamic 
religions— Judaism, Christianity, and Islam— in confl ict reso-
lution, little attention is being paid to the contributions of indi-
genous, dharmic, and other East Asian religious traditions. Similar 
to Abrahamic faiths, these traditions have a wealth of resources and 
values that promote peacebuilding and justice. 
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 WHY RELIGION MATTERS 
 AN INTRODUCTION  
 Christine Schliesser, 
S. Ayse Kadayifci- Orellana, 
and Pauline Kollontai 
 At a conference on poverty alleviation a couple of years ago in 
Salzburg, Austria, I  (Christine Schliesser) presented a paper on 
the religious factor in development. During the Q&A session, a 
renowned economist from Frankfurt, Germany, stood up, saying: “I 
am surprised that you would bring religion into this context. 
We all know that religion is a private aff air and has no bearing 
on public issues such as development”. “I am surprised that you 
are surprised”, I  replied, “Because we all should know that reli-
gion matters in global aff airs”. Religion matters, indeed. Not only 
does it aff ect the everyday choices, behavior, and action of countless 
people worldwide, but religion also has an impact on global issues 
and challenges, including confl ict and confl ict resolution, develop-
ment, and climate change. 
 THE QUESTION IS NOT IF, BUT HOW 
RELIGION MATTERS. OR: THE FAILURE OF THE 
SECULARIZATION THESIS 
 Much of public and academic discourse in the past decades was 
dominated by the so- called “secularization thesis”, claiming that 




religion was retreating. The secularization thesis was reinforced by 
the post- Enlightenment proposition that religion belongs to the pri-
vate sphere, while all matters of public, let alone global concern, ought 
to be treated as purely secular (and this conviction is still very much 
alive, as the economist from Frankfurt cited above demonstrates). 
Recent years, however, have seen signs of an impending paradigm 
change. Instead of a “disenchantment of the world” (Max Weber), 
we fi nd a renewed interest in the role of religion in the making of 
modern societies. A “return to the question of religion” (Freeman 
 2012 : 1), even a “desecularization of the world” (ed. Berger  1999 ), 
is now being proclaimed. Along with the failure of the seculariza-
tion thesis to explain the resurgence of religion in many societal 
and political processes worldwide, this thesis is further contested by 
recent empirical fi ndings. According to a 2015 study conducted by 
the Pew Research Center, the 21st century will be a religious one. 
All main religions— except for Buddhism— will experience growth 
in numbers. By 2050, the number of Muslims will have increased to 
equal Christianity and 10 percent of Europeans will adhere to Islam 
(Pew Research Center  2015 ). 
 The increasing awareness of the signifi cance of religion on 
global issues has become apparent not only in academics, but also 
amongst practitioners and policy makers. Paradigmatic for this is 
the 2016 European Union’s appointment of the fi rst ever Special 
Envoy for the promotion of freedom of religion or belief outside 
the European Union. This appointment stands for the recognition 
of the link between the right of freedom of religion, conscience, 
and thought, on the one hand, and public issues such as stability and 
peace on the other hand. As the Council of the European Union 
states: “Violations of freedom of religion or belief may exacerbate 
intolerance and often constitute early indicators of potential vio-
lence and confl icts” (Council of the European Union  2013 : 1). 
 The question is therefore no longer  if religion makes a con-
tribution in processes of social change, but rather  of what kind 
are these contributions and what are their specifi c potentials and 
problems. In order to better understand the impact of religion on 
diff erent issues of public concern, various national governments in 
secularized, Western countries have started to establish special units. 
The United States, for example, created the “Offi  ce of Religion 
and Global Aff airs” at the State Department, while the UK set up 
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the CONSENT strategy at the Home Offi  ce, with an emphasis on 
understanding the role of religion in promoting radicalization and 
terrorism, and Switzerland’s Federal Department of Foreign Aff airs’ 
Human Security Division formed a task force on “Religion, politics 
and confl icts”. 
 BRINGING TOGETHER ACADEMICS, POLICY MAKERS, 
AND PRACTITIONERS 
 With academics, policy makers, and practitioners becoming increas-
ingly aware of the importance of understanding the religious factor 
in public and global aff airs, it would seem only natural that all of 
these relevant actors join forces. Yet ignorance and suspicion on all 
sides remain high, further perpetuated by the divides between reli-
gious and non- religious actors and between actors of diff erent faith 
traditions. This observation is part of the rationale behind this book 
and the entire book series. In view of the complexity and urgency 
of the challenges presented to us as global citizens, we simply cannot 
aff ord to ignore the wisdom, insights, and experiences by any one 
actor. Coming together from the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim 
faith traditions, we want to connect the contributions of our 
respective religions and our respective disciplines. It is our aim and 
hope that this book series will help to build bridges across diff erent 
faith traditions, diff erent disciplines, and between academics, policy 
makers, and practitioners. We are encouraged to see more and more 
of these cross- boundaries initiatives emerge. One example is the 
2016 conference “Partners for Change. Religions and the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development”. This high- profi le confer-
ence was initiated by the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development and brought together actors from 
politics, religion, and NGOs to jointly explore the role of religion in 
pressing issues such as peace, poverty, and climate change. 
 SITUATING OUR WORK: THE SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT GOALS 
 To our great fortune, we thus do not need to invent a framework 
that situates our work. It is already present in that grand global task 
spelled out to each one of us in the 17 Sustainable Development 
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Goals (SDGs). These goals, adopted by all United Nations member 
states in 2015, include many of the world community’s most 
pressing challenges, such as ending poverty and hunger, redu-
cing inequality, and working for peace and justice. In achieving 
these goals, the SDGs call for a global partnership between both 
developed and developing countries, between the so- called Global 
North and the Global South. The SDGs further recognize the 
intrinsic relationship between the individual goals. Ending hunger, 
for instance, is linked to ending violent confl icts, currently the 
number one driving force of hunger. At the same time, eff orts at 
reducing inequality will only be sustainable if they are connected 
to tackling climate change and eff orts to preserve our forests and 
oceans. Describing this bigger picture, UN Secretary General 
António Guterres states: “We need a global response that addresses 
the root causes of confl ict, and integrates peace, sustainable devel-
opment and human rights in a holistic way – from conception to 
execution” (Guterres  2017 ). So while the diff erent volumes of the 
series “Religion Matters” all address specifi c global issues— related 
directly or indirectly to the SDGs— we always need to remind our-
selves that these issues are connected with one another and cannot 
be treated in isolation. This volume with its focus on confl ict and 
confl ict resolution relates most directly to SDG 16 (“Peace, Justice 
and Strong Institutions”), yet connects to a number of other SDGs 
such as SDG 1 (“No Poverty”), SDG 2 (“Zero Hunger”), SDG 3 
(“Good Health and Well- Being”), SDG 4 (“Quality Education”), 
and SDG 17 (“Partnerships for the Goals”). Having said that, we 
need to turn to the task of fi nding a common language. This entails 
a working defi nition of what we mean by “religion” and by “con-
fl ict resolution”. 
 WHAT ARE WE TALKING ABOUT? DEFINING 
OUR TERMS 
 Religion . Religion is notoriously hard to defi ne and is usually framed 
in terms of substantial (referring to some kind of content or dogma) 
vs. functional (referring to the function of religion, such as creating 
identities or in- and outsiders) defi nitions. We have found it most 
helpful to work with a pragmatic understanding of religion. This 
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means that we understand religion simply as what is described and 
understood as religion by our interlocutors and the communities 
we work with (Waardenburg  1986 ). We understand religion, fur-
thermore, as inherently ambivalent. While it can be used to ignite 
and support strife and violence, it also contains potent resources for 
overcoming violence and for promoting reconciliation. With much 
of public and academic attention focused on the confl ictive sides of 
religion, we also explore its constructive features. 
 In order to better operationalize the structural dimensions of col-
lective religious actors, we work with the term FBO. With Julia 
Berger ( 2003 : 1) we defi ne FBOs as
 formal organizations whose identity and mission are self- consciously 
derived from the teachings of one or more religious or spiritual 
traditions and which operate on a non- profit, independent, voluntary 
basis to promote and realize collectively articulated ideas about the 
public good at the national or international level. 
 Confl ict Resolution . Confl ict in and of itself is ethically neutral. 
It can be constructive, leading to fruitful individual and social 
change, yet it can also result in destructiveness and violence. It 
is the latter that we are concerned with here. The fi eld of con-
fl ict resolution as a subject matter for academics, policy makers, 
and practitioners is continuously evolving (Kriesberg  2009 ). Up 
until now, we cannot boast of a single overarching theory or 
agreement on scope, approaches, and methods. Rather than as a 
distinct approach or a separate discipline, confl ict resolution is best 
described as a mode of constructively dealing with confl ict that 
aims for solutions benefi cial to all sides involved, while minim-
izing the use of violence. It is interdisciplinary, makes use of a var-
iety of approaches and engages both theory and practice. Other 
terms often encountered in this fi eld include confl ict transform-
ation, peacebuilding, peacemaking, and reconciliation, with each 
having a diff erent focus. Our understanding of confl ict resolution 
is inclusive of all these concepts. By paying attention to diff erent 
dimensions of violence— personal, structural, and cultural (Galtung 
 1969 )— confl ict resolution deals with preventing confl icts, stopping 
acute violence and post- confl ict work. 
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 DESCRIPTIVE OR NORMATIVE? UNIVERSAL 
OR PARTICULAR? ON BECOMING  
TRANSPARENT 
 We believe that any helpful approach to understanding the role 
of religion in global issues, such as confl ict and confl ict reso-
lution, benefi ts from listening to the insights of state- of- the- art 
scholarship in these fi elds. Yet these theoretical insights need to 
be supplemented by practical examples of how these approaches, 
methods, or models play out in real- life contexts, or conversely, 
don’t play out. This is why we include case studies. Our case 
studies on Israel, Rwanda, and Pakistan were chosen to provide 
examples of the role of religion in diff erent cultural and religious 
contexts. They are conducted from our own specifi c points of view 
that we lay out below. This includes our own academic discipline, 
our cultural background, our experiences as on the ground, and 
the faith tradition we associate ourselves with. We don’t believe 
in the possibility of absolute neutrality and objectivity— another 
example of post- Enlightenment propositions that the academic 
world has accepted for too long without questioning. Each scholar, 
each policy maker, and each practitioner is shaped in his and her 
perspectives by a variety of factors, including one’s professional 
background, personal upbringing, and perception of reality. Instead 
of pretending that genuinely neutral, value- free judgments are pos-
sible (or even desirable), we rather argue for the need to make one’s 
own particular perspective transparent. 
 Rejecting the possibility of a truly objective position does not 
mean rejecting the possibility of (self- )criticism. On the contrary, 
immanent criticism is very much part of the particular perspective. 
So while we acknowledge our own particular tradition— for instance, 
as a female, white, Jewish, Western academic- practitioner— we do 
engage in active self- criticism of this very tradition. Are, then, our case 
studies done from a descriptive or normative framework? We com-
bine both. While we seek to provide the most accurate description 
possible of a certain context, such as through ethnographic methods, 
we also include normative claims. For instance, if certain theological 
concepts in pre- genocide Rwanda were abused to build tensions 
between the diff erent ethnicities, these problematical hermeneutics 
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will be criticized from within the Christian- theological tradition. 
Normative reasoning thus supplements descriptive accounts. 
 OUTLINE OF THIS BOOK 
 The outline of this book mirrors its approach in that it is 
interreligious, interdisciplinary, and international, with the explicit 
aim to be relevant to academics, policy makers, and practitioners. 
Preceded by an executive summary ( Part I) and this introduction 
( Part II), the analytical heart of the book consists of two main parts 
( Parts III and  IV ), discussing both the confl ictive sides of religion 
and its resources of overcoming confl ict. After providing a general 
orientation into each fi eld, we utilize three case studies to explore 
how this is spelled out in concrete confl ict situations. Each case 
study discusses the role of one particular faith tradition in a cer-
tain confl ict, critically analyzed by a representative of that religion. 
Through using the same case studies in  Part III and  Part IV, we 
emphasize the inescapable ambivalence of religion in containing 
both confl ictive and constructive resources often at work in one 
and the same context (Appleby  2000 ). The fi nal part ( Part V) draws 
together the insights gained from the case studies and spells out con-
crete implications for academics, policy makers, and practitioners. 
 PART III: RELIGION MATTERS IN CONFLICT 
 ORIENTATION 
 Part III focuses on the confl ictive dimension of religion and asks: Did 
religion do it? We discuss some of the most relevant models avail-
able for helping us to understand this role. We fi nd the work of 
Owen Frazer, Richard Friedli, and Mark Owen particularly helpful 
(Frazer and Owen  2018 ; Frazer and Friedli  2015 ). By combining 
their approaches, we discuss six ways of thinking about religion, 
namely: religion as community, as a set of teachings, as spirituality, as 
practice, as discourse, and as institution. The work of Robert Eisen, 
like that of R. Scott Appleby, focuses on how the interpretation of 
religious foundational texts can inspire adherents to engage in either 
peace or confl ict, and points out that the reading of these texts are 
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also dependent on external factors in the political, economic and 
social spheres (Eisen  2011 ). This orientation will be followed by 
three case studies, spelling out the concrete implications of religion 
in diff erent confl icts. 
 JEWISH PERSPECTIVE: RELIGION IN ISRAEL’S LAND RIGHTS CONFLICTS 
 Kollontai’s perspective is from the standpoint of religious studies. 
Using a Jewish lens, she discusses how Judaism in Israel, which is 
both a democratic and Jewish state, contributes to the state’s con-
tinuing ideological struggle over land rights within Israel. Three 
issues are explored:  (1) the nature of the relationship between 
Judaism and the state, (2) a theology of the land which abandons care 
for the stranger/ neighbor, and (3)  the Jewish establishment’s dis-
course promoting and supporting state policy of further Judaization 
of land in Southern Israel. In presenting these issues, Kollontai will 
concentrate on the growth of hard- line political views amongst 
Israel’s political leaders, accompanied by increasing infl uence of 
the Orthodox/ Ultra- Orthodox Jewish establishments on govern-
ment through political appointments and presence of their political 
parties in the Knesset. Opposition is being reinforced against a land 
for peace compromise whether with the Palestinians or Israel’s Arab 
citizens. 
 CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE: RELIGION IN PRE- GENOCIDE AND 
GENOCIDE RWANDA 
 Schliesser, coming from the perspective of Christian theology and 
ethics, traces the role of religion in helping to create and sustain an 
environment in which the Rwandan genocide could occur in 1994 
in which up to one million children, women, and men were killed. 
She identifi es four factors, including the (too) close relationship 
between Church and state, the churches’ support of ethnic policies, 
power struggles within the churches, and a problematic theology 
that highlighted concepts such as obedience to authority, while 
neglecting responsibility and love of the neighbor. At the same time, 
Schliesser points out that it is too simplistic to view all religious 
actors as equally implicated. Rather, the picture is more complex as 
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numerous Church- led initiatives and individuals struggled for peace 
right up to the genocide. 
 MUSLIM PERSPECTIVE: RELIGION IN PAKISTAN’S INTERNAL CONFLICTS 
 Coming from a confl ict resolution perspective, Muslim scholar 
S. Ayse Kadayifci- Orellana explores the relationship between reli-
gion and confl ict within the context of Islamic tradition. More 
specifi cally, recognizing that Islam, like other religious traditions 
included in this book, embodies a dynamic and complex body of 
wisdom that is built on foundational resources such as the Quran and 
the Prophet’s tradition, she investigates how groups like al- Qaeda 
and Taliban in Pakistan use and abuse Islamic tradition to justify vio-
lence and confl ict. This section addresses: (1) conception of jihad in 
Islam from a historical and contemporary perspective, (2) the histor-
ical, social, and political context in which the Taliban and al- Qaeda 
emerged in Pakistan, and (3) how this context contributed to way 
these groups interpreted jihad to respond to modern social, political, 
and economic problems. 
 PART IV: RELIGION MATTERS IN CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 
 ORIENTATION 
 Part IV is the sister of  Part III. With  Part III focusing on the 
confl ictive side of religion,  Part IV discusses religion’s potent and 
often neglected constructive resources for confl ict resolution and 
healing relationships. Our question here is: What are the potentials 
and specifi cities connected to religious peacemaking? What do reli-
gious actors have that others don’t? Again, we fi rst provide a general 
orientation to the topic by discussing the insights of recent schol-
arship (Schliesser  2019 ). While keeping in mind the vast diversity 
of religious actors in peacebuilding, certain specifi c characteristics 
emerge, both formal and content- based. Formal characteristics refer 
to competencies in building relationships, generating trust or being 
able to rely on extended and well- resourced networks. Content- 
based characteristics include certain concepts, for instance, the 
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Christian concepts of grace, forgiveness, and personal transform-
ation or the Muslim concepts of mercy and doing good. 
 JEWISH PERSPECTIVE: RELIGION IN ISRAEL’S QUEST FOR CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION AND RECONCILIATION IN ITS LAND RIGHTS CONFLICTS 
 Reality demonstrates that religion has an ambivalent or dual nature, 
whereby it can be used to promote both peace and violence. 
Therefore, can Judaism contribute to resolving Israel’s confl ict over 
land with the Palestinians and its Arab citizens? Can a solution be 
found by relooking at the founding texts in the Hebrew Bible which 
demand peace, justice, and freedom for all which in contemporary 
Israel are concepts and values, identifi ed in the 1948 Declaration of 
the Founding of the State of Israel, as key to how all its citizens— Jew 
and non- Jew— will be treated? Focusing on the work of two Israeli 
organizations, The Interreligious Coordinating Council in Israel and 
Rabbis for Human Rights, the role of religion in confl ict resolution 
will be discussed in terms of their resources, methods, challenges, and 
achievements. This will be used to examine the potential of Jews to 
reclaim and assert the prophetic principles that combine to safeguard 
the existence and rights of people irrespective of race, ethnicity, or 
religion through compassion and empathetic understanding. 
 CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE: RELIGION IN POST- GENOCIDE RWANDA’S QUEST 
FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND RECONCILIATION 
 With over 90 percent of the population adhering to the Christian 
faith, religious actors and especially Christian churches play a sig-
nifi cant role in Rwanda’s societal and political processes. Focusing 
on the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda, Schliesser traces the signifi -
cance of religion in the government’s offi  cial “National Politics of 
Reconciliation”. The churches supplement the government’s top- 
down strategies with bottom- up initiatives that are characterized by 
a focus on building long- term relationships, even with and between 
perpetrators and survivors and on disseminating Christian concepts 
such as forgiveness or grace. Next to the potentials apparent in the 
Christian churches’ reconciliation eff orts, certain problems surface. 
These include a problematic concept of justice, and a problematic 
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culture of remembrance and silence on the state’s human rights 
violations. 
 MUSLIM PERSPECTIVE: RELIGION IN MUSLIM WOMEN’S PEACEBUILDING 
INITIATIVES IN PAKISTAN 
 Following the 9/ 11 attacks, Islam has been often associated with 
violence and extremism. However, Islam, similar to other religious 
traditions, as a religion and a tradition is replete with teachings 
and practices of nonviolence and peacebuilding, and Muslims— 
both men and women— have been empowered by them to resolve 
their confl icts peacefully and to establish just social, political and 
economic systems (Kadayifci- Orellana  2007 :  85). In this section, 
Kadayifci- Orellana will explore the often under- explored work of 
Muslim women who are employing these values and principles to 
address confl icts in their communities and to respond to challenges 
of violence. Focusing on the work of Mossarat Qadeem, founder 
of PAIMAN, an NGO working to respond to violence and rad-
icalization of youth in Pakistan, Kadayifci- Orellana will explore 
how these Islamic principles of peace and justice inspire and create 
unique opportunities for Muslim women to build just and peaceful 
societies. 
 PART V: NOW WHAT? 
 From our key observation of religion matters in confl ict and con-
fl ict resolution emerge a number of concrete implications. These 
include: Integration of religious actors (individuals, congregations, 
institutions, FBOs, etc., both local and trans- local) in confl ict reso-
lution; Establishment of advisory groups within a given body 
engaged in confl ict resolution that include religious leaders and 
experts on the role of religion in societal processes; Promotion of 
religious literacy within a given body (political, academic, or NGO/ 
FBO) engaged in confl ict resolution; Integration of women and 
youth in confl ict resolution, for example through partnerships 
with local synagogues, churches, or mosques; Evaluation of reli-
gious peacebuilding work for better understanding its mechanisms, 
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 PART III 




 DID RELIGION DO IT?  
 Christine Schliesser, 
S. Ayse Kadayifci- Orellana, 
and Pauline Kollontai 
 RELIGION AND VIOLENCE: BEST FRIENDS  
FOREVER? 
 When we look at human history, both past and present, religion 
and violence appear to be best friends. While religiously inspired 
violence is nothing new, the events surrounding 9/ 11 have brought 
them sharply to the forefront of the Western world. Ever since, reli-
gious violence has been considered one of the most pressing issues 
of our times (cf. Juergensmeyer  2017 ). This perception is backed 
by numbers as the past decade has seen a substantial increase in 
violent religious tensions. “Religious ideologies and commitment 
are indisputably central factors in the escalation of violence and 
evil around the world” (Kimball  2008 : 4). According to a recent 
report by the Pew Research Center (Pew Research Center  2018 ), 
more than one- quarter of the world’s countries experience high 
or very high levels of social hostilities involving religion, compared 
to one- fi fth in 2007. At the same time, government restrictions on 
religion continue to climb, as does the harassment of most religious 
groups. There are, however, some problems connected with the 
 3 
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term “religious violence”. For one, it might be misunderstood as if 
religion was the primary or even sole force behind violence. Rather, 
roots of confl icts entail other dimensions as well, for instance, pol-
itical, economic or social reasons. Second, the term religious vio-
lence can lead to a problematic legitimation of violence by implying 
that religious violence is always irrational and fanatical and must be 
defeated by secular violence which is in turn rational and controlled 
(Cavanaugh  2004 ). 
 With much of academic and popular attention still focusing 
on the violent sides of religion, scholars such as R. Scott Appleby 
( 2000 ), Marc Gopin ( 2012 ;  2000 ) and Robert Eisen ( 2011 ) have 
emphasized the inherent ambiguity of religion. Religion and vio-
lent confl ict can indeed seem like best friends, but so can religion 
and confl ict resolution or reconciliation. While  Part IV of this book 
engages with the constructive sides of religion in building peace 
and reconciliation,  Part III focuses on how religion can actually 
fuel violence and confl ict. For before we can attempt to engage 
religion for confl ict resolution and peacemaking, we need to under-
stand how religion functions in confl icts with religious dimensions. 
There are diff erent models available that can help us understand 
better the roles of religion in confl ict. We have found the works 
of Owen Frazer, Richard Friedli, and Mark Owen, all academic- 
practitioners connected to policy- making, very helpful as they dif-
ferentiate between diff erent ways of approaching religion within 
confl icts (Frazer and Owen  2018 ; Frazer and Friedli  2015 ). Below, 
we combine their work. 
 RELIGION AND VIOLENCE (BRIEFLY) REVISITED 
 Our study takes into account that “no universally accepted defi n-
ition of religion or faith exists” (Ware, Ware, and Clarke  2016 : 324). 
Rather than engaging in discussions around substantial versus 
functional defi nitions of religion, we proceed from the pragmatic 
premise to understand “religion” as what is described as “religion” 
by interlocutors and communities in a given context (Waardenburg 
 1986 ). As for the analysis of religion in situations of confl ict, Frazer 
and Friedli point us to three factors that shape our understanding 
(Frazer and Friedli  2015 : 9). First, the nature and role of religion in 
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society. Religion has no existence in and of itself but always takes 
shape in a particular time and context. The role religion plays in 
a given confl ict is therefore connected to the role it plays in the 
society in which the confl ict takes place. Second, the relevance of 
diff erent dimensions of religion in a specifi c confl ict. Due to the 
fact that there are many dimensions of religion in a given society, 
their respective infl uence on a confl ict diff ers. Third, the individual 
understanding of religion by the analyst him- or herself. No per-
spective is ever entirely neutral or objective. This holds especially 
true in the fi eld of religion and confl ict. The analyst’s personal view 
on religion is therefore likely to have some infl uence on how the 
role of religion is understood in a certain confl ict. 
 While confl ict itself can be both constructive and destructive, vio-
lence is always destructive. Violence, according to Johan Galtung, 
can manifest at three interrelated levels, namely: the direct, struc-
tural, and cultural levels (Galtung  1990 ). At the direct level, per-
petrator and victim can often be directly identifi ed. Perpetrators 
(and victims), however, have often interiorized violent structures 
that can function as a latent, underlying trigger of personal vio-
lence. Any kind of discrimination, for example, would fall into 
this category of structural violence, as well as the unjust distribu-
tion of resources and opportunities. In order to justify their vio-
lent actions— explicitly or implicitly— perpetrators often resort to 
foundational narratives that are part of the cultural dimension of 
violence. Here, Galtung speaks of “deep culture” ( Tiefenkultur ) that 
provides the legitimation of violence through respective traditions. 
Deep cultures are nourished by cultural memories, by foundational 
narratives and by systems of value. Next to these three factors, 
other aspects that need to be considered include unjust economic 
structures, mass media infl uences, climatic conditions, or psycho-
logical conditions created, for instance, by charismatic leaders. 
Furthermore, attention needs to be given to the roots of violence. 
Here, René Girard’s thoughts on the mimetic nature of violence 
are very helpful. Human confl ict, according to Girard, is rooted in 
desire and rivalry rather than in diff erences of opinion or ideology 
and can easily escalate in a spiral of violence that needs a scapegoat 
in order to be stopped (Girard  2008 ; Hodge, Cowdell, Fleming, and 
Osborn  2018 ). 
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 RELIGION IN CONFLICTS: SIX WAYS TO THINK 
ABOUT ITS ROLE(S) 
 Much of confl ict analysis tends to view religion as either irrele-
vant, and hence neglectable, or too complex to be of any use, thus 
relegating it to the realm of specialists. Neither approach is satis-
factory. The fi rst is blind to a signifi cant factor both in confl ict and 
confl ict resolution. The latter neglects the fact that religion is in 
fact connected to many diff erent dimensions of a given confl ict. 
Gaining a precise understanding of the roles of religion in con-
fl ict is crucial for developing eff ective approaches for confl ict reso-
lution. In order to shed light on the ominous “religious factor” in 
confl ict, Friedli, Frazer, and Owen identify the following six ways 
of thinking about religion in confl ict by way of analyzing diff erent 
case studies. These include understanding religion as community, 
as a set of teachings, as spirituality, as practice, as discourse, and 
as an institution (Frazer and Owen  2018 :  10; Frazer and Friedli 
 2015 : 10). Just like religion in general, each aspect is ambiguous in 
and of itself and can serve as a source of confl ict or as a resource for 
confl ict resolution. These six ways of understanding religion are 
not mutually exclusive, in that any number of them might have an 
impact in any given context. The aspects are fuzzy on the edges, 
meaning that there is some overlap with others. In the following 
sections, we will introduce each aspect, using diff erent examples 
to illustrate the practical implications of it for confl ict analysis and, 
subsequently, confl ict resolution. We also point to helpful questions 
to ask when analyzing the roles of religion in a confl ict (Frazer and 
Friedli  2015 : 28). 
 RELIGION AS COMMUNITY: AUTHORITIES, RELATIONSHIPS,  
AND IDENTITIES 
 According to French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858– 1917), 
religion is “a unifi ed system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred 
things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden— beliefs and 
practices which unite into one single moral community called a 
Church, all those who adhere to them” (Durkheim  1915 : 47). Next 
to other aspects, this defi nition emphasizes the community- building, 
integrative dimension of religion. The structural functionalist school 
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of Durkheim and his followers were interested in the way religion 
serves to create and uphold societal structures and institutions, for 
instance, the family and the state. This includes the legitimation 
of authorities, the respective roles of men and women, as well as 
the sanctions rendered against those who act contrary to these 
structures. In confl ict situations, this community- forming aspect 
of religion can be both divisive and constructive. It can be used 
to forcefully uphold traditional authorities and to suppress deviant 
voices. Yet it can also be a resource for building relationships and 
social cohesion, even beyond group boundaries, and strengthening 
community resilience. 
 Next to religion’s role in constituting authorities and power 
structures, this perspective points to religion’s impact on identity 
formation. Religion is a powerful source for establishing identities, 
both on personal and collective levels. Again, this dimension is 
ambivalent. It can serve to form alliances by connecting people of 
the same religion even across otherwise separating identities, such as 
along ethnic or national lines. Yet by establishing an “us”, religion 
can also create a “them”, thereby engaging in divisive “othering”. 
Many current brands of religio- nationalist identity, such as Hindu 
nationalism in India or Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka, play off  
this powerful dimension of religion. The Northern- Irish confl ict 
(1969– 1998) also centered strongly on religion as community and 
as identity marker. The terms “Protestant” or “Catholic” served 
not only as religious labels, but included social, political, and eco-
nomic aspects, as each group drew its identity to a large extent 
through separating oneself from the perceived “other”. At the 
same time, the peace process benefi tted not least from the cross- 
community relationship and trust building across religious actors 
like the Methodist minister Harold Good and Catholic priest Alec 
Reid, who were selected as the two independent witnesses over-
seeing the decommissioning of IRA arms after the 1998 Good 
Friday Agreement. 
 For the analysis of the role of religion in a confl ict and for cre-
ating possible entry points for confl ict resolution, questions to ask 
include:  Do religious identities serve to divide communities? Is 
there a shared religious identity that could serve to connect people 
across confl ict lines? How can religious actors and institutions build 
relationships between people and reduce tension? 
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 RELIGION AS A SET OF TEACHINGS: CONCEPTS, NORMS, AND VALUES 
 Diff erent from the “functional” perspective on religion apparent 
above, “substantial” views focus on the content of a religion, its set 
of teachings or doctrines. For the Abrahamic religions, their Holy 
Scriptures— the Torah, the Bible, and the Quran— are of crucial 
importance because they are viewed as containing divine revela-
tion. While other religions are less focused on sacred texts, reli-
gious teachings are nevertheless important in most traditions. They 
not only help religious teachings to make sense of life, they also 
often include distinctive norms and values for everyday behavior. 
Through their ethical implications, religions can contribute to a 
shared understanding of norms and laws, thereby increasing social 
cohesion. At the same time, this entails a danger of othering, if, for 
example, the Sharia law is used to create boundaries between “us” 
(the believers) vs. “them” (the unbelievers). 
 Again, religious teachings are ambiguous. They can be used as 
eff ective weapons in inciting violence and confl ict, yet they are 
equally powerful tools for peace and reconciliation. Both reli-
gious peacemakers and religious suicide bombers refer to their 
Holy Scriptures in order to explain their actions. In his study of 
Judaism, Robert Eisen traces major Jewish texts from the Bible to 
modern Zionism and shows how each of these texts can be used for 
teachings on peace and on violence (Eisen  2011 ). With reference to 
the Bible, for example, Eisen sees three sources of ambiguity:
 ambiguity in the semantic meaning of the biblical text, from the smallest 
to the largest units, ambiguity in the relative weight given to particular 
phrases, passages, or concepts within the overall scheme of the Bible; 
and ambiguity regarding the use of historical context to explain violent 
passages. 
 (Eisen  2011 : 64) 
 How these texts are read and understood, Eisen points out, 
depends on the complex interplay between religious traditions and 
forces from the outside such as from politics, society, and economy. 
 At the same time, the interreligious search for common ground 
and shared values, such as peace or justice, has proven a potent tool 
in the reduction of stereotypes and interreligious tensions. The 
Jordan- based initiative “A Common Word Between Us and You”, 
for example, launched a seminal Muslim- Christian dialogue in 2007 
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based on the concepts of loving God and neighbor. This ongoing 
interfaith dialogue project has received positive reactions from 
Christian, Muslim, and Jewish leaders worldwide and continues to 
contribute to interfaith cooperation. 
 Questions to ask in the analysis of religion’s role in a confl ict and 
for seeking ways to transform the confl ict include: How are reli-
gious teachings being used to ignite and justify confl ictive behavior? 
How are they used to promote peace and reconciliation? How are 
religious teachings being used to identify common ground between 
confl ict parties? 
 RELIGION AS SPIRITUALITY: PERSONAL EXPERIENCE, MOTIVATION, 
AND MEANING 
 Spirituality refers to personal experiences of faith and bestows a 
sense of motivation and meaning. Spirituality often plays out in a 
particular lifestyle and in certain ethical choices, individually or as 
part of community life, such as in a religious order, ashram, or Sufi  
circle. In confl ict situations, experiences of spirituality can act as 
a strong motivator, in particular in combination with experiences 
of meaning or purpose. Violent Muslim extremists, for example, 
have justifi ed their attacks with reference to their understanding of 
doing God’s will (Kruglanski et al.  2009 ). Here, the eschatological 
framework of many religions plays a crucial role. The individual 
person sees him- or herself as embedded in a larger framework that 
even extends beyond the boundaries of death and time. One’s own 
individual and fi nite life becomes thereby connected to a bigger 
purpose and meaning. Not only does the spiritual dimension of 
religion serve as a potent motivator for specifi c actions— both 
confl ictive and constructive— common spiritual experiences can 
also help create strong bonds between people, even across lines, 
furthering both in- group and out- group experiences. 
 The activities of the NGO International Center for Religion and 
Diplomacy (ICRD) during the Kashmir confl ict 2000– 2007 provide 
an example of approaching religion in confl ict through the perspec-
tive of religion as spirituality. Working with a confl ict resolution 
framework called “Faith- Based Reconciliation”, ICRD promotes the 
idea that the three Abrahamic religions share the principles of plur-
alism, social justice, forgiveness, and God’s sovereignty (Cox  2007 ). 
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For the Kashmir context, this approach was modifi ed to include 
non- Abrahamic traditions, for example, references to Gandhian non-
violence. In their faith- based reconciliation seminars, ICRD brought 
together next- generation leaders from all strands of Kashmiri society, 
including religion, civil society, business, or media, and from all main 
religious groups. During the seminars, participants not only formed 
relationships across boundaries, but were also invited to participate 
in religious rituals including prayers, reading of religious texts, and 
speaking words of apology and forgiveness. 
 In analyzing the role of religion in a confl ict, the following 
questions help in discerning its spiritual dimension and in creating 
points of entry for confl ict transformation: How are shared spir-
itual experiences used to strengthen exclusive group identities or, 
respectively, to create connections between people? What divisive or 
peace- promoting behavior do actors explain as motivated by their 
spiritual experiences? 
 RELIGION AS PRACTICE: SYMBOLS AND RITUALS 
 It is in practice that religion becomes visible. Dress, food, and cer-
tain forms of behavior, for example, towards the poor, and diff erent 
rituals, are part of religion as practice. Weeks, years, and life cycles 
are being structured by the rhythm of religion. Traditionally, reli-
gion plays a signifi cant role in  rites de passage (Van Gennep  2004 ) 
as it guides through the hazards of life’s transitions. Birth, entering 
adulthood, marriage, and death mark turning points in life. In 
sacralized codes and rituals, religion provides stability, structure, and 
meaning through these perilous passages, thereby re- enacting and 
preserving the socially constructed world. Catholic Christianity, for 
instance, knows of diff erent sacraments throughout the life cycle, 
including baptism, confi rmation, marriage, and the anointment of 
the sick. Furthermore, through the participation in rituals, from 
Sunday service over circumcision to pilgrimages, such as  haddsh , 
social bonds are being formed and strengthened. While relationships 
may be created even beyond boundaries, symbols and rituals can 
also serve to enforce in- group and out- group identities. 
 In the context of confl ict, religion as practice plays out in sev-
eral respects. For one, practices themselves can become matters of 
contestation, thereby fueling confl ict. For example, the relationships 
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between Japan, on the one hand, and China and South Korea, on the 
other, have been repeatedly tried by the visits of Japanese offi  cials 
to the Yasukuni Shrine. This Shinto shrine is dedicated to the 
commemoration of those who died in service of Japan, including 
convicted war criminals. Visits by high- ranking offi  cials are therefore 
perceived and criticized by China and South Korea as displaying a 
problematic view of history on the side of Japan and as belittlement 
of Japan’s war crimes. Other examples of religious practices contrib-
uting to confl ict include the blessing of swords and other weaponry. 
The ritual of  benedictio armorum was performed by the churches and 
enjoyed high popularity in the Middle Ages. Yet religion as practice 
can also yield signifi cant resources for coping with confl ict. Times 
of confl ict are intensely unsettling, during which familiar rituals 
and ceremonies provide much- needed structure and comfort. Even 
more so, they may be used to facilitate helpful rites of passages that 
constructively deal with the past, such as through reconciliation rit-
uals and commemoration ceremonies. Here, traditional rituals may 
be used and adapted, or new rituals may be created as the case study 
of Rwanda shows ( Chapter 9 ). 
 Questions to ask for confl ict analysis and resolution include: What 
practices are sources of division? What practices help to overcome 
barriers and to build relationships? 
 RELIGION AS DISCOURSE: LANGUAGE, POWER,  AND  WELTANSCHAUUNG 
 With the other four ways of approaching religion focusing on one 
specifi c aspect of religion, such as practices, or teachings, religion 
as discourse is the most comprehensive perspective. Discourse in 
this sense refers, initially, to the specifi c vocabularies and languages 
used for communication. In the context of confl ict, this has a two-
fold signifi cance. On the one hand, contestation can refer to the 
acknowledgment of the legitimacy of diff erent interpretations. 
Recent studies point to a correlation between confl ict and allowing 
or not allowing for diff erent meanings of a term (Ochs et al.  2018 ). 
On the other hand, acknowledging diverse interpretations is only 
the fi rst step. Diff erent interpretations can themselves become a 
source of tensions, for instance, when the term “justice” is used in 
diverse ways by various parties. Eff orts in “translations” are needed 
in order to facilitate genuine communication. 
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 Yet religion as discourse goes beyond mere semantics. Michel 
Foucault points us to the fact that discourse is an entire system that 
includes language, but also thought, practices, and ideas. These systems 
are subject to constellations of power and knowledge. Religion as 
discourse thus means the social construction of reality and how it is 
perceived, a whole  Weltanschauung with its own internal logic. Along 
similar lines, George Lindbeck ( 1984 : 33) defi nes religion as “a kind 
of cultural and/ or linguistic framework or medium that shapes the 
entirety of life and thought”. This framework is a dynamic construct 
and set in the context of constant power struggles, both internally 
and externally. By internal power struggles we mean confl icts within 
a religious tradition, for instance, regarding authoritative inter-
pretations of certain norms or Scripture passages. External power 
struggles, on the other hand, point to the fact that religious systems 
are not disconnected from the world, but are always part of larger pol-
itical, economic, and social dynamics. In confl ict situations, tensions 
can revolve around the incommensurability of diff erent discourses. 
This results in communication problems when particular concepts, 
for instance of a secular state separating religion and politics, only 
make sense from within a certain framework. Often, the acceptance 
of certain statements within a discourse depends on those who are 
perceived to speak in authority. Their authority can give legitimacy 
to both confl ictive and constructive language and behavior. Just as 
some Catholic priests condoned and practiced ethnic hatred and 
violence during the genocide in Rwanda, thereby inciting other 
Christians, fi gures like Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu proved 
a powerful example of reconciliation rather than revenge in post- 
apartheid South Africa. 
 Helpful questions when approaching religion as discourse 
include:  What are the diff ering worldviews behind opposing 
discourses? Do problems of interpretation contribute to tensions? 
How can diff erent understandings be translated to facilitate genuine 
dialogue? 
 RELIGION AS AN INSTITUTION: LEADERS, NETWORKS, AND 
SERVICE DELIVERY 
 Religion is institutionalized at diff erent levels, extending from 
the local congregation over regional and national councils to 
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international networks. Religious institutions are engaged in the 
delivery of a variety of services, including worship, education, and 
health. Through their leaders, religion receives visibility and a “face” 
(for instance, Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran and Archbishop Emeritus 
Desmond Tutu in South Africa). By means of their leadership and 
the hierarchy they represent, religious institutions can be powerful 
agents for both confl ict and confl ict resolution. Recent confl ict 
analysis has found the intermediate level of leadership particularly 
infl uential as it connects to both the grassroot level and higher 
authorities. At the same time, religious leadership is still mostly 
dominated by older men, while women are at times systematically 
excluded. The Buddhist Sangha in Thailand, for instance, refuses to 
accept women’s ordination. The same holds true for the Catholic 
Church, some Protestant denominations, and many Muslim and 
Jewish congregations. 
 In terms of confl ict resolution, religious institutions can be helpful 
for creating a platform for advocacy and raising awareness. Due to 
their local, regional, and even international links, they can often-
times access fi nancial, logistical, and human resources. For external 
parties, such as UN peacekeeping forces, religious institutions can 
become valuable contacts with insider knowledge of the con-
text, the confl ict, and its religious dimensions. With their infl u-
ence and mobilization powers, religious institutions can provide 
important support to peace processes. The Inter- Religious Council 
of Sierra Leone (IRCSL) is an example of approaching the insti-
tutional dimension of religion in the transformation of a confl ict. 
In 1991, civil war erupted between the government and the rebel 
group RUF (Revolutionary United Front). In 1997, nine Muslim 
and 19 Christian leaders formed the IRCSL to advocate for dia-
logue and the end of violence. Through their joint commitment, 
they managed to rally public support for peace, thus pressuring both 
the government and the rebels to end the confl ict. Their eff ort 
contributed signifi cantly to the Lomé Peace Accords of 1999. 
 Questions to approach religion as an institution in confl ict ana-
lysis include: In what ways are religious institutions part of the con-
fl ict? Which engagements are divisive, and which promote peace? 
 In this chapter, we focused on the confl ictive dimensions of reli-
gion and asked: Did religion do it? By ways of unpacking the com-
plexities of “religious violence”, we discussed six diff erent ways of 
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approaching religion in confl icts: religion as community, as a set of 
teachings, as spirituality, as practice, as discourse, and as an institution. 
This orientation will be followed by three case studies, spelling out 
the concrete implications of religion in diff erent confl icts, namely, 
in Israel, Rwanda, and Pakistan. 
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 JEWISH PERSPECTIVE 
 RELIGION IN ISRAEL’S LAND 
RIGHTS CONFLICTS  
 Pauline Kollontai 
 INTRODUCTION 
 On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly 
voted to partition Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state. While 
the Jewish community agreed to the proposed partition and alloca-
tion of territory, the Palestinian Arabs did not, calling the UN dec-
laration of the State of Israel “al- Nakba”, the catastrophe. Despite 
the non- agreement of the Palestinian Arabs the establishment of 
the State of Israel took place in May 1948. Israel is identifi ed as 
being both Jewish and democratic in its Founding Declaration of 
Establishment. The Declaration states that Jews have a historical 
right to this land because it was “the birthplace of the Jewish people 
where their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped” 
(Ben- Gurion  1948 : 1). The values of justice, freedom, and peace 
are identifi ed in the Declaration as being rooted in the traditions of 
the Hebrew Prophets and a commitment is given to practicing these 
through social, political, and religious rights for all citizens of Israel. 
 This case study discusses the role of the Jewish tradition in the 
ongoing tensions and violence in Israel’s confl ict over territory 
as evidenced internally in the Negev concerning Bedouin land 
rights and externally with Palestinian territory. The discussion 
here will draw on aspects derived from Frazer, Friedli, and Owen’s 
 4 
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understanding of the role of religion in confl ict and reconciliation 
which we outlined earlier in this book (Frazer and Friedli  2015 ; 
Frazer and Owen  2018 , cf. Chapter 3). 
 ORIGINS AND CONTEXT OF THE WAR OVER LAND 
 The dominant issue in Israel’s existence since 1948 has been land 
with the Palestinians. By 1949 Israel had already expanded unlaw-
fully into Palestinian territory during the War of Independence 
(1947– 1949) with Palestinian Arabs and Arabs from neighboring 
countries. Over 6,000 Israelis were killed and 15,000 wounded 
(IMFA n.d.: 1). By the time of the armistice in 1949, the Israelis had 
extended their territory at the cost of 750,000 Palestinians who fl ed 
or were forcibly driven from their homes (UNCCP  1950 ). Over 
5,000 Arab combatants died (this included 3,700 Arabs from out-
side Palestine) and over 11,000 Palestinian civilians were missing or 
presumed dead (Morris  2008 : 404– 406). The taking of more land 
by Israel from Syria, Jordan and Egypt occurred during the Six- Day 
War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1972). Israel has continued 
to control and/ or occupy parts of the Palestinian territories, which 
has included the building of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. 
Palestinian response to the ongoing situation is seen through the 
fi rst and second intifadas and the use of suicide bombers. 
 Other expressions of the land struggle are evident through Israel’s 
border controls, checkpoints, and the building of the West Bank 
Wall. At a total length of 440 miles there are points where it has 
cut over 11 miles into the West Bank, thereby violating the United 
Nations “Green Line” agreed in the original signing of the reso-
lution of the State of Israel in 1947. The incursion of the wall into 
Palestinian territory has aff ected over 25,000 Palestinians either 
by fi nding themselves now living in Israel or sometimes fi nding 
parts of their property or land split between Palestine and Israel 
(UN OCHA  2011 ). Building on the wall commenced in June 
2002 and was announced as one of Israel’s security and defense 
measures against Palestinian suicide bombers whose acts by 2002 
had killed 553 people and injured 645 people. The majority of 
the dead or injured were Israeli citizens and not military or police 
personnel. Given the reality of the consequences of the acts of sui-
cide bombings there was an urgent need for Israel to fi nd a way to 
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try and end these attacks. The solution was to build the wall. But 
building this wall has only provided part of the solution— it has 
signifi cantly reduced the number of suicide bombing attacks since 
2003. But it has not addressed the central issue for the Palestinians 
of having their own independent state. The wall reinforces fear, sus-
picion, and hatred on both sides. 
 The other main land confl ict in Israel is with the Negev Bedouin 
who are Israeli citizens. The majority of Bedouin in Israel who live 
in the Negev are from tribes who in the 18th and 19th centuries 
came from the Arabian Peninsula. In 1947 about 65,000– 90,000 
Bedouins lived in the Negev under British rule (Marx  1967 :  3). 
Following the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, 
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) took most of the Negev from the 
Egyptians between October and December 1948. During this time, 
most of the Bedouin left the Negev, large numbers of them moving 
to Sinai, the Hebron mountains, or areas around the Dead Sea. By 
1953 around 11,000 Bedouin lived in the Negev and were under 
Military Administration until 1966. As the troubles subsided, some 
Bedouin returned to the area where either they were allowed to stay 
and live in the eastern plain of Be’er Sheva or they were expelled by 
the Military Administration. The 1960 census shows that the number 
of Bedouin in the Negev had risen slightly to 16,000 and that 6,700 
were living in Galilee (Marx  1967 : 3). The use of a military adminis-
tration after the cessation of these initial hostilities in the Negev had 
a serious impact on the experience of those Bedouins who returned. 
The ongoing Israeli policy is to reject the majority of Bedouin land 
claims; instead Bedouin have to rent their land from the state. There 
are also two categories assigned to Bedouin villages— recognized and 
unrecognized villages. For those Bedouin who refuse to recognize 
the state as the owners of their ancestral lands and continue to live 
in “unrecognized villages”, the state continues to off er them alter-
native land to live on so that the state can use their existing land 
for other purposes. Continuing refusal to move usually results in 
the bulldozing down of Bedouin homes and property. During the 
1960s and 1970s some Bedouin were moved to government- built 
towns as part of Israel’s urbanization and resettlement strategy of 
the Negev Bedouin. But these towns have not been that successful 
in integrating Bedouin into Israeli society and providing equality 
of access to social and public services. Instead, they have to some 
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extent ghettoized Bedouin into enclaves where they continue to be 
separated from their Jewish neighbors and have been neglected in 
terms of infrastructure and services and have high unemployment 
and crime rates (Swirski and Hasson  2006 : 87). 
 The confl ict over Bedouin land is part of a wider government 
agenda to “Judaise” the Negev. The vision of Judaising the Negev 
to the extent planned has been greatly encouraged and supported 
in Haredi and Orthodox Jewish communities throughout Israel. 
The Negev Bedouin are considered by many Israelis as a barrier to 
realizing this vision. There is a twofold approach which the Israeli 
state has employed since the late 1950s. First, to assimilate Bedouin 
into types of citizens acceptable to the Israeli state which requires 
a diminishing of their religious, ethnic, and cultural identities and 
practices. A tool to try and achieve this has been by state funding for 
targeted economic and welfare investment for individuals, families, 
and communities who show compliance with the state’s agenda. 
Second, Bedouin who continue to challenge the state on land rights 
usually face a lack of state resources in terms of social infrastructure 
regarding their living environment and also in educational, welfare, 
and health provision. 
 RELIGION AS COMMUNITY: IDENTITY, AUTHORITIES, 
AND RELATIONSHIPS 
 According to context and interaction with other identity- forming 
elements (language, ethnicity, politics, and culture), religious belief 
systems “can have a particular identity- forming potential. Religion 
tells you where you belong, what to believe and where to proceed” 
(Harpviken and Roislien  2005 : 9). Religion is social in character, 
off ering the individual a sense of belonging to a community of 
believers who share beliefs, rituals, and places of historical and reli-
gious importance and relevance in contemporary life and experi-
ence. An example of a place combining religious and historical 
importance is Masada in Southern Israel, the site of the Jews’ last 
stand against the Romans after the fall of Jerusalem in 70  CE . The 
events at Masada are described “as a pivotal moment in Jewish his-
tory – one of perseverance, bravery and commitment … [Masada] 
became a symbol of courage for the young modern Jewish state as 
it … struggled for survival” (Rosenbaum  2019 : 1). The memory 
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and signifi cance of Masada continues to be invoked in the context 
of Israel’s survival today with the most recent project “Inscribing 
the Jewish Future on Masada”, set up by the American branch of 
the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and fully supported by the Israeli 
government. This new initiative builds on a project started in 2008 
which enabled a Torah scribe to be present on a daily basis in the 
rebuilt Geniza room, part of the ancient Masada synagogue, where 
visitors had the opportunity to watch him at work. In 2019 this 
project continues to enable visitors to watch the scribe at work 
and now they can pay for one letter, a word, a sentence, a verse, 
a section, or even a whole Torah. In return they are given a cer-
tifi cate confi rming that they have contributed to the writing of a 
Torah scroll. Completed scrolls are dedicated and donated to those 
Jewish communities in Israel, such as the Kibbutz Kerem Shalom 
near the Gaza border, which in recent years have been hit by rockets 
fi red by Hamas. Attending the Torah dedication ceremony at the 
kibbutz was a member of JNF’s National Community Campaign 
James Riola, who said,
 I looked around the kibbutz and within 100 feet of where we were 
standing was a 30- foot wall. It struck me that on the other side of the 
wall there was such violence, but on this side of the wall where we had 
the Torah, everyone was so happy and excited. 
 (Rosenbaum  2019 : 1) 
 Religion can serve as a link with nationhood and can provide 
non- religious events of the state with a sense of transcendence as 
seen with the example of the annual Founding of the State of Israel 
celebrations. Religion can nurture and sustain nationalism, which 
in its more negative expression can dehumanize, expel, or destroy 
those considered as “outsiders” within a nation- state. Religion, to 
varying degrees and in various historical contexts, is from time to 
time a conduit for characteristics of tribalism. Religious identity 
can be on a variant between inclusive and exclusive. Judaism ini-
tially emerges with a model of God that is tribal in the way He 
chooses His people, the Israelites, and makes them into a nation 
through violence and war towards other peoples, whether justifi -
able or not. Religion, which expresses the concept and values of 
tribalism and exclusivism, diminishes the possibility of social trust, 
cohesion, and collective solidarity, and can lead to violation of 
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the Golden Rule principle which is intended to facilitate respect, 
empathy, and unity amongst people in diverse contexts. Since its 
founding in 1948, there is evidence to show the ongoing negative 
infl uence of the Haredi and Orthodox Jewish communities in the 
Israeli body politics’ approach to confl ict between Jews and non- 
Jews in Israel, and with the Palestinians in the Israeli controlled 
territories of Palestine. 
 RELIGION AS A SET OF TEACHINGS AND 
PRACTICE: TRIBAL GOD, LAND, AND VIOLENCE 
 Religion can provide a system of meaning and a framework for 
action. It constitutes a normative system which, “when accepted, 
serves as a directive for how each individual believer should live 
their life” through following the laws, command, and teachings of 
a divine transcendent being (Harpviken and Roislen  2005 : 8). The 
cognitive aspect of this normative system is that it can shape the 
individuals’ world views, which are then further shaped by aspects 
and experiences of their social contexts, both past and present. The 
degree to which the religious system of meaning is closed or open 
will aff ect the individual’s understanding and response to situations 
of diversity, diff erence, and potential for survival. In the case of Israel 
and its establishment in the aftermath of the Holocaust, religion 
and culture is shaped in the context of Jewish survival, security, and 
continuity. The issue of land is essential to all three of these. The 
importance of land in the Israeli Jewish public consciousness, espe-
cially Haredi and Orthodox Jews, is found in the concept of “a 
promised land” given by God to his people following their exodus 
and liberation from slavery in Egypt during biblical times. Having a 
land of one’s own provides more likelihood of peace and freedom, 
of being safe and secure. But as the Jewish scriptures show, this was 
not always the case, as foreign armies attacked Israel at various times, 
sometimes exiling the Israelites or occupying their land. In turn, 
Israel also engaged in campaigns to extend its territory by taking 
land from other people. God’s gift of a promised land to Israel was 
already the land of other people, the Canaanites. 
 The historical narrative of the land as being God- given to the 
Jewish people has led to a growth in religious violence carried out 
by Jewish extremist groups, typically made up of youth from the 
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Haredi and Orthodox communities in Israel, since 2010 (BDHRL 
 2011 ). These groups see nothing wrong in committing violence 
most certainly towards non- Jewish Israeli citizens, but also some-
times against Jews not considered truly Jews (Reform and Liberal), 
and on other occasions against Israeli soldiers for being “too soft” 
on Israel’s non- Jewish population and Palestinians in the Palestinian 
Territories, “It is legitimized, motivated, and guided by a religious 
code. It draws, in a powerful way, the boundaries between them 
and the ‘others’ ” (Nachman  2010 :  174). The key issue driving 
their violence is the belief that Israel is the land which God gave 
to his chosen people and not to anyone else. Their theological 
understanding of the Promised Land has fused with a form of Israeli 
nationalism which is exclusivist as regards the Jewish right to the 
land of Israel. Of course, the use of violence by some Jews based 
on their understanding of Jewish teaching is not a new invention 
and some of the Israeli Jewish leadership either promote or ignore 
their members’ acts of religious violence. Indeed, some religious 
leaders actively promote religious violence. One example is Rabbi 
Yosef Elitzur Fein, a rabbi in a West Bank settlement, who posted 
social media advocating incitement to violence against Palestinians 
and Israeli soldiers and is also co- author of a controversial book,  The 
King’s Torah , that attempts to provide religious justifi cation for the 
killing of non- Jews. Eventually, in December 2016, an Israeli court 
sentenced him to fi ve months’ community service for the social 
media posts calling for violent acts against Palestinians and Israeli 
soldiers (BDHRL 2017: 43). Another example of this extremism 
is of “Price tag” attacks, also known as “Mutual Responsibility”, 
which are acts of vandalism carried out by Jewish fundamentalist 
settler youths against the property of Palestinians, Christians, and 
left- wing Israeli Jews. 
 Enforcing Jewish ownership of land is refl ected in the recent 
adoption of the Nation State Law by Israel’s parliament in July 
2018. In this new law Israel is defi ned and proclaimed, yet again, 
as the historic homeland and nation- state of the Jewish people, 
declaring that only Jews have the right to self- determination there. 
Hebrew has been declared as the offi  cial language of Israel and 
Arabic now has a special status; the use of Arabic in state institutions 
will be regulated by law. The adoption of the law has been met 
with criticism from across the world and within Israel on grounds 
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that it legalizes forms of discrimination, racism, and segregation. 
But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reinforced what Israel is 
and what it is not in a public statement on March 11, 2019, ahead 
of the forthcoming elections in April, Israel is “the national state, 
not of all its citizens, but only of the Jewish people” (Chappell and 
Estrin  2019 : 1). 
 RELIGION AS INSTITUTION AND DISCOURSE: 
RELIGION- STATE RELATIONSHIP, LEADERS, AND   
THE DEMOCRACY FACTOR 
 The relationship between religion and state in Israel is “Neither 
separation of religion and state nor total integration” (Liebman 
and Don- Yehiya 1984:  29). Religious belief systems in Israel, 
especially that of Haredi and Orthodox Judaism through reli-
gious political parties, continue to play a signifi cant role in 
shaping the identity of Israel as a Jewish state and maintaining 
and safeguarding the Jewish right to land as given in biblical texts. 
The Jewish identity of the Israeli state, in terms of it being under-
stood as rooted in biblical times, is visible in Israel’s body politic 
and its institutions through numerous symbols. One example is 
the name “Knesset” for Israel’s legislative body, “it was chosen 
for its connection to  Haknesset Hagdolah’ (Great Assembly), 
established in the fi fth century BCE upon the return of the Jews 
from their exile in Babylon” (Mazie  2006 : 29). A more explicit 
and powerful symbolic link is the image of the  Magen David (Star 
of David) on Israel’s national fl ag, part of Jewish religious iden-
tity, which represents the suff ering and hope of Jews worldwide 
throughout the ages. A further example of the nature of the char-
acter of the religion– state relationship is evidenced through the 
legal status and fi nancial support which the chief rabbinate and 
religious councils receive directly from the state and  Beth Dins 
(Orthodox Jewish Religious Courts) have sole responsibility over 
matters of personal status and family law. This same legal status 
and fi nancial support are not given to the other two religions in 
Israel— Christianity and Islam. 
 A key issue in Israeli public discourse concerns the compatibility 
of the traditional Jewish law ( Halakhic ), which is central to the dom-
inant form of Judaism practiced in Israel, with that of democracy. 
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One dominant view is that traditional  Halakhic Judaism is anti- 
democratic because of its theocratic nature, “The Jewish religion is 
not democratic, just as no religion is democratic in the modern lib-
eral sense of the term” (Neuberger  1997 : 19). Certainly, this argu-
ment appears plausible when applied to those various expressions 
of religions that promote total adherence in contemporary life to 
sacred teachings from centuries past, elements of which may be 
considered to infringe and violate contemporary approaches to 
rights and equality. However, over the centuries reform has taken 
place in Jewish understanding, interpretation, and practice of aspects 
of sacred teachings for the modern world. This is a key character 
of Reform and Liberal Judaism. These communities in Israel have 
little infl uence in the day- to- day running of the state and its deci-
sion making, not just because they are numerically much smaller 
compared to the Haredi and Orthodox communities, but because 
they do not have the same level of political representation through 
political parties. While the dominant views of the Israeli Haredi 
and Orthodox communities continue to advocate no giving back 
of any land to Palestinians and Negev Bedouin, and instead to con-
tinue the expansion of Jewish settlements in Palestinian territory, 
the dominant view of the Reform and Liberal communities is the 
opposite. Perhaps a more nuanced view in the discussion of the 
compatibility of Judaism and liberal democracy is that there are 
elements in the religio- cultural legacy of Israel (Novak  2012 : 6). 
This legacy is described as “particularly rich in ideas and ideals 
which could constitute an ideological value infrastructure for the 
development of democracy” (Langer  1987 : 402). But the question 
remains about whether traditional Jewish  Halakha , as adhered to 
by the Haredi and Orthodox Jewish leadership, is able to actually 
“come to grips” with modern liberal democracy and concepts of 
the modern age. A  response to this question will be key to the 
second part of this case study in the next chapter. By looking at 
the work of two Israeli Jewish organizations, the aim is to show 
that there are two key aspects present in traditional Jewish teaching 
which have the potential to relate to particular elements of the 
democratic model: (1) Human beings are created in the image of 
God and are therefore entitled to equality, and (2)  Halakha is based 
on duties and responsibilities of each human being in terms of 
seeking justice (Falk  1996 : 65). 
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 CONCLUSION 
 The establishment of Israel in 1948 was fraught with diffi  culties 
from the outset because this Jewish homeland was created by taking 
land of which over half of the territory was populated by Arabs, 
Bedouin, and Palestinians for centuries. The discussion here of reli-
gion as community, an institution in relation to the state, and as a 
set of teachings and action informs us about the role which reli-
gion continues to play in promoting and sustaining the Israeli con-
fl ict over land. However, it is important to note that this is due to 
certain expressions of the Jewish tradition (Haredi and Orthodox) 
having signifi cant infl uence on most Israeli governments since 
1948. As will be discussed in the second half of this case study in 
the next chapter, there is within the Jewish legacy the potential to 
promote a world view that can contribute to resolving the confl ict 
over land in Israel. 
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 CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 
 RELIGION IN PRE- GENOCIDE 
AND GENOCIDE RWANDA  
 Christine Schliesser 
 CHRISTIAN CHURCHES: ACCOMPLICES IN 
GENOCIDE? 
 When the genocide scorched Rwanda in 1994, killing up to one 
million people in its wake, it was seen not only as the culmination of 
a civil war raging since 1990, but of decades of ethnic mass violence. 
Since Rwanda’s independence in 1962, repeated massacres between 
the Tutsi minority of the country (about 15 percent) and the Hutu 
majority had left hundreds of thousands of people dead. In the 
genocide, while most victims were Tutsi, countless moderate Hutu 
who refused to participate in the bloodbath were murdered as well. 
Diff erent from previous eruptions of violence, this time the churches 
no longer functioned as sanctuaries. Instead, they became morgues. 
More people were killed in churches and parishes than anywhere 
else. Combined with the fact that over 90 percent of the Rwandan 
population consider themselves Christians, this begs the question 
of what role religion— and more concretely: Christianity— played 
before and during the genocide. Up to this day, the involvement of 
the churches remains controversial as the questions surrounding a 
“complicity of the Churches” (Rittner, Roth, and Whitworth  2004 ) 
have not yet been fully answered. Complicity in the genocide goes 
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beyond wielding a machete or denouncing refugees. Complicity 
also involves creating and sustaining the conditions in which the 
genocide could occur. In order to get a better understanding of 
the “religious factor” in the Rwandan genocide, I will use the six- 
dimensional model outlined in  Chapter 3 in order to approach reli-
gion in this confl ict (Frazer and Owen  2018 ; Frazer and Friedli 
 2015 ). Of the six dimensions of religion, four feature prominently 
in the context of Rwanda, namely: religion as community, as a set 
of teachings, as discourse, and as an institution. 
 RELIGION AS COMMUNITY: RELIGIOUS VS. ETHNIC 
IDENTITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS 
 Diff erent from other ethno- religious confl icts, for instance, in 
Northern Nigeria or Sri Lanka where varying religious traditions are 
a major factor, the genocide in Rwanda took place within one and 
the same religious community. Christians were killing Christians. 
Divisions were not even along denominational lines such as in 
the Northern Ireland confl ict between Protestants and Catholics. 
Rather, people of the same faith traditions, even from within the 
same local church congregation, murdered each other. The divider 
aspect of religion as community that encourages thinking in terms 
of “us” vs. “them” along religious lines therefore does not seem to 
pertain to the Rwandan situation. Nor does the connecting aspect 
that rests on the assumption that religious communities create a 
strong communal identity, transcending other divisive factors such 
as ethnicity. Instead, it appears that in Rwanda identity was viewed 
in terms of ethnicity rather than religion. Here, one needs to keep 
in mind that the terms “Hutu”, “Tutsi”, and “Twa” (a small minority 
of ca. 1 percent) are not conventional ethnic descriptions. Rather, 
they were used to denote professions and/ or wealth. Whoever 
owned more than ten cattle was considered a herdsman or Tutsi. 
Whoever had less was a Hutu, a farmer. Twa were traditionally 
potters (Bataringaya  2012 : 22). It was only the colonial powers— fi rst 
Germany, then Belgium after World War I— who cemented these 
diff erences into ethnic categories through their strategy of divide- 
and- rule. Notwithstanding the historical responsibility of Europe 
for the ethnic- political confl icts in Africa, Rwanda seems to prove 
that the blood of ethnicity is thicker than the water of baptism. In 
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marked contrast, the small Muslim community in Rwanda was not 
drawn into the genocide as their shared Muslim identity transcended 
the Hutu- Tutsi distinction (Prunier  1995 : 253). 
 Yet despite the apparent prominence of ethnicity, the nexus 
of religion, community and Christian identity is more complex. 
Religious identity was recreated on a diff erent level as ethnic 
identities became sacralized into pseudo- religious identities. The 
most powerful religious player in pre- genocide Rwanda, the 
Catholic Church, endorsed the state’s unjust ethnic policies. Their 
mission strategy rested largely on ethnicity as they targeted the 
elite for conversion, fi rst, favoring Tutsi, then Hutu. Ethnicity thus 
became enmeshed with religion, it became religiously charged and 
turned into a sacralized ethnic identity, grotesquely illuminated 
by génocidaires taking daily communion during the genocide to 
strengthen themselves for their “work”. 
 The work of René Girard on religion and violence helps to 
illuminate the nexus of religion, communities, identities, and 
relationships. According to Girard, human relations are based on 
reciprocity; we live in “mimetic” relationships. The reason for this 
is desire. Human confl ict in turn is therefore not so much about 
diff erences, such as in ideology, religion or ethnicity, but about 
rivalry (Girard  1998 : 132). Given humans’ inclination for desire and 
competition and the mimetic nature of our relationships, mimetic 
rivalry can quickly turn into a spiral of increasing hostility and 
violence. Small misgivings are retaliated by bigger off enses and so 
on. Archaic communities, Girard points out, had a sacred built- in 
braking mechanism in the mimetic spiral.
 When you have that mimetic violence, there comes a point when you 
forget about the object and you concentrate on your opponent … 
and there is a tendency for the system to simplify itself … until finally 
everyone polarizes against a single enemy who seems responsible for 
the whole crisis. 
 (Girard  1998 : 133) 
 This single enemy is the scapegoat. The escalating violence can be 
brought only to a halt once the scapegoat is killed, thus mirroring 
the sacred ritual of the Old Testament scapegoat killed for the sake 
of the people. In this ritual, the scapegoat becomes both victim and 
sacrifi ce. 
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 This quick overview already reveals its pertinence for the 
Rwandan context. The deliberate creation of fi xed ethnic bound-
aries combined with decades of colonial policies of favor and disfavor 
had intensifi ed ethnic rivalries, off setting a spiral of violence with 
repeated massacres. From this perspective, artifi cially constructed 
diff erences in terms of ethnicity are therefore just the façade for the 
problem underneath, namely rivalry. Rivalry in Rwanda has many 
faces, ranging from a feeling of inferiority on the side of the group 
in disfavor with the colonial powers over an unjust quota system 
in education to the scarcity of natural resources such as land. In a 
context of ingrained cultural violence (see below: Religion as a set 
of teachings: problematic theology) and structural violence by the 
colonial powers, the step to direct violence is a small one indeed. 
Once the spiral of mimetic violence had escalated, the system’s ten-
dency for self- simplifi cation started showing and the need for a 
victim- sacrifi ce arose. Killing the scapegoat— the Tutsi— bestowed 
a sense of sacralization to both the scapegoat and the killers. While 
Girard’s theory must not be overstretched in the eff ort to understand 
the nature of violence in Rwanda, it helps to shed light on cer-
tain aspects, such as the role of mimetic relationships and the sacred 
ritual of killing a scapegoat. Rather than exposing and confronting 
the underlying rivalry between Hutu and Tutsi and the escalation 
of violence, the churches supported the existing ethnic divisions. It 
is “by making ethnic violence understandable and acceptable to the 
population … [that] Churches helped to make genocide possible” 
(Longman  2001 : 166). 
 RELIGION AS A SET OF TEACHINGS: PROBLEMATIC 
THEOLOGY 
 Approaching religion as a set of teachings in pre- genocide and 
genocide Rwanda provides another helpful angle for understanding 
the role of religion in this context. From the Christian message 
with its core concepts of love and mercy, how could such atrocious 
acts of hatred spring forth? One line of thought tries to explain 
this paradox in terms of a superfi cial faith. From this perspective, 
the mass conversions to Catholic Christianity following the bap-
tism of Rwanda’s King Mutara III Rudahigwa in 1943 were seen as 
guided mainly by strategic purposes, rather than denoting a genuine 
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transformation of hearts and minds. While this argument might 
hold a certain validity, it does not take that into account which 
appears to be at the core of the paradox: theology itself. 
 The theological teachings disseminated by both the early mis-
sionaries and later the institutionalized churches emphasized 
respect for authorities, not least for the hierarchy of the Church, 
and obedience to the state. Furthermore, the Christian religion was 
portrayed as a spiritual, inner aff air with no bearing on public life. 
“Christian identity was socially and politically irrelevant” (Carney 
 2014 : 119). In the aftermath of World Wars I  and II, eschatology 
fi gured prominently in the churches’ teachings. Believers were told 
to look to their rewards in heaven, rather than being burdened by 
the life in this world (Munyaneza  2001 :  64). This- worldly issues 
such as poverty, injustice, and violence were not to be concerns 
of the Christian, but better left to politicians. While obedience to 
authority is indeed one aspect of the Christian Scripture (such as 
in Romans 13), the teachings of the churches neglected other cru-
cial aspects such as active love for the neighbor (as illustrated by the 
Parable of the Good Samaritan in Luke 10:25– 37) that extends even 
to one’s enemy (Matthew 5:44). 
 Rwandan converts hardly learned about important Christian 
concepts such as responsibility, freedom, and the prophetic witness 
of speaking truth to power. Even as massacres of Tutsi were taking 
place throughout the country during the Civil War 1990– 1993, 
the church leaders mostly failed to name or condemn them. For 
instance, in their Easter message of March 1991, the Catholic bishops 
preached on the love of enemies, yet failed to address the massacre 
of Tutsi at Ruhengeri in the previous month. And even when the 
massacres were mentioned, blame was allocated to Hutu or Tutsi 
rather than the government. Chained to a highly dubious theo-
logical justifi cation of loyalty to ecclesiastical hierarchy and state 
power, Christian- based social justice remained a thin concept, even 
as younger priests tried to carry some of the atmosphere of change 
of the Second Vatican Council into the Rwandan context. Though 
there were notable exceptions, one needs to conclude that by failing 
to speak out against ethnicity- based injustices— ranging from dis-
crimination over exclusion to murder— and by failing to condemn 
state instigated hatred, the churches gave the impression that they 
condoned the expanding violence against the Tutsi as in line with 
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Christian belief. “The churches, thus, not only failed to provide 
an obstacle along the path towards genocide but actually helped 
to create a moral climate where genocide was possible” (Longman 
 2010 : 162f.). 
 RELIGION AS DISCOURSE: LANGUAGE, CULTURAL 
MYTHS, AND  WELTANSCHAUUNG 
 Religion as discourse is yet another fruitful lens to employ. 
Approaching religion through discourse means, fi rst of all, taking 
a closer look at language. Drawing on pseudo- theological notions 
of duty and loyalty to authorities, Christian language was often 
instrumentalized for political purposes. For example, after the Tutsi 
RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front) Army had invaded Rwanda from 
the North in 1990, sparking the civil war that culminated in the 
1994 genocide, the religious language of Christian unity and duty 
was invoked to appeal for national unity and the obligation to 
serve one’s country. On October 12, 1990, Vincent Nsengiyumva, 
Archbishop of Kigali and member of the central committee of 
the ruling party until 1990, reminded Catholics of their “duty 
of protecting the country against all peril and against all menace, 
from wherever it comes— from the interior or the exterior” (cited 
in Carney  2014 :  197). Jean- Pierre Karegeye thus rightly points 
to the “strong interaction in political and religious speeches [that] 
facilitated the way to genocide” (Karegeye  2011 : 97). 
 Yet religion as discourse goes beyond language as a system for 
communication and extends to a cultural and linguistic frame-
work that molds the entire life. For a better understanding of how 
mentalities on religion and violence developed in the context of 
Rwanda, we need to go back to pre- colonial times. Long before 
the arrival of Christianity at the turn of the 20th century, reli-
gion was already an integral part of Rwandan life. The spiritual 
world, inhabited by a heavenly Being called Imana and other spirits, 
was believed to have a direct infl uence on the living. Participation 
in diff erent cults, such as that of Lyangombe or Nyabingi, off ered 
access to spiritual powers. Like other parts of Rwandan oral his-
tory, these cults were vibrant with violent images, stories, and ini-
tiation rites. Forming the cultural and linguistic background, “the 
stories told and learnt by heart, orally and transmitted, were full 
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of violent images … and the banalization of violence and death” 
(Munyaneza  2001 : 58). Christianity failed to address this cultural 
heritage of violence. Not only did Christianity not challenge it, but 
contributed to reinforcing latent violence, for instance, by using 
Kinyarwanda words associated with violence in the translation of 
the Bible and hymns. God and Jesus Christ, for example, are called 
 umutabazi (savior/ liberator). In Rwandan oral history and cultural 
myths, however, this term is inseparably connected to the glorifi -
cation of violence as it refers to quasi- mythical heroes who were 
sacrifi ced for their people. 
 Rwandan traditional  Weltanschauung was further characterized by 
the belief in predetermination and fatalism. The experience of mis-
fortune or violence was met with resignation as the expression of 
Imana’s will or as the result of angry spirits one had failed to pacify. 
This thinking aligned itself only too easily with Christian ideas of 
predetermination. At times, biblical narratives were employed to 
justify ethnic diff erences. “Especially the Book of Genesis was used 
to prove that  Abatutsi pastoralists were like Abel, and  Abahutu like 
Cain who was agriculturist and who fell in disgrace and therefore 
was cursed” (Munyaneza  2001 : 64). Instead of addressing and crit-
ically examining the violence latent in Rwandan history and cul-
tural myths, the churches ignored or worse, contributed to cultural 
violence. This failure on the side of the churches helped to sustain 
conditions in which violence and injustice could be understood as 
preordained and therefore inevitable, making the struggle against it 
seem pointless. 
 RELIGION AS AN INSTITUTION: CHURCH- STATE 
RELATIONS, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HEGEMONY, 
AND POWER STRUGGLES 
 In order to better understand the role of religion in creating the 
conditions for genocide to occur, we also need to look at religion as 
an institution. Here, the following three aspects come into view: a 
church- state relationship that lacked critical distance, the construc-
tion of hegemony, and power struggles within the Church. Given 
the prominence of the Catholic Church in pre- genocide Rwanda, 
we will be looking at this church in particular. In 1900, the so- called 
White Fathers, a French Catholic Missionary Order, were the fi rst 
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Christian missionaries entering Rwanda. The White Fathers aimed 
to convert the elites fi rst, hoping that the masses would follow. 
Since the native king, Yuhi V Musinga, was a Tutsi, the missionaries 
focused on the Tutsi. When after World War I Belgium succeeded 
Germany as the colonial power, the new colonial rulers relied on 
the White Fathers for their cultural experience as they implemented 
a policy favoring Tutsi over Hutu. Tensions between the two groups 
intensifi ed when the Belgian authorities issued identity cards that 
cemented ethnic affi  liation, making race the central identity marker. 
Throughout their rule, colonial authorities collaborated closely with 
the Catholic Church. When King Musinga resisted conversion, his 
son Mutara III Rudahigwa, a devout Catholic, was implemented as 
his successor. “There was a perfect relationship between Church 
and State” (Van’t Spijker  1997 : 241). 
 Increasingly, it became apparent that church affi  liation was a 
way to achieve political power and the masses followed when their 
king was baptized in 1943. Even after Rwanda’s independence in 
1962, the Catholic Church continued to grow, until 65 percent of 
the population were members of the Catholic Church. Examples 
like the already mentioned Vincent Nsengiyumva, who was both 
Archbishop of Kigali and a member of the central committee of 
the ruling party until the Vatican forced him to resign from all 
political posts, illustrate the close ties between the state and the 
Church. While too much distance between Church and state can 
result in a church that is disengaged and disinterested in worldly 
aff airs, too little distance can result in a lack of critical prophetic 
witness on the side of the church. The latter was clearly the case in 
Rwanda. Even during the civil war and genocide, offi  cial Church 
statements would shy away from criticizing the government openly, 
thus giving the impression of implicit support of the government’s 
actions. 
 Church affi  liation was not only seen as an entrance into the 
sphere of political power but linked to power and opportunity in 
general. Oftentimes, the Church was the main community sup-
plier of jobs, education, health care, and other resources. Being 
educated and possibly sponsored in a church school was often the 
only chance of escaping the spiral of poverty. The hierarchy within 
the Church was thus mirrored in society through the construction 
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of hegemony. Much power was concentrated in the hands of few 
deciding who would get hired and fi red and who would receive 
fi nancial or practical aid. Even when the churches’ policy changed 
from privileging Tutsi to favoring Hutu after 1959, the under-
lying structures remained in place. With the Church being the 
main source of practical help and opportunities, dependents had 
little choice but to consent to its policies. This was a problem not 
only in the Catholic Church, but also in Protestant denominations 
that had sprung up since 1907. Timothy Longman describes 
the construction of hegemony in view of the Presbyterian 
Church.
 While supporting the dominant class position of a limited elite and pro-
viding little real opportunity for advancement to the majority of people 
in the parish, a patrimonial system within the church created depend-
ency in the subordinate classes that limited their ability to challenge 
the system. 
 (Longman  2010 : 221) 
 Antonio Gramsci’s analysis of power is helpful here, as he describes 
the emergence of a “false consciousness” by the powerless who seem 
to have internalized the oppressive ideology. Yet next to a “false 
consciousness” (Gramsci  1971 : 12), it is also the dire necessity of 
having no practical alternatives that led to people’s acceptance of 
the status quo. 
 At the same time, reform movements from within the churches 
increasingly questioned the patrimonial system of power, the lack 
of transparency, and susceptibility to corruption. New ideas from 
liberation theology challenged especially the Catholic Church to 
become progressive agents of social change on behalf of the poor. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, massive power struggles evolved 
within the Church as conservative and progressive strands fought 
for infl uence. Conservative parts within the Church saw the new 
democratic and social movements as threats to their own power. 
They thus perceived of the genocide as conducive to preserving 
the status quo. “Many church leaders were ultimately sympathetic 
to the genocide because it could help to bolster their power and 
preserve their hold on offi  ce against this movement for reform” 
(Longman  2001 : 175). 
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 CHRISTIAN CHURCHES IN RWANDA: 
COLLABORATORS IN VIOLENCE, WITNESSES 
FOR PEACE 
 By approaching religion as community, as set of teachings, as dis-
course, and as an institution, we have gained a better understanding 
of the role of religion in creating and maintaining the conditions in 
which ultimately the Rwandan genocide could take place. Yet to 
portray all Christian churches per se as genocide collaborators would 
be a misrepresentation. While our discussion has already revealed a 
multifaceted picture, it becomes even more complex when we take 
the numerous initiatives for peace and reconciliation by individuals 
and church communities before the genocide into account. As the 
focus of this chapter is on the confl ictive side of religion rather than 
its peacebuilding capacities, a few examples must suffi  ce here (cf. 
Schliesser  2018 ). One prominent eff ort for de- escalation and peace 
was the creation of the so- called Contact Committee in the middle 
of the civil war, in 1991, by ten Protestant and Catholic Church 
leaders. It was meant to provide a platform for mediation between 
the diff erent political parties, especially between the government 
and the RPF, encouraging democratization and political reconcili-
ation (Gatwa  2005 : 206– 208). While it could ultimately not pre-
vent the genocide, it helped facilitate the transition to a multiparty 
system. Still on the eve of the genocide, on January 1, 1994, the 
Contact Committee organized a peace march for all Christians 
across denominations. Thousands of Christians marched and prayed 
for peace in Rwanda’s capital, Kigali, and other cities throughout 
the country. 
 Next to Church initiatives, countless individuals withstood 
the violence, at times paying for their courage with their lives. 
When ethnic violence was rampant in December 1991, Thaddée 
Nsengiyumva, bishop of Kabgayi and President of the Rwandan 
Episcopal conference, issued a pastoral letter “ Convertissons- nous 
pour vivre ensemble dans la paix ” (“Let us convert to live together in 
peace”) (Nsengiyumva  1991 ). In this pastoral letter, Nsengiyumva 
admonished his church to take responsibility for its part in cre-
ating and sustaining ethnic divisions and called for a renewal within 
the Church. During the genocide, Nsengiyumva repeatedly issued 
public calls for the killings to stop as he assisted the International 
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Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in caring for war displaced 
people in his bishopric. He was murdered on June 5, 1994. 
 A fl at description, therefore, of all Christians or all churches as 
implicated in the genocide does not do justice to the numerous 
individual and Church- led eff orts at peace and reconciliation. 
Despite their courage, however, these initiatives were not repre-
sentative of the overall attitudes on the side of the churches. For 
the most part, instead of openly criticizing ethnic violence, church 
leaders continued to call for support of the government. “In distan-
cing itself from the Rwandan genocidal regime, the church would 
have had the chance to cut off  the moral support to political vio-
lence” (Karegeye  2011 : 100). Instead, the churches remained silent. 
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 ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE 
 RELIGION IN PAKISTAN’S 
INTERNAL CONFLICTS  
 S. Ayse Kadayifci- Orellana 
 INTRODUCTION 
 Pakistan became the epicenter of extremist violence and the war 
against it following the attacks of September 11, 2001, when 19 
militants hijacked four planes and attacked targets in the United 
States (US), killing almost 3,000 people and injuring many more. 
Al- Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, claimed the attacks in the 
name of Islam. In response, the US and its allies, including Pakistan, 
initiated a military off ensive against al- Qaeda, and demanded the 
Taliban government of Afghanistan hand bin Laden over to the US. 
The Taliban government had, however, given refuge to al- Qaeda 
prior to the attacks and refused to surrender bin Laden. 
 Taliban soldiers and leaders in Afghanistan were originally 
recruited from refugee camps in Pakistan at a young age and were 
sent to Deobandi madrasas, where they were indoctrinated with the 
idea of jihad (Malik 2008; Rahman  2008 ; Looney  2003 ; Ali  2009 ). 
These madrasas and mosques continued to spread a radical inter-
pretation of jihad that targeted local and international “enemies” and 
contributed to sectarian violence. Although using religion to justify 
violence is neither unique to Islam nor a recent phenomenon, Islam, 
which is derived from the word  slm (peace), and jihad (struggle), 
has come to be associated with violence and terrorism. As a result, 
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religion and politics in Pakistan have gained international attention 
and Pakistan’s madrasa system of Islamic education has come under 
intense scrutiny (International Crisis Group (ICG)  2002 ,  2003 ). 
 This case study explores the role religion played in the rise of 
extremist violence in Pakistan. The discussion will fi rst explore 
how religion as community contributed to the construction of 
Pakistani identity during and after its establishment as a nation- 
state in 1947. It will then explain how religion as a set of teachings 
was infl uential in the emergence of a particular interpretation of 
Islamic understanding of jihad in madrasas and mosques. Finally, 
it will investigate how religion as a discourse has caused tensions 
amongst various interpretations of jihad and how groups such as 
the Taliban and al- Qaeda have tried to justify their interpretation 
of the term. 
 PAKISTAN AND VIOLENCE IN THE NAME OF ISLAM 
 The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was founded on August 14, 
1947, when the country gained independence from the British 
Commonwealth. At the time of its establishment, it consisted of 
West Pakistan and East Pakistan. East Pakistan seceded to establish 
Bangladesh in 1971 after a civil war. Pakistan continued to have ter-
ritorial confl icts on the Afghan– Pakistan border and in the disputed 
Kashmir region. Today, Pakistan is the sixth most populous country 
in the world with a dynamic and emerging economy (World Bank 
 2019 ). As the only Muslim- majority country with nuclear weapons 
it is also considered a regional power. 
 Since its emergence, Pakistan has had a complicated relationship 
with Islam, which has been used as a source of legitimacy by both 
governments and militant groups. There are a number of diff erent 
militant organizations operating in Pakistan with al- Qaeda being 
the most recognized one. The origins of al- Qaeda date back to 
the Afghan– Soviet war (1979– 1989) when global Muslim fi ghters 
known as  Mujahedeen — supported by the CIA, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Pakistani Intelligence Agency— 
initiated an insurgency to fi ght the Soviet invasion. During this 
period, many al- Qaeda leaders and fi ghters received training in 
madrasas in Pakistan and as a result of their collaboration in the 
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Afghan war developed close bonds with other Pakistani extremist 
groups, particularly the Taliban. 
 “Taliban”, which means “students” in Pashto, is the main umbrella 
group for the Afghan insurgency as well as the name of a number 
of diff erent radical Deobandi Sunni groups in Pakistan. The Taliban 
emerged following the Afghan war in the mid- 1990s. In Pakistan, 
diff erent groups operating under the name Taliban came together in 
2007 to form a political coalition of militias called Tehrik- i- Taliban 
(TTP). While they are distinct groups with a diff erent history and 
leadership, Afghani and Pakistani Taliban often fi ght alongside each 
other. Each control diff erent areas and have diff erent agendas and 
political objectives but are directly supported by al- Qaeda and share 
a similar ideology. Other extremist groups in Pakistan include Hizb- 
ul- Mujahideen, Jaish- e- Mohammed (JeM), and Lashkar- e- Taiba 
(LeT), which focus mainly on jihad in Kashmir, and anti- Shiite 
groups such as Laskhar- Jhangvi and Sipah- e- Sahaba Pakistan, which 
aim to establish Pakistan as a mainly Deobandi- Sunni state. 
 While each of these organizations has diff erent goals and focus, 
and do not adhere to the same Sunni interpretative tradition, they 
all seek their legitimacy within an Islamic framework, and want 
to enforce Sharia (Islamic Law). What diff ers is their geographical 
focus, targets, and military tactics. For example, al- Qaeda and its 
affi  liates are responsible for atrocities around the world including 
the 1988 bombings of the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, 
the 2003 and 2005 bombings in Madrid and London, and others. 
Additionally, they target governments of Muslim- majority countries 
because they consider them illegitimate for being corrupt, impo-
tent, and in collaboration with Western governments. Groups like 
LeT target India in Kashmir (Afzal  2018 : 8). The government of 
Pakistan treats each of these groups diff erently: Pakistan is engaged 
in military operations against TTP but continues to provide sanc-
tuary to Afghan Taliban and groups that fi ght against Indian forces 
in Kashmir (Afzal  2018 : 6). 
 RELIGION AS COMMUNITY: ISLAM AND PAKISTANI 
IDENTITY 
 The rise of militant Islam in Pakistan cannot be understood without 
exploring the role religion played in the construction of Pakistani 
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identity. Religion has been an important source of identity and a 
tool for political legitimacy in Pakistan since its foundation in 1947, 
although the founders of Pakistan, such as Mohammed Ali Jinnah, 
conceived of a secular, pluralistic state, and not a theocratic one. 
Religious traditions often play an important role in defi ning group 
identity, defi ning who belongs to the group and who does not, and 
legitimating particular national objectives. Islam, similar to other 
religious traditions, holds reservoirs of meaning that shape Muslim 
identities and incorporate values, texts, and symbols that give expres-
sion to collective needs and desires. Islam, both as a religion and a 
cultural framework, informs the identities of Muslims as individuals 
and as Muslim communities ( ummah ), and it off ers a set of vocabu-
lary and meanings that legitimize various socio- political projects. 
Islam provides believers with a moral framework that guides their 
actions and plays a profound role in the molding of social structures 
and the justifi cation of the social and political order. Muslim leaders 
often resort to the inimitable power of religion to mobilize the 
population towards their goals, especially at times of confl ict and 
war. Paradoxically, religion is often used as a legitimizing force both 
for governments and those who oppose them. 
 In Pakistan, both political leaders and leaders of militant Islamic 
groups have sought legitimacy for their policies by framing them 
within an Islamic framework. The emotional resonance that 
extremists manage to generate in their Pakistani audiences has roots 
in the narratives that were developed and deployed in the estab-
lishment of Pakistan and in subsequent historical events (Khan 
 2013 : 2). “Religion has always been described as the single most 
important basis of Muslim nationhood, and Islam was employed as 
a means of fostering group identity to mobilize the masses in the 
pre- independence period” (Islam  1981 : 56). 
 Islam as an integrative force was critical in defi ning Pakistani 
national identity (Saqib  1983 : 194) and was successfully utilized to 
mobilize mass support for Pakistan during its establishment (Islam 
 1981 : 57). The idea of Pakistani nationhood separate from India was 
based on the perceived ethnic religious diff erences between Hindu 
and Muslim communities. For Muhammed Ali Jinnah, founder and 
fi rst governor of Pakistan, being a Muslim in India was a “matter of 
identity, a form of ethno- cultural distinction”; therefore, Muslims in 
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India were a distinct nation from Hindus (Afzal  2018 : 34). Muslim 
League leaders, such as Jinnah, needed a framework for legitimacy 
to build the identity of a new state, and often invoked the idea 
that Islam and Muslims in India were in danger and used Muslim 
identity as a glue to hold together diff erent Muslims’ ethnicities 
in Pakistan. Muslims in India consisted of various ethnic groups 
and spoke diff erent languages. Poet and philosopher Allama Iqbal 
(1875– 1938), often credited with being the father of Pakistani 
Islamic identity (Islam  1981 :  55), believed that Islamic identity 
could bring these diff erent ethnic and linguistic groups together as 
an  ummah (the Muslim community), connect them with the wider 
Muslim world, and preserve the Islamic way of life. 
 Over the course of its history, multiple leaders have resorted to 
Islam to legitimize their policies and seek public support. Still, the 
rise of General Zia ul- Haq to power in 1977 was a turning point 
in the Islamization of Pakistan, especially as he started his inten-
sive Islamization policies. General Haq, a practicing Muslim him-
self, used Islam to legitimize his domestic power and to undermine 
opposition. He took both a legal and cultural attitude to Islamicize 
the country by fi rst enforcing Islamic laws and establishing Sharia 
courts and then by using madrasas and other Islamic institutions to 
increase support. With his education policy in 1979, he facilitated 
the integration of madrasas into the Pakistani education system. 
This policy resulted in “Islamic” elements being added to the cur-
ricula at all educational levels. The basic aim of this policy was to 
create a new generation of Muslims imbued with Islam. 
 War against the Soviets in the 1980s provided a new oppor-
tunity for Pakistan’s Islamization. While the military regime used 
Islam internally to gain political legitimacy, the concept of jihad was 
used externally to arouse religious sentiments and mobilize guer-
illa bands of  mujahideen (fi ghters) against the Soviets in Afghanistan 
(Shah  2012 : 310).
 The Pakistani establishment, including its armed forces and intelli-
gence agencies, strongly supported conservative Sunni radicals and 
the Taliban movement to gain putative strategic depth through a 
subordinated Afghanistan and by preempting the formation of a hostile 
Indian– Afghanistan consortium. 
 (Simon and Stevenson  2009 : 47) 
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 When the war in Afghanistan ended, Kashmir became the new 
arena of jihad for Islamic militants, supported by the Pakistani 
Government (Lamb and Mufti  2012 : 18). 
 Taliban and al- Qaeda also frame their objectives and strategies 
within the Islamic framework to justify them and use Islamic identity 
to mobilize followers. Brian Fisherman and Assaf Moghadam ( 2010 : 6) 
argue that the ideology of the global jihadi movement aims to make 
Muslims aware that Islam is in a state of decline relative to its past 
glory, and identify the reasons for this decline in the attacks by anti- 
Islamic Crusaders, Zionists, and apostates. In order to respond to this 
threat, this ideology aims to create a new Muslim identity by off ering 
them membership of the globalized community of believers and to 
present jihad as program of action (Fishman and Moghdam 2016). 
This form of Muslim identity is closely tied to practicing a particular 
interpretation of Islamic law and lifestyle that is rooted in the Sunni 
Wahhabi tradition. To mobilize support, these groups invoke the con-
cept of  ummah to create solidarity and unity amongst Muslims and to 
urge them to take responsibility for issues involving Muslims globally. 
An Islamic framework is used to defi ne the contours of relationships 
between Muslims and non- Muslims. Those who do not follow this 
interpretation are considered to be living in ignorance and, there-
fore, are not true Muslims. For example, Zawahiri, in his articulation 
of Muslim identity, points out that those not residing in Islamic land 
and not living according to Wahhabi interpretation and application of 
Sharia Law, including fellow Muslims, are regarded as apostate infi dels 
who must be purged (Rogan  2010 : 409). Also, in his treatise “The 
Foundations of Loyalty and Enmity in Islam”, he describes friends 
and enemies of Muslims, and urges Muslims to not to take “infi dels” 
as friends or allies (Ibrahim  2007 ). Using the  takfi ri doctrine (the pro-
cess of ex- communicating Muslims for not being pious enough) these 
groups argue that Pakistani Government’s collaboration with the US 
makes them justifi able targets for jihad (Lamb and Mufti  2012 : 19– 20). 
 RELIGION AS A SET OF TEACHINGS: MADRASAS 
AND JIHAD 
 Religion as a set of ideas refers to a shared set of teachings, 
doctrines, norms, values, and narratives that provide a framework 
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for understanding and acting in the world. These religious ideas and 
teachings can be used to support peace and tolerance or justify vio-
lence and confl ict. An ideology and doctrine of jihad that justifi ed 
attacks on local and international enemies were often promoted at 
some of the Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan based on their interpret-
ation of religious verses, teachings, and stories. Madrasas, or Islamic 
schools, have come under scrutiny following the 9/ 11 attacks 
because many of the Taliban soldiers and leaders in Afghanistan, 
including Mullah Omar (who was recognized as the Commander 
of the Faithful or the Supreme Leader by Taliban), were originally 
recruited from refugee camps in Pakistan at a young age and were 
sent to madrasas, where they were indoctrinated with the idea of 
jihad (Malik  2008 ). Rashid ( 2000 : 4) states that, “Taliban interpret-
ation of sharia was infl uenced by extremist Deobandi teachings in 
Pakistan, a perversion of Pashtunwali [the traditional Pashtun code 
of conduct], and its harsh enforcement all over Afghanistan”. The 
Taliban’s ideology was infl uenced by Deobandi teachings in Pakistan 
(Lamb and Mufti 2013: 23). Consequently, Deobandi madrasas in 
Pakistan came to be associated with fundamentalist institutions that 
breed Islamic terrorists. 
 Madrasas have been a major source of religious and scientifi c 
learning throughout much of Islamic history. Since the emergence 
of Islam, madrasas have been part of the Islamic education system. 
Not all madrasas are pro- violence or preach aggression; however, 
in Pakistan, prior to British colonization, madrasas were unstruc-
tured and served the educational needs of both Muslims and non- 
Muslims (Zaman  1999 ). Deobandi religious leaders institutionalized 
the madrasa system as a reaction to British colonization and impos-
ition of the British education system. During this era, the main 
purpose of madrasas was to promote Islam and Islamic ethics, while 
preserving knowledge about the Quran and the traditions of the 
Prophet. Madrasas became an important tool for Islamization 
during General Zia’s presidency. In order to secure his legitimacy 
and undermine his mainly secular political opposition, Zia required 
the support of religious seminaries. His 1979 education policy 
established a Committee for Dini Madaris to transform the madrasas 
into an integral part of the Pakistani educational system, and called 
for 5,000 madrasas to be built (ICG  2002 : 11). 
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 Today, many of these institutions are a part of the normal life in 
Pakistan, and play a key role within the society by educating students 
from poorer areas in particular. There are fi ve distinct schools of 
thought within the madrasas in Pakistan today: Wahhabi, Deobandi, 
Barelvi, Jamat- i- Islami, and Jafria- Shia. In addition to providing 
Islamic education, madrasas also serve other functions in Pakistani 
society such as providing shelter, food, and safety for many rural 
immigrants into urban areas, especially to those poor families who 
cannot aff ord to care for their children. These madrasas provide, 
for the most part, free Islamic education and teach impoverished 
populations how to read and write (Moosa  2015 ). They also house 
thousands of poor people who otherwise lack access to formal edu-
cation and the fulfi llment of basic needs. Thus, the most vulnerable, 
economically depressed, and impressionable youth of Pakistan end 
up in the madrasas. Because the very limited education they receive 
leaves them without any real chance of taking part in the socio- 
economic growth of their country, many of these young people see 
their best option as returning to the madrasa as a teacher or joining 
various groups dissatisfi ed with their own government or the West, 
which they view as anti- Islamic. 
 Texts supporting off ensive jihad were not part of the traditional 
madrasa curriculum, but were developed and included in the 
madrasa education during the war in Afghanistan, when madrasas 
started to play an important role in providing the ideological basis 
of war against the Soviets. Two types of madrasas were particu-
larly active. The fi rst included those madrasas such as Jamaat- e 
Islami’s (JI)  Rabita madrasas , created specifi cally to produce jihadi 
literature to mobilize public opinion and recruit and train mili-
tary forces (ICG  2002 : 11). The second group of madrasas included 
independent madrasas such as the Jamiat- e Ulama Islam (JUI), 
which opposed Zia politically but partnered with him during the 
Afghan war (ICG  2002 : 11). These madrasas were supported by the 
Pakistani military, US, and Arab countries fi nancially, as well as by 
publishing textbooks in local languages. After the end of the war in 
Afghanistan these Deobandi madrasas and mosques continued to 
spread a radical interpretation of jihad that targeted local and inter-
national “enemies” and contributed to sectarian violence as well as 
attacks on the West. 
PAKISTAN: RELIGION AND CONFLICT 69
69
 RELIGION AS DISCOURSE: CONTESTED 
INTERPRETATIONS OF JIHAD 
 Radicalization of Islamist groups in Pakistan goes back to the early 
20th century when Maududi, the founder of Jamaat- e- Islami (JI), 
articulated his off ensive jihad doctrine and elevated it above all 
other interpretations of jihad within the broader Islamic discourse. 
Islam as a discourse refers here to the body of thought and writing 
that is united by having a common object of study, a common 
methodology used by Islamic scholars, and a set of common terms 
and ideas it incorporates which is linguistically and culturally spe-
cifi c. It is possible for all Muslims who have been socialized under 
its authority to speak and act together. Within this discourse, there 
are diff erent interpretations or narratives. Islamic narratives of jihad 
are all based on the Islamic discourse rooted in the Quranic verses, 
sunna, and the hadith. These texts are often fi lled with ambiguities, 
contradicting statements, and are written down in a distant time, 
usually in a language that is diff erent from the ones used by the 
current communities and must go through human interpretation. 
Islamic doctrine of jihad is no diff erent, and there are a variety of 
diff erent interpretations when jihad is permissible and how it should 
be conducted. 
 The Arabic word “jihad” literally means “striving” or “struggle”, 
rather than war, as the Quranic verse “strive in the cause of God” 
(Q22:78) indicates. More specifi cally, jihad is often understood as a 
struggle for the cause of God by means of speech, property, wealth, 
or life. Historically, Muslim scholars diff erentiated jihad according 
to its direction (inner and outer) and method (violent and non-
violent) (Kadayifci- Orellana, Abu- Nimer, and Mohamed- Saleem 
 2013 ). The inner jihad is fought within the individual whereas the 
outer jihad is seen as a struggle to eliminate evil within the  ummah . It 
refers to eff orts an individual must make towards self- improvement 
and self- purifi cation, as well as to the duty of Muslims, both at the 
individual and collective level, to struggle against all forms of evil, 
corruption, injustice, tyranny, and oppression. The term “jihad” 
also refers to use of force to repel an enemy and to fi ght against 
injustice and oppression. Scholars of Islamic jurisprudence and law 
have usually been more concerned with the military form of jihad, 
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as this requires more jurisprudential elaboration and legal regula-
tion ( fi qh ), and Islamic law that deals with war and peace are often 
included under the title of jihad. In the modern era (19th and 20th 
centuries), jihad acquired a new momentum and initially took the 
form of resistance to Western invasion of Islamic lands. Challenged 
by colonialism, modernization, and globalization, many Islamic 
thinkers blamed the decline of Muslim power on a deviation from 
the  right path of Islam and called for the reinstitution of Islamic rule. 
Within this context all kinds of resistance movements and leaders 
adopted jihad as an ideological framework, and as a political rhetoric 
to justify their policies and conduct. 
 Multiple interpretations of jihad are a result of the dynamic inter-
action between the religious texts and changing contextual factors, 
such as social, political, and cultural contexts, as well as particular 
historical events. The way religious texts are understood and acted 
upon during a violent confl ict always involves a tension between 
the fi xed text, the word of God, and the particular context of inter-
pretation. However, when leaders use a religious narrative they tend 
to take them out of a specifi c context and treat them as if they are 
fi xed, identical, and self- suffi  cient origins of meaning. They present 
their interpretation of the religious texts, myths, and symbols as the 
ultimate truth applicable, regardless of time and place. 
 There are a variety of possible reasons as to why people choose 
one interpretation over another. Some of these explanations are 
related to cognitive and emotional needs that may be met by par-
ticular religious imagery, symbolism, and text. Social motivations 
and personal experiences also play a critical role in determining 
affi  liations with a group that espouses a certain interpretation of 
religious texts. According to Gopin ( 2000 : 11), the way sacred texts 
are used to foster peace or promote violence and destruction
 seems to depend on the complex ways in which the psychological and 
sociological circumstances and the economic and cultural constructs of a 
particular group interact with the ceaseless human drive to hermeneutic-
ally develop religious meaning systems, texts, rituals, symbols, and laws. 
 Deep fears and concerns also play a signifi cant role in the way reli-
gious texts are understood and interpreted, especially at times of 
war. In return, religious values and texts shape the way individuals 
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view their confl ict, perceive their enemies, and make sense of their 
suff ering and ways to address them. 
 Al- Qaeda and Taliban argue that the current global economic- 
political system only breeds oppression, injustice, and exploitation; 
therefore, it must be removed and replaced by God’s governance. 
Framing their jihad as a retaliation to injustice, oppression, and 
aggression of the West and its secular allies in the Muslim world, they 
invoke military jihad as an obligation of every Muslim. In order to 
increase popular support, they explain that jihad today is a global revo-
lutionary struggle, which must be fought by any means, including vio-
lence, political action, and propaganda against the Western powers as 
well as secular Muslim regimes. In this, “jihad” attacks against civilian 
targets are necessary evils to bring God’s rule to earth (Ibrahim  2007 ). 
 Islamic symbols, language, imagery, as well as Islamic texts are 
used to spread this ideology through mosques, madrasas, videos, and 
propaganda on social media. Most Deobandi literature traces the 
history of how Muslims have repeatedly been subjugated by the 
“Zionist occupation of Palestine, Indian occupation of Kashmir, 
Russian occupation of Chechnya, and subjugation of Muslim States 
in the Philippines” (Haqqani  2005 : 22). Framing the confl ict within 
a religious framework, these extremist groups aim to provide an 
ideology which conceives of the world in a coherent and manage-
able way, and to off er explanations for worldly events, including 
human suff ering, and the response to it. Using Quranic verses such 
as “You are obligated to fi ght even though it is something you do 
not like” (Q2:216) as well as religious imagery and vocabulary, 
they legitimize their interpretation of jihad, and construct negative 
enemy images such as “the Crusaders” linking current confl ict to 
historical ones. With the aid of religious imagery and vocabulary, 
with which the population is familiar, they provide a cosmology, 
history, and eschatology of the war and simplify the world into good 
and evil. They link the past, present, and future in the minds of their 
followers and invoke emotions such as heroism and vengeance. 
 CONCLUSION 
 This chapter showed that the religion of Islam has been 
instrumentalized to legitimize political objectives both by militant 
groups and by the government in Pakistan. Islam as a discourse has 
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been utilized to craft the ideology of these groups and this ideology 
was spread via madrasas, mosques, and other media, using Islamic 
symbols and texts. However, as it will be shown in the second part of 
this case study, various Muslim groups and organizations are resorting 
to the Islamic principles of peace, tolerance, and justice to respond to 
extremist violence and to build sustainable peace in Pakistan. 
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 WHAT DO THEY HAVE THAT 
OTHERS DON’T?  
 Christine Schliesser, 
S. Ayse Kadayifci- Orellana, 
and Pauline Kollontai 
 When violent interreligious confl ict erupted in Kaduna, Nigeria, in 
1992, Imam Muhammad Ashafa and Pastor James Wuye were drawn 
into the fi ghting, trying to kill each other in the name of religion. 
After the violence had stopped, the two religious leaders reluctantly 
agreed to meet. Over the years, they built a relationship with each 
other and agreed to join forces in helping to heal the chasm between 
their communities. They founded the Interfaith Mediation Centre 
in 1995, an interreligious grassroots organization that successfully 
promotes reconciliation and confl ict resolution between Muslims 
and Christians in Nigeria. Meanwhile, their interfaith methodology 
for prospective civic peace activists is used in Africa and beyond. 
 While the example of Ashafa and Wuye illustrates religious peace-
making within religious confl icts, other examples demonstrate the 
eff ectiveness of religious peacemaking also in transforming violent 
confl icts with no apparent religious dimensions. The engagement 
of the Catholic community of Sant’Egidio, for example, was vital in 
helping to end the civil war in Mozambique (1977– 1992), a proxy 
war during the Cold War. 
 7 
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 INCREASING RECOGNITION: RELIGION MATTERS IN 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
 Increasingly, scholars and practitioners are recognizing the role reli-
gion can play in addressing confl icts. Religion becomes a major 
factor in confl ict and confl ict resolution when, for instance, parties 
are defi ned along religious lines and where religion is an integral 
aspect of social and cultural life, as noted by Appleby ( 2001/ 1996 ), 
Gopin ( 2009 ), Sampson and Lederach ( 2000 ), Smock ( 2008 ), Abu- 
Nimer ( 2015 ), Lederach ( 1997 ), and Schliesser ( 2018 ). These 
scholars point out that religious traditions can bring moral, social, 
and spiritual resources to peacebuilding, and inspire a sense of 
engagement and commitment to the process. “Religion is a source 
not only of intolerance, human rights violations, and extremist vio-
lence, but also of nonviolent confl ict transformation, the defense 
of human rights, integrity in government, and reconciliation and 
stability in divided societies” (Appleby  2001/ 1996 : 821). Religious 
texts and prophetic stories provide examples of peacemaking, for-
giveness, and compassion that can lead to a change of attitudes and 
behaviors, as well as encourage making peace with the “other”. 
Religious values, principles (such as forgiveness, patience, mercy, 
accountability), and rituals can facilitate healing and trauma 
management. 
 The impact of religious peacemaking and confl ict resolution is 
also more and more being taken into consideration at the inter-
national policy- making level. In July 2017, the UN Offi  ce on 
Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect launched 
a “Plan of Action for Religious Leaders and Actors to Prevent 
Incitement to Violence that Could Lead to Atrocity Crimes”. In 
this Plan, UN Secretary General Guterres points out that “Religious 
leaders can play a particularly important role in infl uencing the 
behavior of those who share their beliefs” (UN  2017 : Foreword), 
thereby recognizing them as signifi cant agents in confl ict and con-
fl ict resolution. In a similar vein, the 2018 UN and World Bank 
Study “Pathways to Peace” states: “The more successful cases [of 
confl ict prevention] mobilized a coalition of domestic actors to 
infl uence incentives towards peace, bringing in the comparative 
advantages of civil society, including women’s groups, the faith 
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community, and the private sector to manage tensions” (UN and 
World Bank  2018 : xxi). 
 So, while the role of religious actors in confl ict resolution is 
increasingly recognized, the concrete contribution of religious 
actors remains opaque. What exactly is it about religious actors that 
makes the partnership with them seem signifi cant? What are their 
specifi c characteristics and contributions to confl ict resolution? 
 RELIGIOUS ACTORS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
 Attempts at systematizing the potentials of religious actors face a 
number of diffi  culties. Besides the inherent ambivalence of religion 
itself, we need to consider the internal plurality of any given religion 
as well as the vast variety of religious actors and FBOs. Furthermore, 
FBOs diff er in the way they relate faith and praxis. Ron Sider and 
Heidi Unruh developed a typology of six diff erent types of FBOs 
active in development, ranging from faith- permeated development 
work to quasi- secular organizations (Sider and Unruh  2004 ). 
 While keeping the plurality of religious actors in mind, we can 
still point to certain characteristics and contributions common to 
many of these actors. Not all of these characteristics are exclusive 
in the sense that they only pertain to religious actors, nor does 
every religious actor display all of them. Below, we diff erentiate 
between “formal” and “material” contributions— even though the 
borderlines can be a bit blurry at times. In  Chapter 3 we discussed 
six diff erent ways of approaching religion in confl ict, namely: reli-
gion as community, as a set of teachings, as spirituality, as prac-
tice, as discourse, and as an institution. Our intention behind this 
was to make the diff erent dimensions of religion that can have an 
impact on a confl ict situation more visible. In this chapter, we now 
shift our focus from religion in general to religious actors and their 
concrete contributions. To show how close both perspectives are 
connected, we link the specifi cities we found in religious actors 
with the six ways of approaching religion in confl ict. Some of the 
characteristics we point out align with one of these dimensions, 
while others cut across diff erent aspects or broaden a certain aspect. 
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 FORMAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF RELIGIOUS ACTORS 
 Trust: religion as community, religion as practice 
 For religious actors to be eff ective peacebuilders, religious leaders, 
institutions, and discourses must be perceived as legitimate and 
credible by the parties involved in the confl ict. Religious leaders 
and faith- based actors often enjoy a high degree of credibility and 
moral and spiritual legitimacy. This is especially visible in contexts 
such as Rwanda and Pakistan where religion plays a signifi cant role 
in society. In the joint attendance of Sunday church services or 
Friday prayer and in the participation in youth groups or women’s 
groups, religious and social activities merge. 
 At the same time, the trust enjoyed by religious actors is often-
times linked to religion as practice because many FBOs have a long 
history of service addressing community needs. When Sant’Egidio 
was asked by the warring parties in Mozambique to mediate 
between them, it could not only draw on a web of relationships 
with locals, but also on a history of social services and catering to 
the urgent needs of the poor. The respect and trust associated with 
religious actors is furthermore connected to their perception as neu-
tral agents. They are seen as not pursuing their own personal gain, 
but rather as committed to peace only (Bouta, Kadayifci- Orellana, 
and Abu- Nimer 2005). In the case of Sant’Egidio and Mozambique, 
the success of their mediation eff orts therefore depended to a large 
degree on this community’s record of friendship across boundaries 
and their own integrity. 
 Relationships and identity: religion as community 
 Connected to the level of trust and credibility they enjoy, reli-
gious actors often display strong relationship- building skills as “reli-
gious leaders are uniquely positioned to foster nonviolent confl ict 
transformation through the building of constructive, collabora-
tive relationships within and across ethnic and religious groups for 
the common good of the entire population of a region” (Appleby 
 2008 : 127). Relationships are in turn innately connected to iden-
tity formation. It is through relationships— through the other— 
that we understand ourselves (Buber  1996 ). This specifi c ability 
of relationship building helps religious actors not only in building 
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communities and forming identities, but also in playing a leading 
role in social change processes. Faith- based actors can move parties 
towards an agreement by building trust between disputants and by 
engaging the moral and spiritual resources that emphasize shared 
identities and experiences as well as common moral and spiritual 
values (Kadayifci- Orellana  2017 ). 
 For a better understanding of this specifi c characteristic of reli-
gious actors and of how it can foster sustainable confl ict resolution, 
we found social network analysis helpful (Granovetter 1973). Social 
network analysis diff erentiates between “strong- ties groups” and 
“weak- ties groups”, both of which impact our sense of identity. 
Strong- ties groups provide reliability and meaning to their members, 
who are closely connected to one another, for instance, in traditional 
villages or religious communities. Due to their self- referentiality 
and strong group coherence, however, new ideas often haven dif-
fi culties gaining a footing. Weak- ties groups, on the other hand, 
refer to communities with loose contact between their members, 
such as in chat groups. They are less reliable for the individual 
member, yet they allow for the rapid dissemination of new infor-
mation and concepts. Religious actors often originate from strong- 
ties groups. Given their strong relationship- building skills, they 
are able to function as “connectors” between these groups (Gopin 
 2009 : 79). This competency is of crucial importance in processes of 
social change. Successful confl ict resolution needs nothing less than 
a paradigm change in thinking and behavior that in turn depends 
on the acceptance of new concepts in a given community. For this 
to be successful, connectors are necessary, that is, people who enjoy 
suffi  cient credibility in strong- ties groups to ensure that a new idea 
is not dismissed from the onset, while at the same time are able to 
quickly reach a large number of people. While it is well possible 
to stop immediate violence through outside intervention, sustain-
able peace cannot be had without relationship building within and 
between communities. 
 Networks: religion as an institution, religion  
as spirituality 
 Religious actors can often rely on well- organized, sometimes 
extensive networks, providing them with fi nancial, institutional, 
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and human resources. Religious leaders and organizations have 
access to community members through mosques, churches, temples, 
community centers, and educational institutions. In some cases, 
their involvement can bring international support from their sister 
organizations. Religious groups also tend to have a broader base 
than many secular NGOs. This broad base provides a wide pool of 
committed individuals who are willing to work as volunteers.
 Religious communities are, without question, the largest and best- 
organized civil institutions in the world today, claiming the allegiance 
of billions of believers and bridging the divides of race, class and 
nationality. They are uniquely equipped to meet the challenges of our 
time:  resolving conflicts, caring for the sick and needy, promoting 
peaceful co- existence among all peoples. 
 (World Conference on Religion and Peace, 
cited in Heist and Cnaan  2016 : 6) 
 Next to a wider, sometimes national, or even international support 
structure, religious actors can rely on local, grassroot networks. 
Through their sermons, lectures, and educational programs, they 
can reach out to large number of people in their societies. As so- 
called “middle- range” leaders, they are often in a unique place to 
reach out to both grassroots and high- level leaderships. The ability 
to connect to and mobilize local members and congregations gives 
religious actors a strategic advantage over many secular NGOs. 
This ability becomes of crucial signifi cance not least in the event 
of crises, be it confl ict or natural disaster, as religious actors cannot 
only provide fi rst- hand insight and information but can often help 
to connect international agents with local people well familiar with 
the language and culture, spirituality and discourse, as well as with 
the urgent needs and challenges in a particular situation. 
 Funding: religion as an institution, religion as spirituality 
 While part of the network discussion, funding deserves special 
attention. “Giving USA 2018” reports that even though charitable 
giving for international aff airs decreased compared to the previous 
year, faith- based development organizations were still amongst 
the top recipients of aid money. Food for the Poor, for instance, 
received $ 987.6 million in private contributions; World Vision got 
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$786.01 million ( Giving USA  2018 ). It is furthermore of interest 
to look at where the money comes from. Many faith- based and 
secular international development organizations accept fi nancial 
support from governments, yet they diff er in their approaches. 
While government support is often a major source of income for 
secular NGOs, FBOs tend to limit government support in order to 
maintain their independence (Smillie and Minear  2004 ). For many 
FBOs, the main source of the money comes from private sources, 
including collective donations, such as collected during a religious 
service. Various faith- based actors like Quakers, Sant’Egidio, and 
Islamic Relief Services have well- established regional and global 
networks to which they can turn for institutional and fi nancial 
resources. Next to the community aspect, the spirituality dimension 
of religion becomes relevant. Diff erent religions consider tithing, 
almsgiving, and charity an integral part of their tradition. Giving 
to the poor thus becomes an intrinsic part of one’s own spirituality. 
 Services: religion as practice 
 To many religious actors, engaging in community service is an 
expression of the practice dimension of faith. When it comes to 
service delivery, studies fi nd that both FBOs and secular NGOs 
provide similar services. While the kinds of services provided— 
including food provision, clean water, refugee services, education, 
orphanages, medical services, microfi nance, or infrastructure— are 
similar, a recent study notes diff erences in the number of activ-
ities that these organizations are engaged in. FBOs were covering 
a wider range of services rather than specializing in certain areas 
as secular NGOs tend to. “Faith- based organizations on average 
provided signifi cantly more kinds of services (4.2. types of services 
per organization) compared to the secular organizations (2.6 types 
per organization,  p < 0.05)” (Heist and Cnaan  2016 :  9). Further 
research is required, but the fi ndings indicate a higher concern for 
holistic service provision on the side of FBOs. 
 Studies also show that numerous collaborations exist between 
NGOs and FBOs, as seen, for example, in Kano and Lagos states, 
Nigeria. The NGO BAOBAB focuses on women’s human rights. 
Based in Lagos, BAOBAB has outreach teams in 14 states across 
Nigeria who work with Muslim FBOs with the aim of developing 
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better understanding of women’s rights in the context of Sharia. 
In Kano state, the Ganuwa Group comprises diff erent NGOs, 
FBOs, and other interested parties who work together to promote 
HIV/ AIDS awareness and prevention. The key reason for these 
collaborations “stem from increasing realization amongst NGOs 
and development agencies of the crucial role that FBOs can play in 
the delivery of programmes that have implications for the religious 
beliefs of target populations” (Davis et al.  2011 : 38). 
 MATERIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF RELIGIOUS ACTORS 
 Normative concepts and values: religion as a set of teachings, 
religion as practice 
 Religions are normative. They come with dogmatic claims 
(What is true?) and ethical implications (What is good?). Though 
often misused for the purpose of inciting violence and confl ict, 
religious teachings also contain powerful normative concepts 
and values that can be used to further peace and reconciliation. 
Faith- based actors have a unique spiritual and moral leverage that 
is often unavailable to secular peacebuilders. Spiritual resources 
include values, principles, norms, and rituals rooted in religious 
traditions which can be used to encourage parties to embrace a 
new reality, change their behavior, and form new relationships 
with others, even with former enemies. The Christian tradition, 
for example, off ers the concepts of forgiveness, grace, and love 
that encompasses even the enemy. By teaching love and rec-
onciliation instead of hatred and exclusion, religious values are 
disseminated that call for concrete behavioral implications. The 
parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25– 37) or the Sermon 
on the Mount (Matthew 5– 7) have inspired countless Christians 
to work for peace and justice. Equally, the Jewish and Muslim 
traditions contain potent resources, including the concepts of 
love, compassion, forgiveness, and the pursuit of justice and doing 
good (Kadayifci- Orellana, Abu- Nimer, and Mohamed- Saleem 
 2013 ). These teachings serve not only as motivations for concrete 
actions, but also as ethical orientation and practice as they help 
to transform attitudes and stereotypes, as well as ways of thinking 
and acting. 
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 Holistic perspective: religion as spirituality, religion as  
discourse 
 Religious actors usually bring a specifi c kind of anthropology, 
that is, understanding of the human person, as part of their dis-
course to the fi eld, as they embrace a holistic perspective on well- 
being. This means that well- being relates not only to physical and 
material aspects, but to spiritual and emotional dimensions as well. 
Religious communities often provide care for the soul  and for the 
body. Their holistic perspective gives them an advantage over many 
secular NGOs who focus primarily on material support. In post- 
genocide Rwanda, for example, Christian churches off er reconcili-
ation initiatives linked with development projects, such as giving a 
cow to a victim and a perpetrator. Together, they care for the cow 
and share the income generated by selling its milk. Psychological 
and spiritual support of those aff ected by violence is supplemented 
here with practical help for daily life, resulting in welcome syner-
getic eff ects that enhance the sustainability of both kinds of eff orts. 
 Meaning: religion as spirituality, religion as practice 
 Through their sacred narratives, spirituality, and practices, reli-
gious communities give meaning to everyday life. We want to 
illustrate this by pointing to the experience of Oledai, a village 
in Western Uganda, an area that experienced violent insurgency 
between 1986 and 1993. Oledai PAG (Pentecostal Assembly of 
God) Church was established in 1994, caring for both the spir-
itual and practical concerns of the community. At about the same 
time, diff erent NGOs also moved in, supported by the $233 million 
worth World Bank- funded Northern Uganda Social Action Fund 
(NUSAF). The aim of these NGOs was to “empower communities 
… by enhancing their capacity to systematically identify, priori-
tise, and plan for their needs and implement sustainable develop-
ment initiatives” (Manor  2007 :  264). Ten years later, the NGOs 
and their initiatives had disappeared. Oledai Church, however, was 
fl ourishing, having more than quadrupled in size. How is this diff e-
rence in impact to be explained? For anthropologist Ben Jones, the 
main criterion is meaning. While the NGOs remained extrinsic to 
the local community, Oledai Church successfully engaged the hearts 
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and minds of its members, becoming part of the community and 
making its members feel at home. The NGOs’ initiatives, on the 
other hand, displayed “mostly technical functions and represent an 
ideological agenda— of rights, empowerment or participation— that 
had little purchase. In a fundamental way the work of NGOs lacked 
meaning” (Jones  2012 : 200). 
 Rituals: religion as spirituality, religion as practice 
 Rituals structure our daily life. Especially in times of turmoil, 
these rituals help to provide stability and meaning. Religious rit-
uals like prayer and meditation can therefore become signifi cant 
resources for support and inner structure, even as outer (political, 
economic, etc.) structures are collapsing or changing. Rituals and 
ceremonies in themselves are ambivalent, however. They can be 
employed to create insider- outsider boundaries and to encourage 
confl icts, such as the Rwandan génocidaires taking communion to 
strengthen themselves for their “work”. Yet they can also be used 
as powerful resources for coping with confl ict. Catholic communi-
ties in post- genocide Rwanda, for example, have creatively adapted 
the Christian Sacrament of Reconciliation. The  gacaca nkirisitu 
(Christian gacaca) has thus become a ritualized pastoral process for 
perpetrators and survivors on their path to reconciliation (Carney 
 2015 ). In the context of overcoming confl ict, religious rituals may 
thus be used, adapted, or created to help facilitate healing processes. 
 Dealing with trauma: religion as a set of teachings,  religion as 
spirituality 
 The generation of meaning becomes all the more virulent during 
the experience and in the aftermath of atrocities. Due to gross 
violations of human rights and excessive violence, individuals and 
communities involved in confl ict are usually traumatized and have 
deep injuries. These can be passed on to the next generations, 
resulting in intergenerational trauma. Painful memories of confl ict, 
loss of loved ones, and injuries suff ered cause deep emotional and 
psychological stress. Healing these injuries and trauma thus becomes 
a major component of peacebuilding eff orts, especially for recon-
ciliation at the grassroots level (Abu- Nimer and Kadayifci- Orellana 
 2008 ). For if these wounds are left unaddressed, they can not only 
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result in severe post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but also breed 
bitterness, hatred, and revenge, thereby perpetuating the spiral of 
violence as former victims turn into perpetrators. 
 Religious traditions and their emphasis on transformation and a 
new beginning can help to integrate experiences of loss and hurt 
into a framework that restores meaning. Religious perspectives off er 
hope and an eschatological horizon that assist traumatized victims 
in dealing with the past and the present. At the same time, concepts 
such as forgiveness and grace include powerful resources for dealing 
with guilt, shame, and failure, existential experiences inevitably 
encountered in the context of confl ict and reconciliation on the 
side of both victims and perpetrators. In Islam, for example, Islamic 
values of peacebuilding, reestablishment of harmony and order, and 
respect for others, together with Islamic ideas on fate, predestination, 
and total sovereignty of God serve as the basis for healing and recon-
ciliation (Abu- Nimer and Kadayifci- Orellana  2008 ). Organizations 
such as the Nigerian Interfaith Mediation Center focus on healing 
the trauma of injuries infl icted during times of confl ict. 
 Memory and reconciliation: religion as a set of teachings, religion 
as spirituality, religion as practice 
 “Culture, history, memory, authenticity …  — these are the cur-
rency of the local peacebuilder” (Appleby  2008 : 128). Of these, we 
would like to draw special attention to memory. During, but even 
more so after violence, questions of dealing with the past and of 
remembering arise. Without memory, there is no path to reconcili-
ation and sustainable peace. How we remember the past, what we 
remember— and what we don’t remember— has an impact on how 
we live in the present and the future. Yet memory is not ethically 
neutral. Rather, it can be just or unjust, as Paul Ricœur’s ( 2004 : 68) 
call for a “juste mémoire” (“just memory”) reminds us. A  just 
memory does not simply mirror the victors’ narrative but includes 
the victims’ perspectives. 
 Nevertheless, remembrance in itself and as the mere representa-
tion of the past rarely leads to a genuine new beginning. For this, 
concepts such as forgiveness and reconciliation are helpful, even if 
not always possible. Forgiveness liberates both victim and perpet-
rator from the haunting past— and from each other. Through for-
giveness, the victim regains self- determination over his/ her own 
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life, while the perpetrator is no longer defi ned merely by his/ her 
deeds but acknowledged in his/ her shared humanity. As genuinely 
religious concepts, forgiveness and reconciliation can be actively 
strengthened through the teaching and practice of FBOs, religious 
actors, and communities, as displayed, for example, by Christian 
churches in post- genocide Rwanda. Forgiving does not mean for-
getting, nor does it mean impunity. Yet it can pave the way for the 
genuine healing of relationships and communities as prerequisites 
for sustainable peace. 
 In this chapter, we gave an orientation on some of the specifi c 
characteristics and contributions— both formal and material— 
associated with religious actors in confl ict resolution. While reli-
gious actors have no magic wand to solve confl icts and while their 
role must not be overstated, it is clear that they bring signifi cant 
resources to the fi eld that no one genuinely interested in confl ict 
resolution can aff ord to ignore. The following case studies illustrate 
the specifi c contributions of religious actors in concrete contexts of 
violent confl ict. 
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 JEWISH PERSPECTIVE 
 RELIGION IN ISRAEL’S QUEST 
FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
AND RECONCILIATION IN ITS 
LAND RIGHTS CONFLICTS  
 Pauline Kollontai 
 INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL APPROACHES TO 
RESOLVING LAND CONFLICTS 
 Seventy- one years on from its establishment, Israel continues to be 
in confl ict over land with the Negev Bedouin and the Palestinians. 
During these past seven decades there have been signs of a reduction 
in the level and intensity of these confl icts. In the case of the Negev 
Bedouin, the fi rst serious attempt at addressing this issue was seen in 
the work of the Goldberg Commission, set up by the Israeli govern-
ment in 2007 during the Prime Ministership of Ehud Olmet. The 
Goldberg Commission, chaired by retired Supreme Court Justice, 
Eliezer Goldberg, had eight members, including two Bedouin 
representatives. The starting point for Goldberg was to acknow-
ledge that there had been a number of government committees 
tasked to propose further strategies for Negev Bedouin resettlement 
and to fi nd a compromise over land, “Most of these committees 
have had no serious impact on the issues they were set up to deal 
with” (Goldberg  2011 : 22). At the beginning of the Commission’s 
Report it states that seeing the Bedouin as the “other” has to be 
changed, “The approach of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is not acceptable to us, 
and it will not advance a solution, but rather drive it further away” 
 8 
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(Goldberg  2011 : 5). This approach is also a fundamental obstacle 
to resolving Israel’s confl ict with the Palestinians. As of the time of 
writing (September 2019), there has been no signifi cant improve-
ment to the Negev Bedouin’s land struggle with the Israeli state. 
 Attempts at fi nding ways to resolve the situation with the Palestinians 
have been evident amongst some political leaders since the 1970s 
from the two main parties— Likud and Labour. There are two key 
examples of this. The fi rst under the leadership of Menachem Begin 
with a proposal for “Home Rule” for Palestinians in Judea, Samaria, 
and Gaza in the late 1970s. This became part of the discussions at the 
Camp David Accords aimed to facilitate dialogue between Israel and 
Egypt through the offi  ces of the American President Jimmy Carter. 
The peace framework agreed at Camp David proposed that a self- 
governing authority for Palestinians in the West Bank would be set 
up; Israeli troops are to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza after 
an election of a Palestinian self- governing authority to replace Israel’s 
military government. This has only been partially realized. The 
second example is the Oslo Accords in 1993 signed by Yasar Arafat, 
Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and 
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. In summary, The Declaration 
of Principles deemed it essential to begin the process of resolving 
the Israeli- Palestinian confl ict. Unfortunately, by 1996 these accords 
had stalled and eventually collapsed due to a variety of factors on 
both sides, including the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister 
Rabin at a Peace Rally in Tel Aviv by Yigal Amir, an Israeli Jew who 
opposed the Rabin’s overall peace plan on religious grounds. As with 
many enlightened moments in human history the full expression of 
making the necessary changes to deep confl ict is not quickly and 
easily implemented. Since the mid- 1990s, confl ict over Palestinian 
rights to the land and their call for independent statehood has either 
continued to stagnate or has actually deteriorated. 
 RELIGION IN THE SEARCH FOR CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION AND RECONCILIATION: CAN 
RELIGION HELP? 
 Overcoming the viewpoint that Bedouin and Palestinians are the 
“other” requires more than passing policies and legislation. In a state 
that claims to have a secular and religious identity, what can religion 
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do to assist in developing, enhancing, and sustaining a society which 
gives justice and fairness to all? 
 In the Jewish tradition, the key resources that I would consider 
to be an essential tool in helping to resolve Israel’s land confl icts 
is the Jewish ethical approach to the just treatment of the “other” 
or “stranger”. The Jewish philosopher Hermann Cohen makes an 
important observation relevant to the discussion here. He considers 
the biblical injunction to treat the stranger as one’s own citizen is 
an attempt to overcome prejudice by evoking sympathy which he 
believes can make an important contribution. But he argues that 
if the appeal to love employed by religion is the primary founda-
tion of the ethical command to care for the stranger, then, on the 
basis of the hostility to strangers, which he witnessed in Germany 
at the beginning of the 20th century, this had made little impact 
on humanity. His approach is to disqualify love as a basis for eth-
ical action and instead promotes a reinterpretation of love of the 
other (stranger, neighbor) in terms of the law (Cohen  1907 : 216). 
However, trying to construct an ethics of the love of the stranger 
only through legal requirements and enforcement does not neces-
sarily nurture human attributes of compassion, love, respect, mutual 
understanding, and empathy. It is not only about adhering to a legal 
instruction but it is given in the context that the values of compas-
sion, justice, and peace are essential aspects of being human and that 
such values are also a necessary part of establishing and maintaining 
human relations that seek to enable the well- being of all people. 
 Can Judaism contribute to resolving Israel’s confl ict over land with 
the Palestinians and its Arab citizens? In considering this question 
there follows a brief overview of key Jewish teachings relevant to prac-
ticing constructive attitudes and behavior towards others which are 
essential in reducing confl ict and promoting understanding and rec-
onciliation. We will consider the work of two Israeli organizations/ 
groups, namely:   Wahat al- Salam— Neve Shalom (Oasis of Peace), a 
community of people living together, and Rabbis for Human Rights. 
 NORMATIVE CONCEPTS AND VALUES: RELIGION AS A 
SET OF TEACHINGS, RELIGION AS PRACTICE 
 The values of  Va’ahavtem et ha- Ger (love of stranger) and  Ve’ahabhath 
le- Re’akha (love of neighbor), as contained in the Hebrew scriptures, 
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are an extremely important and signifi cant set of teachings in this 
discussion. This duty of love of stranger is spoken about 36 times in 
the Hebrew scriptures, the best known of these teachings is in the 
Book of Leviticus:
 When a stranger resides with you in your land, you shall not wrong him. 
The stranger who resides with you shall be to as one of your citizens; 
you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of 
Egypt: I the Lord am your God. 
 (Lev. 19:33– 34) 
 This teaching clearly states that if a non- Jew has come to live and 
work in a Jewish land then they are to be treated equally, without 
discrimination; they are to be treated as an equal citizen. Further 
reference to treating the stranger as one of your own citizens is pre-
sent in the later teaching of Leviticus: “You shall have one standard 
of law for the stranger and the citizen alike” (Lev. 24:22), and in 
Numbers 15:16, which is referring specifi cally to the stranger who 
wishes to present a fi re off ering to God, it states, “There shall be one 
law for you and the resident stranger; it shall be a law for all time 
throughout the ages”, and the basis of this teaching is that, “You and 
the stranger shall be alike before the Lord” (Numbers 15:15). The 
underpinning principle in this teaching is justice. The importance 
of not oppressing the stranger and practicing justice towards them 
appears in various places in Deuteronomy. 
 As with the treatment of the stranger, numerous teachings appear 
in the Hebrew scriptures of both a legal and ethical nature, aimed 
at providing a code of behavior covering all aspects of relations 
between neighbors. While there is not suffi  cient space to deal 
with this in depth here, it is worth considering key aspects of 
these teachings. The emphasis on being truthful, fair treatment, 
and not thinking or practicing evil against a neighbor is found in 
a number of the texts, including in the Book of Zechariah (Zech. 
8:16– 17). These teachings are considered to be encapsulated in the 
command: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself ” (Lev. 19:18). 
Both Rabbi Hillel (110  BCE – 10  CE ) and Rabbi Akiba (40‒137 
 CE ) taught that the fundamental principle of the Torah is the 
Leviticus commandment:  “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thy-
self ” (Ginzberg  1906 :  1034; Finkelstein  1936 :  210). Ben Azzai, a 
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student of Akiba, commented on the same commandment empha-
sizing the importance of love for all humankind because “all human 
beings are descended from Adam, a common ancestor which means 
being bound together by the kinship of a common origin” (Cohen 
 2008 : 225). More recent articulation of Akkiba’s understanding is 
seen in the writings of 18th- century Rabbi and Kabbalist, Pinchas 
Elijah Hurwitz, who argues that the core essence of love of 
neighbor consists of loving all of humankind because of their iden-
tical humanity (Hurwitz  1818 ). During the 20th century a number 
of Jewish thinkers also argued that the command concerning love 
of neighbor must apply to non- Jews (Cohen  1907 ; Buber  1958 ; 
Katz  1961 ). 
 Even if the Palestinians and Negev Bedouin are considered as 
strangers— then, surely the admonishment “you shall not wrong the 
stranger who lives alongside you” means they should be accorded 
fair treatment, including recognizing where possible land claims or 
adequate fi nancial/ land reparations on a level that would be given 
to any Jewish citizens. Unfortunately, there continue to be those 
within the current Jewish establishment in Israel that certainly do 
not agree with this approach. An example was witnessed in 2010 
with the views of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, the former Sephardi Chief 
Rabbi of Israel and then current Head of the Council of Torah 
Sages and spiritual leader of Israel’s ultra- orthodox Shas party. In 
a Saturday night sermon, some of which was audio recorded and 
later broadcast on Israel’s Channel 10, Yosef said in relation to the 
issues of what work non- Jews can perform on the Sabbath, “Goyim 
(non- Jews) were born only to serve us. Without that, they have 
no place in the world; only to serve the People of Israel” (Oyster 
 2010 :  1). Challenges to such views of Rabbi Yosef in religious 
circles come mostly from the Reform and Liberal religious com-
munities in Israel. The next sections discuss how the Jewish values 
of love and care for stranger and neighbor are being promoted and 
actioned by various religious groups in Israel by focusing on the 
work of Rabbis for Human Rights, founded in 1988, consisting of 
Israeli rabbis and rabbinical students, and the community  Wahat al- 
Salam— Neve Shalom , jointly established by Jewish and Palestinian 
Arab citizens of Israel in the 1970s, located between Jerusalem and 
Tel Aviv. 
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 TRUST: RELIGION AS COMMUNITY, RELIGION AS 
DISCOURSE 
 During the early stages of the fi rst Palestinian Intifada, a small group 
of Israeli rabbis founded the organization, Rabbis for Human Rights 
(RHR). It consists of Israeli rabbis and rabbinical students from 
diff erent streams of Judaism. RHR states: “We derive our authority 
from our Jewish tradition and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Our mission is to inform the Israeli public about human 
rights violations, and to pressure the state institutions to redress 
these injustices” (RHR  2019 : 1). The work of this organization is 
identifi ed as being located in the traditional Jewish responsibility 
of caring for and protecting the stranger, the poor, the weak, and 
the convert. In the run- up to voting in the 2015 Israeli election 
campaign, RHR released several public statements identifying these 
Jewish responsibilities as an essential aspect to voting. Rabbi Arik 
Ascherman referred to Torah teachings that condemn oppression 
and mistreatment of the “stranger”. The overall message was about 
“Encouraging citizens to vote and reminding them to bring the 
values of human rights work and the honouring of God’s Image 
along with them into the voting booth” (RHR  2015 : 1). 
 There are six main areas of RHR’s work, three of these are 
concerned specifi cally with Palestinian rights in the occupied terri-
tories and rights of Bedouin communities located in the Negev and 
Jahalin Bedouin communities situated on the outskirts of Jerusalem. 
In the occupied territories, human rights work, legal advocacy/ 
intervention regarding land and other socio- economic rights, and 
aiming to protect agricultural access for Palestinian farmers is the 
core of their work. Their work with the Bedouin is advocating and 
petitioning against their forced displacement from land, resolving 
outstanding land claims, and in the Jahalin Bedouin community 
they provide children with afterschool and summer school activ-
ities. The three other areas of RHR’s work involve providing advice 
and legal representation for any Israeli citizens with regard to socio- 
economic and welfare rights; human rights education workshops 
for post- secondary and university students to learn and understand 
about the importance of human rights in the Jewish tradition and 
interfaith work to “harness the teachings and values of our region’s 
faiths as a means of reconciliation & understanding” (RHR  2019 : 1). 
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 NETWORKS, SERVICES, AND ADVOCACY: RELIGION 
AS INSTITUTION AND PRACTICE 
 RHR’s work in the occupied territories involves trying to pre-
vent and reverse the taking of Palestinian land by the Israeli 
state for Jewish settlers or other government projects; interven-
tion to maintain road access for small Palestinian communities in 
Hebron, and protection of Palestinian rights who live amongst the 
large, growing Jewish settlements in parts of Hebron. Sometimes 
members of RHR’s engage in nonviolent activism to reinforce the 
Jewish message of caring for and protecting all people. A  recent 
example of this is seen in early 2019 in the Israeli- administered 
H2 area of Hebron, with a solidarity walk organized by RHR to 
speak with Palestinians, the Israeli military, and Jewish settlers about 
the growing harassment which Palestinians and their civilian inter-
national accompaniers have been facing from settlers and soldiers. 
Although there have been some signs hinting at a reduction in 
the level of harassment, RHR members continue to visit this area 
and aim to promote dialogue and understanding between the 
various communities by appealing to key Jewish ethical teachings 
in human relations. The work of RHR regarding the land rights 
and displacement of Negev Bedouin and the Jahalin Bedouin is 
done in collaboration with the Regional Council of Unrecognized 
Bedouin Villages and the Negev Coexistence Forum. It involves 
legal advice and advocacy, petitioning government to address and 
resolve these land injustices, public statements, organizing non-
violent activist events, and visiting these communities to show soli-
darity. A key focus of RHR’s work since 2012 is ongoing public 
critique of the failure of government to implement the more posi-
tive elements of the Goldberg Commission’s Report. Instead, they 
continue to block land arrangements for the majority of Bedouin 
land claims which total 590,000 dunams, refuse to give building 
permits even in recognized Bedouin villages, continue demolition 
of some villages, and there is a new development of Jewish towns 
on existing Bedouin land where Bedouins already live. Overall, the 
central message taken from the Jewish tradition in all RHR work is 
the sanctity of all human life, sanctifying the name of God through 
respect and care for all humanity, behaving ethically, and pursuing 
justice and peace. 
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 IDENTITY, RELATIONSHIPS, AND HEALING: RELIGION 
AS COMMUNITY, RELIGION AS SPIRITUALITY 
 In an area between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv is located  Wahat al- 
Salam— Neve Shalom , a community jointly established by Jewish and 
Palestinian Arab (Muslim and Christian) citizens of Israel. It was 
established in 1970 by Bruno Hussar, who was born in Egypt in 
1911 to non- practicing Jewish parents. His early years were spent 
in Hungary, Italy, and Paris where, at the age of 39, having earlier 
converted to Christianity, he was ordained in 1950 as a Catholic 
Priest of the Dominican Order. Fr. Bruno Hassar never lost sense of 
his Jewish origins and in 1953 he went to live as a Dominican Priest 
in Israel. Here, over the next few years, after witnessing the growing 
fear and hatred between Jews and Arabs, he negotiated to have the 
 Wahat al- Salam— Neve Shalom (WASNS) community established in 
1970 on land belonging to the Latrun Monastery. This community 
of Jews, Christians, and Muslims live together and are dedicated to 
building justice, peace, and equality for all people in Israel and the 
wider region. Most of those living in the community regard reli-
gious belief as a personal matter, a part of cultural identity. In 2019 
there are 70 families living in the community and it is expected 
to grow over the new few years to around 150 families (WASNS 
 2019a ). 
 This community endeavors to provide “a model of equality, mutual 
respect and partnership that challenges existing patterns of racism 
and discrimination as well as the continued confl ict” and many of its 
members work on peace, justice, and reconciliation projects in wider 
Israeli and Palestinian societies (WASNS  2019b :  1). To promote, 
nurture, and embed the key ideals and behavior of justice, peace, and 
equality for all people within its community and to take this to the 
wider society, the  Wahat al- Salam— Neve Shalom community has its 
own kindergarten and primary school, both of which have a bilin-
gual and multi- cultural curriculum (which includes religion). There 
has been increasing interest from some parents in the surrounding 
Gezer region who in 2018 “waged a struggle, including a protest 
with a one day hunger strike” to get the mayor of the Gezer region 
to allow their children to attend the WASNS kindergarten for their 
compulsory kindergarten year. Permission was eventually given and 
children and parents from outside experienced WASNS work and 
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aims (WASNS  2018 : 1). Teachers at the kindergarten and school 
receive ongoing additional training and guidance to support their 
work in delivering a bilingual and multi- cultural curriculum. 
 SERVICES, NETWORKS, AND TRUST BUILDING: 
RELIGION AS PRACTICE, RELIGION AS  
COMMUNITY 
 WASNS has a School of Peace (SFP) providing opportunities for 
adults from both within as well as outside the community to experi-
ence various forms of educational and practical projects. One of these 
is the Mixed Cities Program designed to focus on the challenges of 
the ongoing confl ict between Israel and its Arab population and 
the Israeli- Palestinian confl ict. In 2018 there were 22 participants 
from Jewish, Muslim, and Christian backgrounds working on 
fi ve joint projects which they would continue to work together 
on back in their own respective communities. The Peace School 
also off ers a new programme of seminars to facilitate dialogue and 
work between academic researchers and leaders of NGOs. In 2018, 
over 70 people attended this new programme, who aim to promote 
peace activism and the development of a shared society, particularly 
amongst students and young people back in the communities where 
they live and work (WASNS  2018 :  2). Each year workshops are 
run for non- WASNS teachers designed to develop inter- group dia-
logue and negotiation skills. In 2018, over 30 participants attended 
the summer workshops coming from Jewish, Muslim, and Christian 
backgrounds and from other parts of the region around Jerusalem 
and Tel Aviv. Some of those who attended spoke of learning to 
realize that: “We are almost identical in everything: pain, feelings, 
emotions, we understand everything when we open up and hear the 
experiences of others” (WASNS  2018 : 2). The encounter which 
the workshops enable between educationalists is spoken of as pro-
viding hope and optimism for the future, “that in another 70 years 
our grandchildren and great- grandchildren will sing a common 
anthem” (WASNS  2018 :  2). Overall, the workshops show the 
importance of education as a tool to assist in building inclusive soci-
eties and remove barriers, “Even if we are not the ones in power, 
we are an essential part of society and everything starts with edu-
cation and from educators” (WASNS  2018 :  2). Other SFP work 
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includes providing three- day youth encounter programmes for Arab 
and Jewish students from schools around the area; the Massa- Masar 
programme, started in 2015, bringing together Jewish, Muslim, and 
Christian teenagers over a four- day period. Through seminars and 
workshops that involve outdoor environmental activities and cul-
tural encounters, participants can explore self and identity in relation 
to issues of religion, identity, and Jewish- Arab relations. One of the 
participants refl ected what many of those who attended felt: “This 
Journey changed me. I will always ask questions. I will try to help 
everyone. I don’t promise but I will listen and try. It is important to 
hear before you judge” (WASNS  2015 : 3). 
 CONCLUSION 
 Principles of justice and peace are an essential part of the Jewish 
prophetic tradition and its ethical and legal frameworks. The living 
out of these values is identifi ed in the Torah as central to the cov-
enantal relationship between God and his chosen people. The 
context in which these commandments are given is of a people 
who have fl ed from slavery in Egypt and are on a journey to a 
land which God is said to have given them (Deut. 4:14, NIV). 
But going into a land that is already the land of other people who 
then are driven out or slaughtered, apparently on the command 
of God, raises somewhat of a dilemma in the current discussion 
of the land issues in contemporary Israel. It is therefore essential 
to recognize the diversity of the Jewish system of values and that 
interpreting and implementing these needs to be contextualized in 
the socio- political- historical moment of human life and experience 
(Jacobs  1960 : 8– 9). Therefore, can Judaism contribute to resolving 
Israel’s confl ict over land with the Palestinians and its Arab citizens? 
I would suggest that the Jewish tradition, as expressed and under-
stood in the examples of the organizations discussed above, does 
have an important role and contribution to make. It will not be 
an easy task challenging the political and religious mindsets who 
believe that Israel has a right to rule the occupied territories, to 
oppress Palestinians, and continue to pursue an assimilation policy 
to homogenize Israel’s non- Jewish citizens. But the Jewish tradition 
has evolved over the centuries through the dialogue, disagreement, 
and debate by Rabbis and scholars over interpretation of Jewish 
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ethical and legal traditions in the context of their day. The challenge 
is to continue this process so that the Jewish ethical teachings of love 
and care for all humankind will be reasserted over the “nationalist 
and isolationist understanding of Jewish tradition” that dominates 
Israeli society (RHR  2019 : 1). 
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 CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 
 RELIGION IN POST- GENOCIDE 
RWANDA’S QUEST FOR CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION AND RECONCILIATION  
 Christine Schliesser 
 INTRODUCTION: THE CONTEXT 
 On April 6, 1994, the plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal 
Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, the president of Burundi, 
was shot down as it approached Kigali, capital of Rwanda. Everyone 
on board was killed. While the question of responsibility remains 
disputed until today, this attack served as the catalyst for the geno-
cide in Rwanda. Since 1990, Rwanda had suff ered under a civil 
war. With the attack on the plane, civil war culminated in the 
well- prepared massacre of up to one million children, women and 
men, while the world community stood by and watched (Dallaire 
 2004 ). Most of the victims belonged to the Tutsi minority (ca. 
15  percent), yet countless moderate Hutu (ca. 85  percent) who 
refused to participate in the killings were murdered as well. What 
became the fastest genocide of modern history stood out not only 
because of its preventability, systematic preparation and brevity, 
but also because of its cruelty. Many victims were cut into pieces 
with machetes or buried alive. Due to the excessive sexual vio-
lence in the Rwandan genocide, sexual violence and mutilation has 
since become acknowledged and punishable as genocidal crimes 
 9 
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(“Akayesu ruling” of 1998). Another characteristic of the Rwandan 
genocide is that many victims and perpetrators knew each other. 
They were neighbors, friends, or even family. 
 Convicted perpetrators, who have been released from prison, usu-
ally return to their home villages, oftentimes the place of their atro-
cities and the home of survivors. There, feelings of hatred and fear, 
shame and revenge, are all mingled together. With a country vir-
tually in ashes, the struggle for everyday survival was compounded 
by the emotional turmoil of both survivors and perpetrators wrest-
ling with anxiety and hostility. Rwanda’s long- term president 
Paul Kagame realized that in order for the country to be rebuilt, 
he needed to provide stability and social unity. He thus initiated 
a “National Politics of Reconciliation”, pushing reconciliation 
initiatives on all levels in society. On a national level, Rwanda’s 
“National Unity and Reconciliation Commission” (NURC) was 
founded that promotes diff erent reconciliation and sensitization 
projects throughout the country. The terms “Tutsi”, “Hutu”, and 
“Twa” were forbidden, and the offi  cial motto “We are all Rwandan” 
was introduced to forge a new, national identity. On the judicial 
level, Rwanda established the so- called gacaca courts, traditional 
mechanisms of confl ict resolution. In terms of stability and eco-
nomic progress, Kagame’s reconciliation strategy seems to be paying 
off  as Rwanda’s Human Development Index (HDI) has steadily 
increased and foreign investors hail Rwanda’s “economic miracle” 
(Amman  2015 : 31). At the same time, however, reports of severe 
and continuing violations of human rights and of a political climate 
that stifl es basic rights, such as freedom of the press and freedom of 
political opposition, give rise to concern (Bouka  2018 ). 
 WHAT HAPPENED TO RELIGION AFTER THE 
GENOCIDE? 
 A hundred days of slaughter in 1994 left Rwanda permanently 
altered. The eff ects of the genocide were not only visible on the 
social, economic, and political levels, Rwanda’s religious landscape 
changed as well. With about 90 percent Christians, pre- genocide 
Rwanda was— and still is— one of the most Christian countries on 
the African continent. Within the Christian faith, it was Catholicism 
that was most prominent with almost two- thirds of the population 
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following the Catholic faith. Diff erent from other African coun-
tries, the wave of Christian revival and renewal that had swept across 
Africa at the end of the 20th century had bypassed Rwanda to a 
large extent. 
 It was only after the genocide that these “new” churches 
experienced any kind of signifi cant growth in Rwanda. While 
the once dominant Catholic Church lost almost one- third of its 
members, Protestant churches doubled their membership numbers 
from 19  percent pre- genocide to 38  percent post- genocide 
(National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda  2014 : xv). Most of this 
increase can be attributed to new churches of Pentecostal and cha-
rismatic orientation. Pentecostal and charismatic churches place 
special emphasis on a personal relationship with God through 
accepting Jesus Christ as personal Lord and Savior and on spiritual 
gifts such as speaking in tongues and divine healing. With their 
emphasis on healing, on breaking with the past, and a new begin-
ning, Pentecostal churches seem to hearken to the needs of a society 
traumatized by mass violence. It was oftentimes through refugees 
returning from exile that these new churches were introduced to 
the country. 
 Contributing further to the change of the religious landscape 
after the genocide was a sense of disillusion and disappoint-
ment with the established churches, especially with the Catholic 
Church. As discussed in  Chapter 5 , churches had become the sites 
of massacres rather than sanctuaries of refuge. Not only did people 
feel betrayed by the lack of assistance by the churches when it 
was needed most, but questions of a possible complicity of the 
churches (Rittner, Roth, and Whitworth  2004 ) remain unanswered 
until this day. 
 RELIGION: A MAJOR PLAYER IN CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION AND RECONCILIATION 
 Despite these changes, religion remains a major factor in Rwanda’s 
current civil society. While the religious microlevel has under-
gone major changes, the macrolevel remained nearly the same 
with still about 90  percent of the population adhering to the 
Christian faith. Contrary to many secularized countries in the 
West, religious actors at both the individual and institutionalized 
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levels are signifi cant players in this country’s processes of social 
change: “Religion has been and continues to be part of Rwanda’s 
system of meaning- making and meaning- interpretation, and hence 
has contributed to shaping new values, demands of propriety and 
interpretations of old norms that have emerged after the geno-
cide” (Kubai  2016 :  3). This holds especially true for Rwanda’s 
process of reconciliation and its quest for sustainable peace and 
social cohesion. Reconciliation is understood both as a process 
of healing relationships and as the result of this process. The pro-
cess includes diff erent elements, such as confessing one’s guilt, 
asking and granting of forgiveness, and making amends. Against 
the background of the genocide, reconciliation, social unity, and 
development are explicit topics on the agendas of many churches. 
The churches generally support the government’s top- down rec-
onciliation strategies, yet at the same time they supplement them 
with bottom- up strategies. 
 CHRISTIAN CHURCHES IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
AND RECONCILIATION: CONTRIBUTIONS 
 Based on our discussion of the specifi c characteristics of religious 
actors in  Chapter  7 , the following examines the contributions of 
Christian churches in Rwanda’s reconciliation process. I will make 
use of the examples of diff erent Church denominations, including 
“traditional” churches, such as the Presbyterian Church, the Anglican 
Church, and the Catholic Church, “new” churches, such as Pentecostal 
Church of Rwanda (ADEPR) and Christian Life Assembly in Kigali, 
as well as non- church- based Christian actors like Christian Action 
for Reconciliation and Social Assistance (CARSA). My analysis is 
based on both literature analysis and recurrent empirical research and 
ethnographic work I have conducted in Rwanda since 2014. 
 TRUST: RELIGION AS COMMUNITY, RELIGION AS 
PRACTICE 
 Trust in the churches and their moral credibility had been seriously 
harmed through the genocide. The consequences of the perceived 
failures of the churches are visible in the changed religious landscape 
as people turned their backs on the established churches. Regaining 
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the trust of the people thus proved to be a key challenge for many 
churches as they sought for ways of dealing with the past. While many 
chose to downplay their actions and inactions during the genocide, 
some took a diff erent route. A group that included representatives 
of Tutsi, Hutu, and the West from diff erent church denominations 
gathered in Detmold, Germany, in 1996 to draft a confession of 
guilt, the so- called “Detmold Confession”. The Confession begins 
by acknowledging that reconciliation starts with recognizing the 
suff ering of the other and with asking for forgiveness, “The Rwandan 
people will never be reconciled with each other unless each party 
accepts to kneel down before the suff ering of the other party, to con-
fess their own off ense and to humbly ask forgiveness of their victims” 
(Detmold Confession, §1). For 20 years, the Detmold Confession 
remained the only one of its kind, until in 2016 the Catholic Church 
in Rwanda issued a long- awaited apology, followed by a statement 
of Pope Francis in 2017. Trust needs authenticity, not least in terms 
of dealing with the past. A genuine confession of guilt helps prepare 
the ground for sustainable peacebuilding and reconciliation. At the 
same time, confessions of guilt, apologies, and asking for forgiveness 
in words, symbols, and deeds are not limited to religious actors, such 
as churches, but have proven powerful tools of confl ict resolution in 
the political realm as well (cf. The 1970 Warsaw Genufl ection of the 
German chancellor Willy Brandt). 
 RELATIONSHIPS AND IDENTITY: RELIGION AS 
COMMUNITY 
 Many Rwandan churches emphasize the importance of building 
relationships, of creating a sense of belonging and identity. In the 
context of the nation’s reconciliation process this not only means 
building relationships with survivors and with perpetrators, but also 
assisting both in building relationships with one another. Pascal 
Bataringaya, current President of the Presbyterian Church, sees rela-
tionship building as a specifi c strength of the churches as compared 
to government initiatives: “The churches have something special. 
They walk with the people, with the perpetrators, with the victims. 
People feel that they are not alone” (Bataringaya, Kigali, February 
21, 2016, personal interview). Against the background of  ubuntu , 
that is, the idea that one’s own identity is bound up with that of 
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the other person— “I am because we are” (Tutu  2011 ), I will illus-
trate the emphasis on relationships by referring to the example of 
Remera, a small village in Western Rwanda. 
 In Remera, the pastor, a trained mediator, of the local Presbyterian 
congregation founded the “Lights”. It is the aim of this group, 
named after the Gospel of Matthew 5:14 (“You are the light of the 
world”), to reach out and establish relationships with survivors and 
perpetrators. Once these relationships are established, they invite 
both to participate in the weekly meetings of the Lights. During 
these meetings Christian concepts such as forgiveness, healing, 
and transformation are discussed, supplemented by insights from 
trauma therapy, confl ict resolution, and mediation. Through the 
ongoing engagement of the Lights, relationships between survivors 
and perpetrators are established and supported. The example of 
Remera illustrates our discussion of social network theory above 
( Chapter 4.1 ). It is by means of “connectors”— such as the pastor 
and the members of the Lights— that diff erent groups and individ-
uals are linked, even across (former) enemy lines. By connecting 
them, new ideas and concepts, such as on forgiveness or dealing 
with trauma, are disseminated; a prerequisite for the paradigm 
change required by complex social processes such as reconciliation 
and building a new nation. 
 NETWORKS AND FUNDING: RELIGION AS AN 
INSTITUTION, RELIGION AS SPIRITUALITY 
 “Global networking is an inherent characteristic of the whole 
enterprise of the new churches in Rwanda” (Kubai  2007 :  208). 
The link between local congregations and global partners is vis-
ible as churches bring together locals, returnees, and sponsors from 
abroad. This holds true for both new and traditional churches such 
as the Presbyterian and the Anglican Church. Their close ties with 
the German United Evangelical Mission (UEM), for example, 
facilitate not only networks and connections, but also funding. In 
terms of confl ict resolution, the local- global perspective of many 
churches can be an asset as resources and knowledge, as well as 
experiences and best practices are being exchanged across borders. 
The experiences of Remera, for instance, have attracted interest in 
places like Germany, the US, Nigeria, or Kenya. 
RWANDA: RELIGION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 109
109
 SERVICES: RELIGION AS PRACTICE 
 As in many other African contexts, the churches in Rwanda pro-
vide a number of community services, including education, med-
ical services, orphanages, or microfi nance. In that way, they do not 
diff er signifi cantly from non- religious actors such as NGOs. Some 
churches prioritize certain services, while others display a wider array. 
The Pentecostal Church of Rwanda (ADEPR), for example, focuses 
on education. With about two million members it self- describes as 
a “religious organization with the vision consisting of quantitative 
and qualitative transformation of the Rwandan Community by Jesus 
Christ Integral Gospel” (Kwizera  2015 ). ADEPR is responsible for 80 
nursery schools, 158 primary schools, 58 secondary schools, six voca-
tional and technical schools, and four bible schools. ADEPR’s literacy 
programs throughout the country were awarded prizes by UNESCO. 
In the post- genocide context of Rwanda, the signifi cance of educa-
tion for processes of confl ict resolution and peacebuilding can hardly 
be overemphasized. “Education has played a great role during the rec-
onciliation process since it has been used to sensitize the Rwandese 
society to build the skill of living with diversity” (Sundqvist  2011 : 183). 
 NORMATIVE CONCEPTS AND VALUES: RELIGION  
AS A SET OF TEACHINGS, RELIGION AS PRACTICE 
 As people go to church each Sunday, they listen to teachings on 
dogmatics (what to believe) and ethics (how to behave). As any 
religion, the Christian faith includes strong normative concepts and 
values. In the aftermath of the genocide, concepts such as reconcili-
ation, forgiveness, and grace have become particularly signifi cant. 
These theological concepts become very concrete once they are set 
in the context of torn social fabric and the quest for the healing of 
broken relationships. Genocide survivor Fr. Marcel Uwineza, S.J, 
recounts his mixed emotions when he met one of the murderers of 
his parents, brothers, and sister.
 I thought he was coming to kill me too. But I could not believe what 
happened. As if in a movie, he knelt before me and asked me to forgive 
him. After a time of confusion, asking myself what was happening, and 
by which force I could not describe, I  took him, embraced him and 
said: “I forgive you; the Lord has been good to me.” Ever since that 
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moment, I have felt free. I have realized that forgiveness heals the for-
giver even more than the forgiven. 
 (Uwineza  2016a ) 
 Uwineza’s description of “a school of forgiveness” that he perceives 
God has led him through since the murder of his family is that of a 
very personal experience, yet it is not an uncommon account, either. 
Narratives like Uwineza’s help illustrate the potency of concepts 
like forgiveness and healing in transforming attitudes and behaviors. 
 HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE: RELIGION AS SPIRITUALITY, 
RELIGION AS DISCOURSE 
 Part of Christian theology is a specifi c understanding of anthro-
pology or human nature. Human fl ourishing is cast not only in 
terms of physical and material well- being, but also in spiritual and 
emotional terms. From this holistic understanding follows for many 
Christian churches that care for the soul must be accompanied by 
care for the body. Reconciliation initiatives by the churches in 
Rwanda are therefore often linked to development projects. As 
Nathan Gasatura, bishop of the Anglican Church, explains,
 The aim is not only to reconcile, but to do projects together, they give 
them cows together, to feed together, milk the cow together, share the 
milk together, sell what remains of the milk together, divide the cash 
together. They would get medical insurances together, build their homes 
together … get into cooperatives together, maybe it is rice, maybe it 
is bee hives, maybe about credit and savings. They also go to church 
together, celebrate together. 
 (Gasatura, Butare, February 23, 2016, personal interview) 
 Connecting the spiritual with the material, and reconciliation with 
development, the sustainability of both are enhanced as welcome 
synergies are reaped. 
 DEALING WITH TRAUMA AND RESTORING 
MEANING: RELIGION AS A SET OF TEACHINGS, 
RELIGION AS SPIRITUALITY, RELIGION AS PRACTICE 
 Violent confl ict leaves visible and invisible wounds. If the latter 
are not treated, they might not only result in severe post- traumatic 
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stress disorder (PTSD), keeping the individual from eff ectively man-
aging his or her own life. They can also contribute to the spiral of 
violence that turns former victims into perpetrators. Meanwhile, a 
quarter of a century after the genocide, second- generation trauma 
has become a major challenge as the challenges of survivor guilt 
and fi nding meaning are being reframed in the next generation. 
Through developing trust, personal relationships, and feelings of 
belonging, Christian churches help create a place where trauma can 
be addressed and healing processes begin, oftentimes by enlisting the 
help of trained trauma counselors. Trauma healing workshops such 
as off ered by CARSA teach participants strategies to alleviate the 
eff ects of PTSD and build resilience (cf. CARSA Trauma Healing). 
Participants learn to share their stories in a safe way that does not 
result in re- traumatization and given the opportunity to do so. 
They furthermore receive counseling in order to give and receive 
forgiveness. Situating one’s own story in the larger eschatological 
framework of Christian hope can help restore meaning to fi rst and 
second- generation victims of trauma. 
 RITUALS: RELIGION AS SPIRITUALITY, RELIGION 
AS PRACTICE 
 Rituals provide structure and stability in daily life. Religious rituals, 
such as prayer, meditation, or communion can become important 
resources of support, especially in times of social upheaval. Catholic 
communities in post- genocide Rwanda have attempted to utilize 
Christian ritual in terms of reconciliation such as in  gacaca nkirisitu 
(Christian gacaca), a pastoral process for perpetrators and survivors. 
Genocide perpetrators are asked to abstain from the sacraments for 
six months, while participating in a weekly catechetical program. 
They are encouraged to confront their shame and seek forgive-
ness from the victims. If both consent, survivors join perpetrators 
in receiving the Sacrament of Reconciliation. “Echoing ancient 
church penitential traditions, the priest … performed a ritual rite 
of reincorporation including the sprinkling of baptismal water” 
(Carney  2015 : 20), followed by a celebratory feast with the entire 
community. Based on the conviction that reconciliation is a long- 
term process, the church then assists in facilitating day- to- day 
relationships between the perpetrator and the survivor. 
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 MEMORY: RELIGION AS A SET OF TEACHINGS, 
RELIGION AS SPIRITUALITY, RELIGION AS PRACTICE 
 Memory is central to human identity— to who we are and how we 
have become who we are. Oftentimes, memory is used to foster 
hatred and perpetuate stereotypes. Recognizing the importance 
of memory for reconciliation and sustainable peace, the Christian 
churches in Rwanda seek to contribute to the healing of mem-
ories, for instance, through trauma workshops and their emphasis 
on forgiveness. Christian churches participate in the nation- wide 
rituals of remembrance, for instance, through the joint preparation 
of the week of remembrance following April 7 as the Genocide 
Memorial Day. At the same time, churches develop their own rit-
uals of commemoration. The Presbyterian congregation in Remera, 
for instance, erected a memorial site with the names and graves of 
the church members killed at a prominent place next to the church. 
There, survivors have a place for their grief as their murdered loved 
ones are being acknowledged by the community. Bringing Christian 
eschatological hope and a framework that reaches beyond the indi-
vidual lifespan to people’s despair is the “theological imperative of 
memory” in post- genocide Rwanda (Uwinzea  2016b ). 
 CHRISTIAN CHURCHES IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
AND RECONCILIATION: CHALLENGES 
 Next to the signifi cant contributions of the Christian churches and 
their potentials for supporting, if not leading positive social change, 
the following problems emerge. 
 REINVENTING SOCIAL CLEAVAGES 
 Rwanda’s reconciliation process is marked by the offi  cial motto “We 
are all Rwandan”. Much political and social energy has been invested 
in the creation of one collective national identity, transcending 
former ethnic identities. Yet the problem seems to be more com-
plex as additional layers of identity are being added to society, for 
instance, by returnees from Anglophone and Francophone coun-
tries. These emerging new social alignments are also visible in some 
churches as language, common backgrounds, and affl  uency become 
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markers of identity. For example, Christian Life Assembly, one of 
the fastest growing churches in Kigali, represents an Anglophone 
identity, with many members being returnees from East Africa. The 
apparent affl  uence of its members is a further identity marker of this 
church. Especially in urban contexts it seems, therefore, as if “the 
churches have wittingly or unwittingly reinvented new layers of 
identity” (Kubai  2007 : 212), thereby inadvertently countering their 
own reconciliation eff orts. 
 LACK OF ATTENTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
 For years, Rwanda has been criticized for its tight political con-
trol, state intimidation, and suppression of basic human rights 
(Human Rights Watch  2019 : 491– 495). One example is the prob-
lematic situation of the Twa people, a minority of about 1 percent. 
Traditionally hunters and gatherers, the Twa have suff ered polit-
ical and social marginalization for decades. In April 2016, the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination issued 
an offi  cial warning that the Twa are threatened by extinction. Yet 
within Rwanda’s current political discourse on national unity that 
obliterates diff erent social groups, the problem of the Twa cannot 
even be adequately framed. The denial of ethnic plurality results, in 
this case, in the denial of basic human rights to a certain group of 
people, with harmful consequences to the nation’s process of social 
unity and reconciliation. Perhaps due to the harsh political climate, 
the churches have so far expressed little interest in issues of human 
rights, thereby neglecting their role as advocates on behalf of the 
poor and marginalized. 
 (TOO) CLOSE CHURCH AND STATE RELATIONSHIP 
 In general, Christian churches in Rwanda seek good relationships 
with the state. In terms of confl ict resolution and reconciliation, the 
churches support the state- led top- down initiatives. Quantitative 
studies support our fi ndings here that there are no systematic 
diff erences between the diff erent religious groups and their engage-
ment in peacebuilding (Bazuin  2013 ). The close relationship 
between the churches and the state is illustrated by the presence 
of (former) church representatives in higher government positions, 
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such as the president of the “National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission” (NURC), an Anglican bishop. The reconciliation and 
forgiveness rhetoric of the state aligns well with the churches’ own 
core values. At the same time, the churches mostly abstain from 
critically addressing problematic state conduct. This lack of pro-
phetic stance has evoked some inner- church criticism (Kazuyuki 
 2009 ; Nsengimana  2015 ), yet mostly the churches “try to see how 
to gain favor from the state instead of challenging it” (Nsengimana 
 2015 : 108). 
 ONE- SIDED CONCEPT OF RECONCILIATION 
 Processes of reconciliation must pay adequate attention to peace, 
justice, mercy, and truth in order to be sustainable (Lederach  1999 ). 
Yet in the context of the Rwandan reconciliation process, churches 
seem to focus primarily on mercy and peace, while neglecting justice 
and truth. This impression is supported by Josephine Sundqvist’s 
study on Pentecostal churches and reconciliation. “The Pentecostal 
movement has barely been emphasizing justice in their reconcili-
ation strategy or their interpretation of the concept” (Sundqvist 
 2011 : 169). The neglect of justice and truth is visible, for instance, in 
a problematic offi  cial discourse on memory that primarily enforces 
the “narrative of the victor”, while suppressing dissenting voices. If 
reconciliation lacks justice and truth, however, resentment towards 
it is likely to build up. 
 CONCLUSION 
 A thorough understanding of post- genocide Rwanda’s ongoing 
major social experiment called “Politics of Reconciliation” needs 
to take the contributions of religious actors into account. Churches 
successfully contribute to the social change needed for sustainable 
peace on multiple levels. Their specifi c contributions display both 
formal and material characteristics. Formal aspects such as building 
trust and personal relationships with survivors and perpetrators or 
off ering diff erent community services such as health care and edu-
cation are supplemented by material aspects such as disseminating 
normative concepts and values related to reconciliation and forgive-
ness, while off ering meaning and hope in the face of a traumatic 
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past. At the same time, certain challenges emerge. A  one- sided 
understanding of reconciliation neglecting justice, a Church- state 
relationship lacking critical distance, and a lack of explicit concern 
regarding the state’s human rights violations seem to be amongst the 
most pertinent problematic aspects threatening to turn “thick” and 
substantial reconciliation into a “thin” and formal process. 
 REFERENCES 
 Amman ,  Daniel.  ( 2015 ). “ A Country of Hope: Africa. Rise of a Continent”, 
 Credit Suisse Bulletin ,  3 :  30 – 45 . 
 Bazuin ,  Joshua T.  ( 2013 ). “Religion in the Remaking of Rwanda After 
Genocide”, Ph.D. Dissertation,  Vanderbilt University . 
 Bouka ,  Y.  ( 2018 ). “ Rwanda” , in  Jon  Abbink ,  V.  Adetula ,  A.  Mehler , and  H. 
 Melber (eds.),  Africa Yearbook Volume 14. Politics, Economy and Society South of 
the Sahara in 2017 .  Leiden :  Boston ,  342 – 352 . 
 Carney ,  J.J.  ( 2015 ). “ A Generation After Genocide: Catholic Reconciliation in 
Rwanda” ,  Theological Studies ,  76 ( 4 ):  785 – 812 . 
 Christian Action for Reconciliation and Social Assistance (CARSA).  “Trauma 
Healing & Reconciliation”. Viewed from:  www.carsaministry.org/ trauma- 
healing- reconciliation/ [Date accessed October 31, 2019]. 
 Dallaire ,  Roméo.  ( 2004 ).  Shake Hands with the Devil. The Failure of Humanity in 
Rwanda .  London: Da Capo Press . 
 Detmold Confession . ( 1996 ). Viewed from  www.rwandahope.com/ confes-
sion.pdf [Date accessed November 1, 2019]. 
 Human Rights Watch . ( 2019 ).  World Report 2019 . Viewed from  www.hrw.org/ 
de/ world- report/ 2019 [Date accessed October 31, 2019]. 
 Kazuyuki ,  Sasaki.  ( 2009 ). “Beyond Dichotomies. The Quest for Justice and 
Reconciliation and the Politics of National Identity Building in Post- 
Genocide Rwanda”,  Ph.D. Dissertation ,  Bradford . 
 Kubai ,  Anne.  ( 2007 ). “ Post- Genocide Rwanda:  The Changing Religious 
Landscape” ,  Exchange ,  36 :  198 – 214 . 
 Kubai ,  Anne . ( 2016 ). “ ‘ Confession’ and ‘Forgiveness’ as a Strategy for 
Development in Post- Genocide Rwanda” ,  HTS Teologiese Studies/ Theological 
Studies ,  42 ( 4 ):  1 – 9 . 
 Kwizera ,  Emmanuel.  ( 2015 ). “ADEPR Education Ministry”.  Pentecostal Church 
in Rwanda ADEPR . Viewed from:   www.en.adepr.rw/ spip.php?article61 
[Date accessed October 31, 2019]. 
 Lederach ,  John P.  ( 1999 ). “ ‘ Justpeace.’ in European Centre for Confl ict 
Prevention” ,  People Building Peace ,  Utrecht :   European Centre for Confl ict 
Prevention ,  27 – 36 . 
RELIGION MATTERS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION116
116
 National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda . ( 2014 ).  Socio- Cultural Characteristics 
of the Population.  Viewed from:   www.statistics.gov.rw/ publication/ rphc4- 
thematic- report- socio- cultural- characteristics- population [Date accessed 
October 31, 2019]. 
 Nsengimana ,  Célestin.  ( 2015 ).  Peacebuilding Initiatives of the Presbyterian Church in 
Post- Genocide Rwandan Society. An Impact Assessment .  Geneva :  Globethics.net . 
 Rittner ,  Carole ,  Roth ,  John K. , and  Whitworth ,  Wendy (eds.). ( 2004 ).  Genocide 
in Rwanda. Complicity of the Churches?  St Paul, MN :  Paragon House . 
 Sundqvist ,  Josephine.  ( 2011 ). “ Reconciliation as a Societal Process. A  Case 
Study on the Role of the Pentecostal Movement (ADEPR) as an Actor in the 
Reconciliation Process in Post- Genocide Rwanda” ,  Svensk Missionstidsskrift, 
 99 :  157 – 195 . 
 Tutu ,  Desmond.  ( 2011 ).  God Is Not a Christian:  And Other Provocations . 
 New York :  HarperOne . 
 Uwineza ,  Marcel.  ( 2016a ). “On Christian Hope”,  America. The Jesuit Review , 
April, 4– 11. Viewed from:  www.americamagazine.org/ issue/ christian- hope 
[Date accessed October 31, 2019]. 
 Uwineza ,  Marcel.  ( 2016b ). “ Memory:  A Theological Imperative in Post- 
Genocide Rwanda” ,  Hekima Review ,  54 :  51 – 65 . 
17
 ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE 
 RELIGION IN MUSLIM WOMEN’S 
PEACEBUILDING INITIATIVES 
IN PAKISTAN  
 S. Ayse Kadayifci- Orellana 
 INTRODUCTION 
 Militant groups, in the name of Islam, continue to threaten peace 
and security in the Western and Muslim worlds. Pakistan is one of 
the countries that suff ers most from the attacks of these groups. 
For instance, in December 2014, gunmen stormed the Army Public 
School in Peshawar, setting off  explosives and fi ring automatic 
weapons, killing more than 148, mostly children. The Tehreek- e 
Taliban Pakistan claimed responsibility for the attack. Within this 
context, Mossarat Qadeem, a Muslim woman in Pakistan, founded 
the PAIMAN Alumni Trust (PAIMAN), a national organization 
working at the grassroots level, to address radicalization and extremist 
violence, and also to build peace in the confl ict- ridden regions of 
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Based on the principle of “local own-
ership”, PAIMAN draws its confl ict resolution from Islamic and 
Pakistani traditions and values. This case study will explore how 
PAIMAN, empowered by Islam, works to address extremist vio-
lence in Pakistan. It considers: (1) religion as a community, which 
explores how Muslim identity provides women with credibility 
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and legitimacy to resolve confl icts and build peace; (2)  religion 
as practice, which examines how PAIMAN assists women and 
youth impacted by violence and confl ict in Pakistan by engaging 
and supported them, and (3)  religion as a set of teachings, which 
describes how Islamic values inform their work. 
 RELIGION, CONFLICT RESOLUTION, AND 
PEACEBUILDING 
 Since 9/ 11 the role of religion in confl ict has become a main area 
of interest. In order to respond to religiously motivated confl icts, 
scholars and practitioners have pointed out that our policies must 
be based on a deeper understanding of the dynamics of religion, 
violence, and confl ict resolution, and must address the unique needs 
and opportunities of the communities within their religio- cultural 
contexts. Consequently, the potential of religious traditions as 
sources of peace and the crucial role religious actors can play are 
increasingly being recognized by governmental agencies as well as 
non- governmental organizations working in the fi eld of security, 
confl ict resolution, and peacebuilding. This recognition has led 
institutions such as USAID ( 2019 ), the World Bank ( 2015 ), and the 
United Nations (UNIATF  2018 ) to identify engagement with reli-
gion and faith- based actors as an important component of the 2030 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
 Religious peacebuilding includes a range of activities performed 
by religious actors or religiously motivated individuals and groups 
for the purpose of resolving and transforming confl ict and building 
sustainable peace. Engaging in religious peacebuilding can provide 
a spiritual basis for transformation and supplement the mechan-
istic and instrumental confl ict resolution models. Religion can 
bring social, moral, and spiritual resources to the peacebuilding pro-
cess. They can also inspire a sense of engagement and commitment 
to resolving confl ict and to transforming confl ictual relationships 
into peaceful ones, especially because religion incorporate ideals of 
peace. Furthermore, they provide vocabulary, images, and myths, 
exemplars to serve as symbols and models of peace, as well as a range 
of values and principles to guide confl ict resolution. Religious 
involvement in peacemaking initiatives can prepare and equip 
confl ict resolution practitioners and diplomats for proactive roles 
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in transforming the confl ict. As Abu- Nimer ( 2001 :  686) notes, 
“Framing the interventions within a religious context and deriving 
tools from a religious narrative have made it possible for interveners 
to gain access and increase their potential impact on the parties”. 
Gopin ( 2000 : 15) supports this by stating that
 a close study of the sacred texts, traditions, symbols and myths that 
emerge in conflict situations may contribute to theoretical approaches 
to conflict analysis by providing a useful frame of reference for conflict 
resolution workshops, and interfaith dialogue groups, and by creating a 
bridge to the unique cultural expression of a particular conflict. 
 Religious peacebuilding, then, could become a major tool for 
training, empowering, and motivating religiously oriented people 
towards peace. 
 WHERE ARE THE WOMEN IN FAITH- BASED ACTORS? 
 Engaging religious actors and developing intervention strategies have 
been incorporated to address Islamic militancy in Pakistan. Noticing 
that religious actors have more credibility and legitimacy than secular 
actors, governmental organizations such as USAID, OECD, and the 
Interior Ministries of Iraq and Pakistan have started to work with 
religious leaders and develop counter- narrative strategies that aim 
to deconstruct, discredit, or demystify groups like Taliban and al- 
Qaeda and to de- radicalize or disengage their followers (Briggs and 
Feve  2013 ). However, these approaches focused on traditional reli-
gious leaders, which are often men, and have rarely recognized the 
important role women have been playing in responding to violence 
and building peace in their communities. Gendered approaches to 
peace and security are mainly articulated by the Women, Peace and 
Security (WPS) community which emphasizes addressing women’s 
needs and empowering them at times of confl ict, mostly through 
secular approaches. Much of the research and discussions still pre-
sume religious women are voiceless victims of religion and religious 
institutions and therefore are in need of being saved. Hence, the 
important work Muslim women activists are doing in their com-
munities to respond to violent extremism and their intervention 
strategies rooted in Islamic theology go unnoticed. 
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 It is often the case that, in many religious traditions, women’s 
role in the public sphere is limited as a result of patriarchal inter-
pretation of religious text, and many male religious actors ignore 
or obstruct women’s leadership in peacebuilding and confl ict reso-
lution eff orts (Hayward and Marshall  2015 : 13). Muslim women, 
in particular, have often been perceived as victims of not only vio-
lence committed by militant organizations but by Islam in general. 
Hence, emancipation and empowerment of Muslim women have 
been an integral part of foreign policy objectives and democratiza-
tion, and development eff orts by many Western governments and 
organizations. While it is true that Muslim women are often victims 
of patriarchal structures and discriminatory practices, this depiction 
of Muslim women as victims does not tell the whole story. Many 
Muslim women are inspired by their faith and believe Islam calls 
for justice and peacebuilding. They are increasingly playing critical 
peacebuilding roles either by organizing to stop violence and end 
the confl ict or developing initiatives. 
 PAIMAN AND ISLAMIC SOURCES OF CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 
 One such example of a Muslim woman working on building peace 
in her community is Mossarat Qadeem, who co- founded PAIMAN, 
a non- profi t organization in 2004 ( www.paimantrust.org ). Within 
an Islamic framework, PAIMAN works directly with youth as well 
as mothers of radicalized youth, female community leaders, teachers, 
and elected representatives to respond to violent extremism and 
build resiliency in her community in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) 
and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan 
(Peace Direct  2019 ). Based on the belief that there is an urgent 
need for developing the understanding of people on various aspects 
of confl ict transformation and peacebuilding and its application at 
a community level, PAIMAN aims to neutralize extremist tenden-
cies through community mobilization, active citizenship, and com-
munity empowerment for building social cohesion (ICAN  2017 ). 
To accomplish this, PAIMAN established the Center for Confl ict 
Transformation and Peacebuilding in Islamabad to act as a resource 
center and training institute in South Asia. Initiatives of PAIMAN 
engage various local actors such as elected offi  cials, youth, women, 
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madrasa teachers, religious leaders, and journalists, amongst others, 
from confl ict- aff ected areas. PAIMAN also trains women, particu-
larly mothers, and youth in a number of diff erent areas to increase 
local capacity for addressing violent extremism. Recognizing “[A] 
woman’s role is not just a mother, but also an activist, a teacher, a 
religious scholar, a political leader, a decision maker, and a peace 
negotiator” (ICAN  2017 ). Qadeem’s organization has trained 
14,000 males and females, who then became members of Peace 
groups called TOLANA to promote peace and counter violent 
extremism within the community (ICAN  2017 ). Amongst other 
tasks, they use social media, and hold community sessions at schools, 
madrasas, and public places to create awareness and to discuss how 
to address extremism. The PAIMAN Alumni Trust also developed 
an inclusive peace curriculum and trained 220 teachers of private 
schools and 98 teachers of madrassas who then use the curriculum 
in their respective schools and madrassas. 
 MUSLIM IDENTITY AS A SOURCE OF CREDIBILITY AND 
LEGITIMACY: RELIGION AS COMMUNITY 
 Muslim women who are working in their communities to respond 
to violence and build peace, like Qadeem, frame their eff orts within 
their Muslim identity and the religio- cultural traditions of Islam. 
Despite all the challenges faced by Muslim women peacebuilders, 
they are often inspired and empowered by Islam to work towards 
peace. Given that Islam is the primary source of legitimacy in Muslim 
communities, the women’s religious identity and their eff orts to use 
Islamic texts, images, concepts, and vocabulary provides them with 
legitimacy and credibility that is vital to the success of peacebuilding 
actors. More particularly, when the confl ict and violence is framed 
within a religious framework, as is the case with the Taliban and al- 
Qaeda, it becomes even more important to frame the responses to 
it within the same religious framework. Therefore, to be considered 
legitimate and authentic, the women derive their confl ict resolution 
and peacebuilding approaches from the Quran, hadith, and sunna . 
 Islam and their Muslim identity were an important source of legit-
imacy for PAIMAN and Qadeem in reaching out to youth, women, 
and religious leaders in their community. One of the strategies 
of PAIMAN was to build women’s capacity for critical thinking, 
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allowing them to recognize indicators of violent extremism in an 
individual and in their communities, and to fi nd ways to address 
these early warning signs by promoting dialogue and community 
peacebuilding. This required them to fi nd ways to make women 
aware of their potential in infl uencing and guiding their children’s 
lives, and in preventing them from engaging in extremist activ-
ities. Because, in almost all cases, the extremists used the text of 
the Quran to attract youth and communities towards the concept 
of violent jihad, the women needed to develop a strategy that was 
rooted in the Islamic discourse. This was important particularly for 
them to gain legitimacy to off er narratives countering the extremist 
interpretations. Therefore, PAIMAN based their initiatives within 
an Islamic framework, used the Quranic verses and the  Sunna to 
reach out to radicalized and vulnerable youth, and to help transform 
the mindset of these mothers. For, instance, regarding their work 
with mothers, Qadeem notes, their “transformative methodology is 
based on the Quran and Sunnah, as Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) 
insists that a mother’s role is vital in the upbringing of her children 
in accordance with the values of true Islamic teaching, which does 
not preach hatred or violence” (Qadeem  2018 : 8). Consequently, 
PAIMAN was able to off er an alternative understanding of jihad 
and justice. 
 SERVICE FOR WOMEN IMPACTED BY CONFLICT: 
RELIGION AS PRACTICE 
 Often inspired by their faith, many religious actors provide a 
number of diff erent services in their communities, ranging from 
providing food, clean water, or education, amongst other amenities. 
During confl icts, the religious actors may also provide services to 
help resolve confl ict and build relationships between the parties. 
Confl icts and violence impact men and women in various ways, 
and they have diff erent needs and opportunities. In conservative 
communities, where interactions between men and women are 
restricted, women can work with female victims and perpetrators 
of violence more easily, and have resources that may not be available 
to male religious leaders, as it is the case with PAIMAN in Pakistan. 
Associated with the honor of the family and the community, their 
contact with outsiders, especially men, is often constrained. Stigma 
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associated with secular women’s organizations also limits their 
access to more conservative women in these communities. Since 
advancing women’s status and rights is an important dimension of 
peacebuilding, development, and countering violent extremism, it 
is particularly critical for women who have a good understanding 
of other women’s needs and concerns, and who have legitimacy to 
work with them, to reach out to women who have been impacted 
by violence. 
 Many Muslim women work on a number of issues engaging 
diff erent actors in their communities. One of the areas Muslim 
women are uniquely positioned to work is addressing the impact of 
confl ict on women and children. Confl ict in Pakistan put additional 
burdens on women there. Imposing a strict gender code based on 
their interpretation of Islam, extremist groups limited women’s and 
girls’ mobility and participation in social and cultural life, such as 
going outside of the home without a male escort and participa-
tion in social and political activities. Women were excluded from 
working in public and private sectors. Qadeem states that those 
women and girls who failed to comply with this interpretation of 
Islam were often subjected to harsh punitive measures for defying the 
social practices (Qadeem  2018 : 4– 5). In addition to being physically 
attacked by these groups, more than 400 girls’ schools in the Swat 
region were destroyed and burned and many girls were prevented 
from attending the schools that remained (Qadeem  2018 : 4). Fear 
of punishment even prevented many of the female health workers 
and doctors from providing basic health care to women. As Qadeem 
puts it, extremists were engaged in “gender apartheid, but nobody 
dared to raise a voice against them” (Qadeem  2018 : 5) because any-
body who would talk about women’s rights was ostracized for being 
anti- Islamic and pro- west. 
 In addition to being victims of violence, some women in Pakistan 
had become supporters of militant organizations and their jihadi 
ideology. Qadeem ( 2018 : 8) states that women were easily infl uenced 
by the jihadi sermons of extremist leaders whose notion of jihad 
transcended gender, and who used a convergence of propaganda, 
media attention, and intellectual and theological ignorance to con-
struct a hybrid role for women in their idea of an Islamic society. 
Some of the mothers also wanted to provide support for their sons 
who were involved in extremist groups. PAIMAN also found that as 
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a result of socially accepted gender roles women often followed the 
instructions and advice of their male relatives. Within this context, 
working with women was particularly important. 
 Recognizing that engaging women in general, and mothers in 
particular, was critical to counter extremist violence in Pakistan, 
PAIMAN developed an integrated approach to empower women 
socially, economically, and psychologically. This multilayered 
approach focused on building women’s capacity in critical thinking, 
dialogue, and community peacebuilding, to help them recognize 
early signs of extremism in order to prevent them and to make them 
aware of their potential in infl uencing and guiding their children’s 
lives. Moreover, PAIMAN sought to provide them with livelihood 
skills, thereby raising their status and voice in their families and 
communities and reducing their vulnerability to violent extremism. 
PAIMAN also worked to build the capacity of female school and 
madrassa teachers, police women, and female leaders of religious 
political parties and activists, and to form a coalition known as 
“Women of faith building social cohesion in Pakistan” (Qadeem 
 2018 :  7). Finally, PAIMAN also provided education to women 
on Islamic teachings and texts that promote tolerance and gender 
equality and helped women to understand their role in promoting a 
culture of tolerance and peace and encouraging resilient communi-
ties. PAIMAN’s trainings also focused on building self- confi dence, 
competences, and basic skills in understanding attitudinal and behav-
ioral changes in their sons. For example, PAIMAN, to this date, 
has trained more than 235 female teachers, including those from 
religious schools in their peace curriculum that emphasizes values 
of pluralism and harmony, and reached more than 6,400 students 
(Qadeem  2018 : 11). 
 Following these trainings, participants became members of 
PAIMAN mothers’ peace groups called Mothers Tolana (“together” 
in Pashto) (Qadeem  2016 ). Through the 23 Mothers Tolana (with 
a total of 1,500 members), PAIMAN has reached out to 23,198 
women and worked to reintegrate 1,450 extremist and vulner-
able youth through a phased process that includes psycho- social 
counseling (Qadeem  2018 :  9). Mothers Tolana hold community 
meetings with other women and have been instrumental in iden-
tifying vulnerable and extremist youth and mothers who support 
them. Qadeem explains that when the Mothers Tolana found 
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out that 30 women were supporting extremism by stitching sui-
cide bomber jackets, they met with them to talk to them. When, 
during their conversation, the woman who supplies the jackets to 
the extremists was asked whether she knew what they were used for, 
she explained to them:
 Of course I know, we are all engaged in a jihad. I haven’t told the other 
women who sew the jackets, but they must know. What other use can 
these strange jackets be for? I know whom I am supplying, I know 
what they are being used for and I am putting my bit in the jihad that is 
being carried out against the infidels. 
 (ICAN  2018 ) 
 The woman also explained, in addition to contributing to jihad, 
stitching these jackets brought them respect and security, and 
provided with an income as they were paid to do so. Through 
their eff orts, the Tolana Mothers and Qadeem provided the women 
with alternative sources of livelihood by helping them make dresses 
instead, and explaining “that going to heaven can be done in many 
other ways, without the need to be part of a group that kills people” 
(ICAN  2018 ). They were able to convince 13 of the 30 women 
involved in the stitching of suicide bombing jackets to stop. 
 ISLAMIC VALUES OF PEACE AND CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION: RELIGION AS A SET OF TEACHINGS 
 Islamic values and principles play an important role in Muslim 
women’s eff orts (Kadayifci- Orellana  2015 : 196– 201) because as “a 
powerful constituent of cultural norms” they infl uence individual 
and social conceptions of peace and confl ict, including jihad. For 
this reason, extremist groups in Pakistan base their ideology within 
Islamic frameworks and use religious texts selectively and out of 
context, especially regarding jihad, to recruit followers (ICAN 
 2018 ). They exploit the fact that most Pakistanis do not speak 
Arabic and many Pakistanis depend on the interpretation of reli-
gious leaders. However, Islam tradition is replete with teachings 
and practices of nonviolence and peace (Kadayifci- Orellana, Abu- 
Nimer, and Saleem 2013). Muslims often point out that Islam itself 
is derived from the word  slm , which means peace and safety. There 
are many references to peace ( salam ,  silm ,  sulh , etc.) in the Quran that 
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indicate that peace, together with justice ( adl ), is a central message 
of Islam (Q3:83; 4:58; 5:8; 10:25; 16:90; 41:11; 42:15; 57:25). Based 
on these verses, peace in Islam is associated with a wide range of 
values and principles of peace such as  Tawhid (unity of God),  Fitrah 
(original constitution of human beings as good),  Khilafah (humans 
as vicegerents of God on earth),  Adl (justice),  Rahmah and  Rahim 
(compassion and mercy),  Afu (forgiveness),  Sabr (patience), and  Hubb 
(love) (cf. Kadayifci- Orellana et al.  2013 : 8), which urge Muslims 
to resolve their confl icts peacefully. These values and principles 
can provide a moral framework, inform attitudes, and guide action 
towards resolving confl icts. Islamic sources lay down fundamental 
Islamic ethical principles and moral values to provide guidance and 
coherence to Muslim confl ict resolution practices across cultures 
and historical periods. Many of these continue to inspire Muslim 
peacemakers in their eff orts to establish a just and sustainable peace. 
 As Abu- Nimer ( 2003 : 71) states, “Peacebuilding in Islam is based 
on a framework of deeply embedded religious beliefs regarding 
individuals’ responsibility for their actions and their active partici-
pation in larger social contexts”. The Quran constantly reminds 
Muslims about the value of justice, which is a divine command, 
and not an option, therefore it is the responsibility of all Muslims 
to work towards the establishment of justice, including social and 
economic justice, for all (Q4:135; 57:25; 5:8; 2:178; 2:30; 16:90). 
The Quranic notion of justice is universal and valid for all human 
beings with the universality of justice being clearly expressed in 
the following Quranic verses: “O ye who believe! Stand out fi rmly 
for justice as witnesses to Allah even as against yourselves, your 
parents or your kin, and whether it be (against) the rich and poor” 
(Q4:135) or “To fair dealing, and let not the hatred of others to 
you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just for 
it is next to Piety” (Q5:8). Therefore, the Qur’an calls Muslims to 
mobilize and act against injustice, even if a Muslim originates the 
injustice (Q4:135). The universality of justice for all, not only for 
Muslims, is critical for the resolution of confl icts and developing 
peaceful relations. 
 Because of the critical role religious teachings play in the justifi -
cation of jihad, PAIMAN has developed a counter- narrative based 
on Quranic teachings and Islamic values of peace. As Qadeem 
( 2016 ) states:
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 In almost all cases the extremists used the text of the Quran to attract 
youth and communities towards the concept of violent jihad or con-
vince them to act in an extremist fashion. We used the Quranic verses 
in their appropriate context to help transform the mindset of these 
mothers. 
 In their work with mothers PAIMAN found that women had 
no weapon to fi ght against violent extremism because they were 
unaware of the basic interpretation of the Quran (PAIMAN 
n.d.: 19). In that respect, Qadeem points out that in their work they 
employ Islamic values and principles, particularly Quranic texts and 
hadith. To counter violence and to promote a culture of tolerance 
and peace PAIMAN uses Islamic teachings and texts. For example, 
Qadeem states ( 2018 : 8):
 To counter this extremist strategy, it was crucial to educate women on 
Islamic teachings and texts that promote tolerance and gender equality 
and help them in understanding their role in promoting a culture of tol-
erance and peace and encouraging resilient communities. 
 So, the PAIMAN community sessions have always been grounded 
in the interpretation of “Peace” and “Jihad in the light of the Holy 
Quran” and provided Quranic education by engaging  Aalima 
(women religious leaders) because women believed that “once they 
were well versed about the concepts of peace and jihad they would 
be in a better position to educate their children to prevent them 
from being radicalized” (PAIMAN n.d.:  20). In addition to the 
Quranic verses, the prophet’s life and dealings with non- Muslims 
based on tolerance and patience were referred to as examples. As a 
result, women became more aware of Islamic conceptions of peace 
and jihad and were able to counter narratives that called for violence 
(PAIMAN n.d.: 20). 
 CONCLUSION 
 Islamic tradition is replete with teachings that promote peace, har-
mony, and co- existence. The Quran and Prophet’s tradition pro-
vide Muslims with values, principles, and examples of resolving 
confl icts and building peace. Responding to extremist violence 
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in the name of Islam requires developing strategies and counter 
narratives rooted within this tradition. Many Muslim women, like 
Qadeem and her organization PAIMAN, work in their communi-
ties to resolve confl icts and build peace. As this case study illustrated, 
Islam as a community informs their identity and gives them cred-
ibility and legitimacy to work to counter religiously based violent 
extremism. Islam as practiced can inspire and empower women 
to develop approaches to work eff ectively with mothers to pre-
vent radicalization of their children, address gender- based violence, 
collaborate with imams and religious schools to develop peace- 
oriented curricula, promote peace and social cohesion, as well as 
prevent numerous youth from joining extremist groups. Islam as a 
set of teachings provided the theological framework of their peace 
work and narratives countering extremists’ understanding of jihad. 
 REFERENCES 
 Abu- Nimer ,  Mohammed.  ( 2001 ). “ Confl ict Resolution, Culture, and 
Religion: Toward a Training Model of Interreligious Peacebuilding” ,  Peace 
Research ,  38 ( 6 ):  685 – 704 . 
 Abu- Nimer ,  Mohammed.  ( 2003 ).  Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islam.  Florida : 
 University Press of Florida . 
 Briggs ,  R.  and  Feve ,  S.  ( 2013 ). “Review of Programs to Counter Narratives 
of Violent Extremism:  What Works and What are the Implications for 
Government?”  Institute for Strategic Dialogue . [Online]. Viewed from  www.
publicsafety.gc.ca/ cnt/ ntnl- scrt/ cntr- trrrsm/ r- nd- fl ght- 182/ knshk/ ctlg/ 
dtls- en.aspx?i=127 [Date accessed October 10, 2019]. 
 Gopin ,  Marc.  ( 2000 ).  Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, 
Violence, and Peacemaking.  New York :  Oxford University Press . 
 Hayward ,  S.  and  Marshall ,  K.  ( 2015 ). “ Religious Women’s Invisibility: Obstacles 
and Opportunities” , in  Susan  Hayward  and  Katherine  Marshall (eds.), 
 Women, Religion and Peacebuilding: Illuminating the Unseen.  Washington, DC : 
 USIP Press . 
 International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN) . ( 2017 ). “Peace 
Heroes: Pakistani Activist Mossarat Qadeem Responds to Donald Trump”, 
 MS Magazine , October 31, 2017. [Online]. Viewed from  https:// msmagazine.
com/ 2017/ 10/ 31/ peace- heroes- pakistani- activist- mossarat- qadeem- 
responds- donald- trump/ [Date accessed October 10, 2019]. 
 International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN) . ( 2018 ). Interview with 
Mossarat Qadeem by ICAN (January 25, 2018). [Online] “Mossarat Qadeem 
PAKISTAN: RELIGION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 129
129
and Tolana Mothers: Cutting off  Extremists’ Resources— One Thread at a 
Time”. Viewed from  www.icanpeacework.org/ 2017/ 10/ 31/ peace- heroes- 
pakistan- mossarat- qadeem- responds- trump/ [Date accessed October 10, 
2019]. 
 International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN) and Rana Allam . ( 2018 ). 
“These Pakistani Women are Cutting Off  Extremists’ Resources— One 
Threat at a Time?”  MS Magazine , January 24, 2018. [Online]. Viewed 
from  https:// msmagazine.com/ 2018/ 01/ 24/ pakistani- women- cutting- off - 
extremists- resources- one- thread- time/ [Date accessed October 10, 2019]. 
 Kadayifci- Orellana .  S. ,  Ayse . ( 2015 ). “ Muslim Women Building 
Peace: Challenges and Opportunities ”, in  Yasmin  Sakia  and  Chad  Haines 
(eds.),  Women and Peace in the Islamic World: Gender, Agency and Infl uence .  I.B. 
Tauris & Co Ltd ,  191 – 223 . 
 Kadayifci- Orellana ,  S. ,  Ayse ,  Abu- Nimer ,  M. , and  Saleem ,  A.M.  ( 2013 ). 
 Understanding an Islamic Framework for Peacebuilding.  Islamic Relief Worldwide , 
 Birmingham.  [Online]. Viewed from  http:// policy.islamic- relief.com/ pub-
lication/ [Date accessed October 10, 2019]. 
 PAIMAN Trust . ( n.d ). “PAIMAN TOLANA: The Torch Bearers Countering 
Violent Extremism Success Stories from the Field”. Viewed from  http:// 
paimantrust.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2015/ 05/ Casestudies- EU.pdf [Date 
accessed October 10, 2019]. 
 Peace Direct . ( 2019 ). “PAIMAN Alumni Trust (PAIMAN)”. [Online]. Viewed 
from 28e Oct 4.3. Christian docx https:// www.peaceinsight.org/ confl icts/ 
pakistan/ peacebuilding- organisations/ paiman- alumni- trust- paiman/ [Date 
accessed October 10, 2019]. 
 Qadeem ,  Mossarat.  ( 2016 ). “Women’s Participation in Transforming Confl ict 
and Violent Extremism”,  UN Chronicle , Vol. LII, No. 4, April 2016. [Online]. 
Viewed from  https:// unchronicle.un.org/ article/ womens- participation- 
transforming- confl ict- and- violent- extremism [Date accessed October 
10, 2019]. 
 Qadeem ,  Mossarat.  ( 2018 ). “Engendering Extremism:  Women Preventing 
and Countering Violent Extremism in Pakistan”. LSE Center for Women, 
Peace and Security. Paper 16/ 2018. [Online]. Viewed from  www.lse.ac.uk/ 
women- peace- security/ assets/ documents/ 2018/ wps16Qadeem.pdf [Date 
accessed October 10, 2019]. 
 United Nations InterAgency Task Force (UNIATF) . ( 2018 ). “Engaging 
Religion and Faith- based Actors on Agenda 2030/ The SDGS 2017”. Annual 
Report of the United Nations Inter- Agency Task Force on Engaging Faith- 
based Actors for Sustainable Development. United Nations. [Online]. 
Viewed from  www.unaoc.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ Annual- Report- 
IATF- on- Religion- and- Development- Jan- 18.pdf [Date accessed October 
10, 2019]. 
RELIGION MATTERS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION130
130
 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) . ( 2019 ). 
“U.S. Strategy on Religious Leader and Faith Community Engagement”. 
[Online]. Viewed from  www.usaid.gov/ faith- and- opportunity- initiatives/ 
us- strategy [Date accessed October 10, 2019]. 
 World Bank . ( 2015 ). “The World Bank Group’s Engagement with Faith- Based 
and Religious Organizations”. [Online]. Viewed from  https:// jlifl c.com/ 
wp/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2015/ 07/ Faith- Based- fl yer- 4- 14- 15web.pdf [Date 
accessed October 10, 2019]. 
131
 PART V 
 NOW WHAT? 
132
13
 NOW WHAT? 
  IMPLICATIONS FOR ACADEMICS, 
POLICY MAKERS, AND PRACTITIONERS 
 Christine Schliesser, 
S. Ayse Kadayifci- Orellana, 
and Pauline Kollontai 
 Our case studies, ranging from ongoing land disputes in Israel to 
the continuous quest for sustainable peace and reconciliation in 
post- genocide Rwanda and women responding to violence in their 
communities in Pakistan, show the signifi cance of religion in each 
of these confl icts. With diff erent faith traditions in each context, 
their roles reveal remarkable similarities as religion has been used for 
both good and bad. How can we then, as academics, policy makers, 
and practitioners, better understand the concrete role of religion 
in a given confl ict? And how can we strengthen the constructive 
resources religion brings to confl ict resolution? Based on, but at 
the same time going beyond our discussion, we now present nine 
concrete implications and recommendations for academics, policy 
makers and practitioners. 
 IMPLICATION 1: BRIDGING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN 
RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR 
 Religious peacebuilding “still operates on the fringes of the larger 




the fringes of international relations, a fi eld dominated by real-
politik or a hegemonic power paradigm” (Abu- Nimer  2015 : 16). 
The side- lining happens from two sides. On the one hand, religious 
peacebuilding is still often ignored by the secular side. Governmental 
and NGO- based eff orts for integration must therefore include 
promoting religious literacy in government, business, media, and 
higher education (McDonagh  2018 : 26). On the other hand, many 
religious initiatives are designed and implemented independent of 
secular eff orts. Here, theological refl ection that stresses the coopera-
tive and public dimensions of faith can be helpful, for instance, in 
public theology (Storrar and Morton  2004 ). Eff orts towards inte-
gration must happen from both sides. 
 IMPLICATION 2: BRIDGING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN 
DIFFERENT FAITH TRADITIONS 
 Besides the necessity for bridging the religious– secular divide, there 
is a need for more and deeper cooperation between diff erent faith 
traditions in confl ict resolution. More often than not, ignorance 
and prejudices hinder interfaith cooperation. Interfaith dialogue 
and joint initiatives, however, can serve as powerful inspirations 
for overcoming violence, not only within a particular confl ict, 
but also far beyond it. The example of Imam Muhammad Ashafa 
and Pastor James Wuye, former enemies who overcame their own 
enmity, not only helped to re- establish peace and trust in their own 
warring communities in Nigeria, but the interfaith methodology 
developed by them has been employed in Africa and beyond (for 
further examples on interfaith confl ict resolution see Abu- Nimer 
and Augsburger  2009 ). 
 IMPLICATION 3: BRIDGING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN 
ACADEMICS, POLICY MAKERS, AND PRACTITIONERS 
 Eff ective confl ict resolution depends on the cooperation of all rele-
vant actors, religious or not, including academics, policy makers, 
and practitioners. One powerful example is the “Pathfi nders for 
Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies”, a joint endeavor by the 
governments of Brazil, Sierra Leone, and Switzerland to fulfi ll the 
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vision of SDG 16+ (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions). This 
roadmap aims to “mobilize partners from all sectors behind a shared 
vision” (Pathfi nders  2017 :  7), including policy makers from the 
UN and national governments, religious and secular NGOs, and 
academics. At the same time, integration here goes beyond its func-
tional dimension in terms of a broad coalition between all relevant 
partners. Integration also refers to the interconnectedness between 
SDG 16 and other SDGs. This is signifi ed by the plus in SDG 16+. 
For peace cannot be viewed in abstraction from education, gender 
equality, and climate change, to name just three related challenges. 
 IMPLICATION 4: MORE EVALUATION 
 Despite the increasing number of programs focusing on religious 
peacebuilding, there is a knowledge gap in the area of evaluation 
(Vader  2015 ) and there is a “pressing need for greater monitoring 
and evaluation of religious peacebuilding work – and peacebuilding 
generally” (Hayward  2012 : 8). One of the pioneer studies in this 
area is the meta- review of interreligious peacebuilding evaluations, 
which was conducted by Peacebuilding Evaluation Consortium 
(PEC), led by Alliance for Peacebuilding (Vader  2015 ). Evaluation 
of religious peacebuilding generates better understanding of what 
is eff ective religious peacebuilding, and supports evidence- based 
policy and practice. A  deeper understanding of the nature and 
impact, as well as strengths and weaknesses of religious confl ict reso-
lution, would in turn help with integrating it into the larger aca-
demic, political, and societal frameworks. 
 One helpful example is the South African Reconciliation 
Barometer, the world’s longest running public opinion survey on 
national reconciliation. Since 2003, the Institute for Justice and 
Reconciliation (IJR) in South Africa conducts nationally represen-
tative public opinion surveys on South Africans’ attitudes towards 
reconciliation. While not specifi cally geared towards examining the 
role of religion in reconciliation, its extensive data base allows for 
the reconstruction of the impact of religion. The availability of all 
surveys online not only ensures the worldwide accessibility of the 
data, but also facilitates chronological and comparative approaches 
necessary for in- depth evaluation. 
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 IMPLICATION 5: BETTER INCLUSION OF WOMEN 
 Most of faith- based peacebuilding work focuses on clergy, 
which, traditionally, have been mostly men. Women are often 
marginalized in these processes, and consequently, their perspectives 
and experiences are excluded. Many women of faith are actively 
involved in peacebuilding in their communities. In fact, studies have 
shown that women are particularly eff ective agents of social change 
and confl ict resolution (Hayward  2012 ; Marshal et al.  2011 ; cf. the 
case study of Pakistani women in  Chapter 10 ). 
 One recent attempt to better include women at various levels in 
confl ict resolution processes are the current negotiations with the 
Taliban in Afghanistan. Zalmay Khalilzad, Special Representative for 
Afghanistan Reconciliation at the US State Department, proposes 
a formula that not only includes senior government offi  cials in the 
negotiations, but also representatives of the political opposition, of 
civil society, and in particular, women (Al Jazeera  2019 ). Khalilzad’s 
approach represents the growing recognition that for too long the 
vital contributions of women in processes of confl ict resolution and 
reconciliation have been sidelined. 
 IMPLICATION 6: BETTER INCLUSION OF THE YOUTH 
 At the same time, more attention in confl ict resolution theory and 
praxis must be directed towards the youth. While the so- called 
“youth bulge” in many countries of the Global South has already 
given rise to concern about potential destabilizing eff ect, its tre-
mendous potential goes largely neglected. Children and youths are 
often the most vulnerable group and those most severely aff ected 
by confl ict. Engaging them in peacebuilding and trust building 
activities, for instance, through interreligious partnerships between 
local synagogues, churches, and mosques, is therefore critical. Youth 
leaders such as Malala Yousafzai and Greta Thunberg show the 
remarkable transformative power of young people that can quickly 
grow in outreach from a local to a national and even global scale. 
 Given the wide scope of SDG 16, SDG 4 (quality education) 
and SDG 5 (gender equality) are of particular importance. The 
current UNHCR report on refugees and education shows that 
more than half of the children who had to leave their home, often 
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due to violent confl ict, have no opportunity to attend school. Yet 
children and youths who do not attend schools are more likely to 
be involved in child labor or criminal activity, gangs, and militias. 
Filuppo Grandi, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, points to 
the direct connection between peace and educating the youth by 
arguing “Education will prepare refugee children and youth for the 
world of today and of tomorrow. In turn, it will make that world 
more resilient, sustainable and peaceful” (UNHCR  2019 : 9). 
 IMPLICATION 7: BETTER ENGAGEMENT OF 
THE MEDIA 
 Connected to the need to better include the youth is the need for 
confl ict resolution in general, and religious confl ict resolution in 
particular, to become better in strategically engaging the media and 
social media. The events connected with the so- called Arab Spring, 
for example, were largely driven by the youth and (social) media. 
And while there is no shortage of media outlets preaching religious 
hatred and intolerance— ISIS, for example, demonstrated how the 
media can be used creatively and eff ectively to disseminate their 
message of fear and destruction— religious peacebuilders have to 
catch up in employing these powerful instruments for the means of 
peace and tolerance. 
 Abu- Nimer points to three stumbling blocks on the way to suc-
cessfully engaging the media (Abu- Nimer  2015 ). First, the existing 
religious media outlets are often part of the problem rather than the 
solution by promoting intolerance or even outright violence. This 
holds true for countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, or Somalia, as well as 
the Western communities such as ultra conservative evangelicals in 
the US. Second, especially in the Western hemisphere, many media 
outlets are infl uenced by the post- Enlightenment paradigm which 
regards religion as utterly private with no legitimate relevance for 
the public sphere. Accordingly, many media outlets lack religious lit-
eracy necessary to adequately understand and represent the religious 
dimension of many public issues. Third, religious peacemaking is 
usually not regarded as the most interesting type of news and there-
fore deemed neglectable. Filmmaker Wim Wenders points to the 
diffi  culties in portraying peace contrary to the more “exciting” vio-
lence (Wenders and Zournazi  2013 ). 
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 IMPLICATION 8: TAKING THE ISSUES OF 
PROSELYTIZATION AND INSTRUMENTALIZATION 
INTO ACCOUNT 
 Religious actors often face the charge that their main goal is to 
attract followers and convert others. “The fear of conversion 
often comes up in interfaith engagement and it is not unfounded, 
because numerous traditions do contain a mandate to spread the 
faith” (Garred and Abu- Nimer  2018 :  12). This can be a serious 
impediment to peacebuilding between religious groups. At the 
same time, one needs to acknowledge that conversion is not an 
exclusively religious phenomenon. Rather, “Both secular and faith- 
based organizations are engaged in some form of conversion. … All 
organizations aim to transform the way people in developing coun-
tries think and operate” (Heist and Cnaan  2016 : 12). In the case 
study of post- genocide Rwanda, for instance, conversion and evan-
gelization were named as explicit goals of the Christian churches in 
the context of reconciliation and development, without, however, 
making it a prerequisite for service delivery. This sensitive subject 
should therefore be treated in a diff erentiated manner and framed 
under the aspects of transparency and equality. If there is a goal of 
religious conversion, is it  made transparent? Is service delivery inde-
pendent of religious affi  liation? Negative answers to these questions 
would indicate a problematic view on proselytization and the pos-
sible instrumentalization of service delivery for religious purposes. 
 IMPLICATION 9: BETTER ENGAGEMENT OF 
INDIGENOUS AND NON- ABRAHAMIC RELIGIONS 
 With much of Western attention focusing on the Abrahamic 
religions— Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—in confl ict resolution, 
little attention is being paid to the contributions of indigenous and 
dharmic traditions (Hayward  2012 :  6– 7). Similar to Abrahamic 
faiths, these traditions have a wealth of resources and values that 
promote peacebuilding and justice, and many religious actors in 
these traditions play critical roles in their communities to resolve 
confl icts. Therefore, there is a pressing need for academics, policy 
makers, and practitioners to engage these traditions to broaden and 
deepen the fi eld (Hayward  2012 : 7). 
NOW WHAT? 139
139
 Religions for Peace is an example of a multi- religious coalition 
that engages in common action for peace amongst the world’s reli-
gious communities. As the world’s largest and most representative 
multi- religious network engaged in promoting peace, Religions 
for Peace engages local communities from the grassroot level to 
senior political leaders. At the 10th World Assembly in Lindau, 
Germany, in 2019, Religions for Peace adopted the Peace Charter 
for Forgiveness and Reconciliation. Its preamble states,
 The vision of the Peace Charter for Forgiveness and Reconciliation is 
that the process of forgiving is vital if healing and reconciliation are 
to take place, as part of our collective efforts to seek justice, harmony 
and sustainable peace. Fostering and practicing forgiveness has the 
power to transform memories and deep- seated responses to legacies 
of injustice, conflict and war. … Faith and spiritual traditions guide and 
inspire us to awaken the best of our human potential, by practicing 
compassion, mercy, kindness, love, forgiveness and reconciliation, and 
to positively reshape our destinies. 
 (Peace Charter for Forgiveness and Reconciliation  2019 ) 
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and confl ict resolution ; religious, 
confl icts 
 connectors  81 ,  108 
 context  9 ,  14 ,  15 ,  26 ,  27 ,  28 ,  35 ,  39 , 
 41 ,  42 ,  43 ,  70 ,  86 ,  87 ,  88 ,  93 ,  100 , 
 101 ,  103 ;  African  109 ;  changing 
contextual factors  70 ;  of confl ict 
 33 ;  context of interpretation  70 ; 
 cultural context  70 ;  Islamic  17 ; 
 Kashmir  32 ;  political context  70 ; 
 Rwandan  52 ,  53 ,  54 ,  80 ,  114 ; 
 of Sharia  84 ;  social context  70 ; 
 urban  113 
 contribution  3 ,  6 ,  10 ,  11 ,  79 ,  80 ,  82 , 
 84 ,  88 ,  90 ,  100 ,  106 ,  122 ,  114 , 
 136 ,  138 ;  of Christian churches 
 106 ,  112 ;  formal  79 ,  80 ,  88 , 
 114 ;  material  82 ,  84 ,  88 ;  of 
religious actors  3 ,  79 ,  80 ,  84 , 
 88 ,  114 
 culture  27 ,  41 ,  43 ,  60 ,  82 ,  87 ,  128 ; 
 cultural memories  27 ;  cultural 
myths  54 ;  deep culture  27 ;  of 
tolerance and peace  67 ,  72 ,  124 , 
 127 ;  see also  cultural context 
 democracy  45 ,  46 ,  47 ,  48 ,  73 
 destabilizing eff ect  5 ,  136  
 discourse  15 ,  28 ,  33 – 34 ,  36 ,  45 , 
 50 ,  54 ,  62 ,  69 ,  71 ,  80 ,  82 ,  85 , 
 96 ,  110 ,  114 ,  122 ;  see also 
 Weltanschauung 
 discrimination  27 ,  45 ,  98 ;  structural 
violence  27 
 doctrines  66 ,  67 ,  69 ; of jihad  67 ,  69 ; 
 takfi ri doctrine  66 
 Durkheim, Émile  28 ;  structural 
functionalist school  28 – 29 
 eschatology  53 ,  71  
 ethnicity  41 ,  50 ,  52 ,  53 ;  ethnicity-
based injustices  53 
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 European Union (EU)  10 
 evaluation  4 ,  19 ,  135 ,  140  
 exclusivism  42 
 exploitation  71 
 extremism  44 ,  124 ;  extremists  64 , 
 122 ,  125 ,  127 ,  128 ,  129 ;  extremist 
groups  71 ,  128 ;  see also  extremist 
violence 
 faith:  faith traditions  4 ,  11 ,  14 ,  15 , 
 134 ;  interfaith cooperation  4 ,  31 , 
 134 ;  interfaith dialogue  4 ,  31 ,  119 , 
 134 ;  see also  Abrahamic religion, 
faith ;  Catholic faith ;  Christian, 
faith ;  faith-based actors 
 faith-based organizations (FBOs)  4 , 
 13 ,  19 ,  79 ,  80 ,  83 ,  84 ,  88 ,  138 
 fi ghters  62 ,  65 ;  see also  mujahideen 
 forgiveness  18 ,  31 ,  32 ,  78 ,  84 ,  87 ,  88 , 
 109 ,  106 ,  107 ,  108 ,  109 ,  109 – 115 , 
 126 ,  139 ,  140 ;  see also  religious 
texts 
 freedom:  freedom of political 
opposition  104 ;  freedom of the 
press  104 
 fundamentalist  44 ,  67 
 funding  41 ,  82 ,  108 ;  networks and 
funding  108 
 gacaca:  Christian  gacaca  111 ;  courts 
 86 ,  104 ,  111 ;  gacaca nkirisitu  111 
 genocide  17 ,  49 ;  accomplices in 
genocide  49 ;  eff ects of  104 ;  ethnic 
mass violence  49 ;  genocidal 
crimes  103 ;  genocide  103 ; 
 post-genocide  85 ,  86 ,  88 , 
 103 – 116 ,  133 ,  138 ;  pre-genocide 
 14 ,  16 ,  49 – 59 ,  104 ,  105 ;  religion 
in post-genocide  103 ;  Rwanda 
genocide  17 ,  18 ,  34 ,  49 – 60 ;  see also 
 perpetrators ;  Rwanda ;  victims 
 globalization  70 
 God  31 ,  44 ,  55 ,  69 ,  87 ,  94 ,  97 ,  100 , 
 105 ,  110 ,  126 ;  God’s governance 
 71 ;  image of  46 ,  96 ;  model of  42 ; 
 tribal God  43 ;  umutabazi (savior/
liberator)  55;  word of  70 
 Golden Rule principle  43 
 guilt: survivor guilt  111 
 hadith  121 ,  127  
 Halakha  46 
 Halakhic  45 
 Haredi  41 – 47 ;  Haredi community 
 46 ;  Haredi Jewish leadership  46 
 hatred  34 ,  40 ,  52 ,  53 ,  84 ,  87 ,  88 ,  104 , 
 112 ,  122 ,  126 ,  137  
 healing  78 ,  86 ,  105 ,  108 ;  process 
 86 ,  111 ;  see also  memory; 
relationships, healing ;  identity , 
 relationships and healing ; 
 reconciliation ;  trauma healing 
workshops 
 hegemony  55 ,  56 
 holistic  85 ,  110 ,  112 ;  see also 
 perspective, holistic 
 Holy Scriptures  30 ;  see also Jewish, 
scriptures; Quran; Torah 
 hope  45 ,  99 ,  111 ,  112 ,  114 ; 
 eschatological hope  112 
 human rights  12 ,  113 ;  basic  113 ; 
 lack of attention to human rights 
 113 ;  violations  19 ,  78 ,  86 ,  104 , 
 115 ;  women’s human rights  83 , 
 84 ;  see also  Rabbis for Human 
Rights (RHR) 
 Hutu  49 ,  50 ,  104 ,  107 
 identity  41 ;  collective national 
identity  112 ;  ethnic identity  51 ; 
 formation  80 ;  forming elements 
 41 ;  inclusive and exclusive  42 ; 
 Islamic identity  65 ;  Muslim 
identity  52 ,  64 ,  121 ;  other 
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 29 ;  othering  29 ,  30 ;  outsiders 
 42 ,  122 ;  Pakistani identity  63 ; 
 pseudo-religious identities  51 ; 
 relationships and healing  98 ; 
 religious identity  51 ;  religious 
vs. ethnic identities  50 ;  see also 
 networks ;  relationships, and 
identity 
 ideologies:  anti-democratic  5 ; 
 destabilizing ideologies  5 ; 
 religious ideologies  25 
 ignorance  4 ,  11 ,  123 ,  134  
 infi dels  66 ,  125 ;  see also 
 unbeliever 
 injustice  55 ,  69 ,  71 ,  96 ;  see also 
 ethnicity-based injustices 
 instrumentalization  5 ,  138 
 intolerance  5 ,  10 ,  78 ,  137  
 ISIS  137 
 Islam  6 ,  19 ,  45 ,  63 ,  64 – 73 ,  87 , 
 117 – 129 ;  see also  fundamentalist ; 
 Islamic; militant groups; 
perspective, Islamic ;  slm 
 Islamic:  discourse  71 ,  122 ;  education 
system  67 ;  fundamental  126 ; 
 militants  66 ,  119 ;  principles  72 ; 
 schools  67 ;  symbols, language, 
imagery  71 ,  72 ;  texts  71 ;  theology 
 119 ;  tradition  125 ;  see also  Islamic 
values 
 Islamization  65 ,  67 
 Islamophobia  5 
 Israel  91 ;  citizens  40 ;  Jewish 
perspective  38 ;  Jewish settlements 
 39 ;  land confl ict in Israel  40 ; 
 Negev  38 ;  Palestinian Arabs 
 38 ;  Palestinian territory  38 ; 
 quest for confl ict resolution  91 ; 
 State of Israel  38 ,  40 ;  War of 
Independence  39 ;  war over land 
 39 – 41 ;  see also  Bedouin ;  land 
confl icts ;  West Bank 
 Jamaat-e Islami’s  68 
 Jamiat-e Ulama Islam  68 
 Jerusalem  41 ,  47 ,  48 ,  95 ,  96 ,  98 ,  99 
 Jewish:  community/communities 
 41 ,  42 ,  43 ,  44 ;  extremist groups 
 43 ;  Haredi Jewish community 
 41 ,  43 ;  Jewish–Arab relations 
 100 ;  Jewish Religious Courts 
 45;  Kibbutz Kerem Shalom 
 42 ;  leadership  46 ;  non-Jewish 
Israeli citizens  44 ;  scriptures 
 43 ;  settlements  97 ;  tradition  93 ; 
 traditional Jewish law  45 ;  see also 
 Orthodox, Jewish community ; 
 perspective, Jewish ;  values, Jewish 
 Jews  43 ;  Reform  44 ;  Judaism Liberal 
 44 ;  see also Orthodox  
 jihad  61 ,  66 ,  69 ;  military jihad  71 ; 
 retaliation to injustice, oppression, 
aggression  71 
 Judaise  41 ;  see also  Negev 
 Judaism  6 ,  16 ,  18 ,  20 ,  30 ,  36 ,  42 , 
 45 ,  46 ,  93 ,  100 ,  138 ;  Liberal 
Judaism  46 ;  Orthodox Judaism  45 ; 
 Reform Judaism  46 ;  traditional 
 Halakhic Judaism  45 ;  see also 
 Haredi 
 justice  6 ,  12 ,  18 ,  19 ,  30 ,  33 ,  135 ,  138 , 
 139 ;  adl  126 ;  economic  126 ;  social 
 31 ,  53 ,  126 ;  see also  values 
 Kibbutz Kerem Shalom  42 
 Knesset  16 ,  45 
 land  39 ,  43 ;  see also  land rights 
confl icts ;  war over land 
 land confl icts  see  confl ict 
 language  33 ,  54 ;  see also  discourse ; 
religion, as  discourse 
 leaders  34 ,  45 ;  al-Qaeda leaders  62 ; 
 charismatic  27 ;  church leaders  53 , 
 57 ,  59 ;  Christian  31 ;  Israeli Jewish 
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leadership  44 ;  Jewish  31 ;  middle-
range leaders  82 ;  Muslim  31 ,  64 ; 
 next-generation  32 ;  Protestant 
and Catholic Church leaders  58 ; 
 religious  19 ,  77 ;  religious actors as 
eff ective leaders  80 ;  Taliban  61 
 Love of neighbor  see  Ve’ahabhath 
 Love of stranger  see  Va’ahavtem et 
ha-Ger 
 madrasas  61 ,  66 ,  67 ,  68 ,  71 ,  72 ,  121 ; 
 Deobandi madrasas  61 ,  67 ,  68 ; 
 functions of madrasas  68 ;  schools 
of thought within madrasas  68 ; 
 see also Jamaat-e Islami’s ;  Jamiat-e 
Ulama Islam; 
 Magen David  46  see also  Star of 
David 
 marginalization  113 
 massacres  49 ,  52 ,  53 ,  105 
 meaning  28 ,  30 ,  31 ,  32 ,  33 ,  43 , 
 64 ,  70 ,  81 ,  85 ,  87 ,  89 ,  110 ,  111 ; 
 restoring meaning  110 
 media  32 ,  72 ,  123 ,  134 ;  better 
engagement of  5 ,  137 ;  mass media 
infl uences  27 ;  social media  5 ,  44 , 
 71 ,  121 ,  137 
 meditation  86 ,  111 ;  see  religious 
rituals 
 memory  41 ,  87 ,  90 ,  112 ,  114 , 
 116 ;  healing of memories  112 ; 
 memories  86 ,  139 ;  memory 
and reconciliation  87 ,  112 ; 
 remembrance  87 
 militant groups  62 ,  64 ,  66 ,  117 
 modernization  70 
 Mothers Tolana  121 ,  124 ,  125 ,  129  
 Mujahedeen  62 
 mujahideen  65 
 Muslim  10 ,  31 ,  64 ,  66 ,  71 ,  72 , 
 73 ,  126 ;  faith tradition  11 ,  84 ; 
 peacemakers  126 ;  power  70 ; 
 regimes  71 ;  violent Muslim 
extremists  31 ;  see also identity ; 
 perspective ;  Muslim women 
 Muslim women  117 – 128 ;  activists 
 119 ;  peacebuilding initiatives; 
Mossarat Qadeem  117 ,  120 ,  123 , 
 125 ,  128 ;  see also  Mothers Tolana ; 
 PAIMAN 
 narratives  27 ,  43 ,  55 ,  64 ,  66 ;  biblical 
 55 ;  counter narrative  122 ,  126 , 
 127 ,  128 ;  counter-narrative 
strategies  119 ,  128 ;  historical  43 ; 
 Islamic  69 ;  religious  70 ,  119 ;  sacred 
narratives  85 ;  victors  87 ,  114 
 nationalism  29 ,  42 ,  44 ;  Buddhist 
nationalism  28 ;  Hindu 
nationalism  29 
 Negev  40 ,  41 ;  Judaise the Negev  41 ; 
 see also  Negev Bedouin 
 networks  17 ,  34 ,  35 ,  83 ,  97 ,  99 ,  108 ; 
 global  83 ,  108 ;  international  35 ; 
 and services and advocacy  97 ; 
 social network analysis  81 ;  social 
network theory  108 ;  strong-ties 
groups  81 ;  weak-ties groups  81 ; 
 see also  funding ; religion, as an 
institution;  religion, as spirituality 
 Nigeria  77 ,  83 ,  89 ,  108 ,  134  
 non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs)  4 ,  83 ,  85 ,  118, 135 ;  religious 
and secular  134 ;  secular  82 ,  85 
 norms  30 ,  34 ,  66 ,  84 ,  106 ,  125  
 Oasis of Peace  see Wahat al-Salam-
Neve Shalom (WASNS) 
 oppression  69 ,  71 ,  96 
 Orthodox  see  Jewish, community/
communities ;  Jews ;  Jewish, 
leadership ;  Judaism 
 other  see  identity 
 outsiders  12 ,  42 ,  122 
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 PAIMAN  19 ,  117 ,  118 ,  120 – 128 
 Pakistan  14 ,  17 ,  19 ,  36 ,  61 – 69 , 
 71 ,  72 ,  80 ,  117 – 125 ,  133 ,  136 ; 
 internal confl icts  61 ;  Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan  62 ;  violence 
(extremist)  62 ;  see also  identity 
(Pakistani) 
 Palestinian  16 ,  18 ,  39 ,  40 ,  43 ,  44 ; 91, 
92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100;  Intifada 
 96 ;  Israeli-Palestinian confl ict  92 , 
 99 ;  Palestinian Arabs  38 ,  39 ,  47 , 
 98 ;  Palestinian territory  38 ,  39 , 
 44 ,  46 ;  rights  96 ;  other  92 ;  see also 
 confl ict ;  other ;  West Bank 
 peace  10 – 18 ,  29 ,  30 – 32 ,  38 ,  43 , 
 58 ,  59 ,  61 ,  67 ,  70 ,  72 ,  77 ,  81 , 
 84 ,  87 ,  88 ,  92 ,  93 ,  97 – 100 , 
 106 ,  112 ,  114 ,  117 ,  119 – 121 , 
 124 – 128 ,  133 ,  137 ,  139 ;  Peace 
groups  121 ;  building peace  26 ; 
 peacebuilding  118 ;  peacebuilding 
initiatives  118 ;  peacemaking 
 78 ;  religious peacebuilding  118 ; 
 see also  Mothers Tolana; Muslim, 
peacemakers ;  Religions for Peace ; 
 religious actors, peacebuilders ; 
 religious, peacemakers ;  religious, 
peacemaking ; religious traditions ; 
 slm ; Tolana 
 perpetrators  27 ,  85 – 88 ,  104 – 114 , 
 122 ;  violent actions  27 ;  see also 
 survivors 
 perspective:  Christian  49 ,  103 ; 
 holistic  85 ,  110 ;  Islamic  61 ,  117 ; 
 Jewish  16 ,  18 ,  38 ,  92 ;  local–global 
 108 ;  Muslim  17 ,  19 ;  religious  87 
 Pew Research Center  10 ,  25  
 Politics of Reconciliation  104 , 
 114 
 post-apartheid  34 
 post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD)  111 
 poverty  9 ,  11 ,  12 ,  53 ,  56 ;  poverty 
alleviation  9 
 power  33 ,  34 ,  57 ,  139 ;  colonial 
power  50 ,  52 ,  56 ;  Muslim power 
 70 ;  power structures  29 ;  power 
struggles  16 ,  55 ,  56 ,  57 ;  spiritual 
power  52 ,  54 ;  Western  71 
 prayer  32 ,  80 ,  86 ,  111 ;  see  religious 
rituals 
 prejudice  3 ,  4 ,  93 ,  134 
 Promised Land  44 
 propaganda  71 ,  123 ;  see  social media 
 proselytization  5 ,  138 
 Protestant  29 ,  30 ,  35 ,  50 ,  58 ,  105 
 Quran  67 ,  69 ,  71 ,  105 ,  121 ,  125 , 
 126 ,  127 
 Rabbis for Human Rights (RHR)  93 
 racism  5 ,  45 ,  98 
 radicalization  11 ,  69 ,  117 ,  128  
 reconciliation  5 ,  13 ,  18 ,  26 ,  30 – 39 , 
 58 ,  59 ,  77 ,  78 ,  84 ,  86 ,  91 – 98 , 
 103 – 116 ,  135 – 140 ;  and 
healing  87 ;  one-sided concept 
 114 ;  religion as a source of 
reconciliation  78 ;  Rwandan 
reconciliation process  114 ; 
 Sacrament of Reconciliation 
 111 ;  see also  memory and 
reconciliation ;  Politics of 
Reconciliation ; religion as a 
player in confl ict resolution and 
reconciliation 
 relationships:  church and state 
relationship  113 ;  healing  17 ,  88 , 
 98 ,  106 ,  109 ;  and identity  80 ,  108 ; 
 mimetic relationships  51 ;  between 
Muslims and non-Muslims  66 ; 
 personal relationship with God 
 105 ;  religion-state relationship 
 45 ;  religious vs. ethnic identities 
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and relationships  50 ;  relationship-
building  114 ;  relationship-
building skills  80 ,  81 ;  see also 
 identity ,  relationships and 
healing 
 religion:  aspect of social and cultural 
life  78 ;  as community  28 ,  41 – 43 , 
 50 ,  64 ,  80 ,  96 ,  98 ,  106 ,  107 ,  121 ; 
 community-building integrative 
dimension of religion  28 ;  in 
confl ict and confl ict resolution 
 26 ,  27 – 39 ,  41 ,  47 ,  50 ,  78 – 80 ,  88 , 
 105 ,  118 ;  defense of human rights 
 78 ;  dimensions of religion  79 ;  as 
discourse  33 – 34 ,  45 – 47 ,  54 ,  69 , 
 85 ,  96 ;  after genocide 104; dogma 
 12 ;  eschatological framework 
of religions  31 ;  freedom of 
 10 ;  functional perspective  30 ; 
 impact on identity formation 
 29 ;  indigenous religions  138 ;  as 
institution  34 – 36 ,  45 – 47 ,  81 ,  55 , 
 108 ;  non-Abrahamic religions 
 138 ;  normative  14 ,  15 ,  84 ,  93 , 
 109 ,  114 ;  as practice  32 – 33 , 
 43 ,  80 ,  84 ,  87 ,  93 ,  106 ,  109 , 
 110 ;  Religions for Peace  139 ; 
 religious teachings 84; source 
of extremist violence  78 ;  source 
of human rights violations 
 78 ;  source of intolerance  78 ; 
 source of nonviolent confl ict 
transformation  78 ;  as spirituality 
 81 ,  85 ,  87 ,  98 ,  108 ,  110 ; 
 substantial view  30 ;  as teachings 
 43 – 45 ,  52 ,  66 ,  84 ,  87 ,  93 ,  109 , 
 110 ,  125 ; and violence  26 ;  see also 
 Abrahamic religions ;  language ; 
 services ;  rituals ;  reconciliation 
 religious:  communities  82 ;  confl icts; 
framework  71 ;  groups  82 ; 
 imagery  70 ;  meaning systems  70 ; 
 peacemakers  30 ;  peacemaking  26 , 
 77 ,  137 ;  secular divide  4 ;  suicide 
bombers  30 ;  teachings  84 ;  texts 
 78 ;  see also  peacebuilders ;  religion, 
in confl ict and confl ict resolution ; 
 traditions 
 religious actors  80, 81, 122;  in 
confl ict resolution  79 ;  formal 
contributions of  80 ;  material 
contributions  84 ;  neutral agents 
 80 ;  peacebuilders  80 
 remembrance  87 ,  112 ;  see also 
 memory 
 rituals  32 ,  33 ,  41 ,  70 ,  78 ,  84 ,  86 ,  111 , 
 112 ;  Christian rituals  32 ;  religious 
rituals  86 ,  111 
 Rwanda  14 ,  16 ,  18 ,  33 ,  34 ,  36 , 
 49 – 59 ,  103 – 114 ;  civil war  103 ; 
 independence  49 ;  massacre 
 103 ;  reconciliation process  114 ; 
 Rwandese  109 ;  see also  ethnic 
mass violence ;  gacaca courts ; 
 genocide ;  Hutu ; pre- genocide ; 
post- genocide; Tutsi; Twa 
 scriptures:  Hebrew scriptures  93 ,  94 ; 
 see also  Holy Scriptures ;  Jewish 
scriptures 
 secular  3 ,  4 ,  10 ,  26 ,  34 ,  64 ,  67 ,  71 , 
 79 ,  82 ,  83 ,  84 ,  85 ,  92 ,  119 ,  123 , 
 133 ,  134 ,  135 ,  138 ;  secularized 
 105 ,  110 ;  state  34 ,  64 ;  violence  26 ; 
 see also secular actors;  religious–
secular divide 
 secularization thesis  9 ,  10 
 services  83 ,  99 ,  109 ;  service delivery 
 34 ,  35 ,  83 ,  138 ;  see also  networks , 
 and services and  advocacy ; 
 religion, as practice 
 Sharia Law  30 ,  63 ,  65 ,  67 ,  84 
 slm  125 ;  see also  peace 
 social cohesion  106, 120, 124 
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 spirituality  28 ,  31 ,  36 ,  79 ,  81 ,  82 ,  83 , 
 85 ,  86 ,  87 ,  98 ,  108 ,  110 ,  111 ,  112 ; 
 religion as spirituality  31 ,  81 ,  85 , 
 86 ,  87 ,  98 ,  108 ,  110 ,  111 ,  112  
 Star of David  45 
 stereotypes  30 ,  84 ,  112 
 sunna  69 ,  121 ,  122 
 survivors  18 ,  86 ,  104 ,  107 – 114 
 Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs)  11 ,  12 ,  118 ,  135 ,  136 
 Taliban  17 ,  61 ,  62 ,  63 ,  65 ,  66 ,  67 ,  71 , 
 73 ,  117 ,  119 ,  121 ,  136 
 teachers  99 ,  120 ,  121 ,  124 
 tension  33 ,  34 ,  38 ,  56 ,  62 ,  70 ,  79 ; 
 interreligious tensions  25 ,  30  
 terrorism  11 ,  61 ;  terrorists  67 
 texts:  patriarchal interpretations  120 ; 
 religious texts  78 ;  sacred texts  70 ; 
 see also  Islamic, texts 
 theology:  Islamic theology  119 ; 
 problematic theology  52 – 54 ; 
 see also  Christian ; religion, as 
teachings 
 Tolana  121 ,  124 ,  125 ,  129 
 Torah  30 ,  42 ,  44 ,  94 ,  95 ,  96 , 
 100 
 traditions:  East Asian religious 
traditions  6 ;  faith traditions  134 ; 
 religious traditions  78 ;  see also 
 Christian ;  Islamic, tradition ; 
 Jewish, tradition ;  Muslim, faith 
tradition 
 transparent  14 ,  138 ;  becoming 
transparent  14 
 trauma  78 ,  86 ,  87 ,  105 ,  108 ,  110 , 
 111 ,  112 ,  114 ,  115 ;  dealing with 
trauma  86 ,  110 ;  fi rst and second-
generation victims  111 ;  healing 
of  87 ;  re-traumatization  111 ; 
 second-generation trauma  111 ; 
 trauma healing workshops  111 ; 
 traumatic past  114 ;  workshops 
 112 
 tribalism  42 ;  tribal  42 ,  117 ,  120 ; 
 tribal God  43 
 trust  29 ,  42 ,  80 ,  81 ,  96 ,  99 ,  106 ,  107 , 
 111 ,  114 ,  117 ,  134 ,  136 ;  building 
 29 ,  81 ,  99 ,  114 ,  136 ;  religion as 
community, religion as discourse 
 96 ;  religion as community, 
religion as practice  80 ;  social trust 
 42 
 Tutsi  49 – 57 ,  103 ,  104 ,  107 
 Twa  50 ,  104 ,  113 
 ubuntu  107 
 unbeliever  6 ;  see also  infi del 
 United Nations (UN)  12 ,  39 ,  78 , 
 79 ,  118  
 Va’ahavtem et ha-Ger  see  values 
 values  18 ,  19 ,  30 ,  38 ,  43 ,  64 ,  66 , 
 70 ,  78 ,  81 ,  84 ,  93 ,  100 ,  106 ,  109 , 
 114 ,  124 ,  126 ,  138 ;  of indigenous 
and dharmic traditions  138 ; 
 Islamic values  87 ,  117 ,  118 ,  122 , 
 125 ,  127 ;  Jewish values  95 ;  of 
justice  30 ,  38 ,  72 ,  84 ,  93 ,  98 ,  115 , 
 120 ,  126 ;  religious values  70 , 
 78 ,  84 ;  Va’ahavtem et ha-Ger  93 ; 
 Ve’ahabhath  93 
 victims  27 ,  49 ,  59 ,  87 ,  103 ,  104 ,  107 , 
 111 ,  109 ,  119 ,  120 ,  122 ,  123 ;  fi rst 
and second-generation victims 
 111 ;  see also  perpetrators ; 
 trauma 
 violence  13 ,  25 ,  123 ;  actions  27 ; 
 acute violence  13 ;  cultural 
dimension of violence  27 ; 
 cultural violence  55 ;  deep culture 
( Tiefenkultur )  27 ;  dimensions of 
violence  13 ;  ethnic mass violence 
 49 ;  ethnic violence  52 ;  extremist 
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violence  61 ,  62 ,  121 ,  122 ,  123 , 
 128 ;  gender-based  128 ;  mimetic 
nature of violence  27 ;  personal 
violence  27 ;  religious violence  26 ; 
 roots of violence  27 ;  in the name 
of Islam 63; structural violence 
 27 ,  52 ;  see also  perpetrators ; 
 victims 
 Wahat al-Salam–Neve Shalom 
(WASNS)  95 ,  98 ,  99 
 war over land  see  confl ict 
 well-being  85 ,  93 ;  dimensions 
 85 ;  material  110 ;  physical 
 110 
 Weltanschauung  33 ,  34 ,  54 ,  56 
 West Bank  39 ,  44 ,  92 
 women  35 ,  103 ,  117 – 128 ,  133 , 
 136 ;  agents of change  136 ;  better 
inclusion  4 ,  136 ;  contribution 
of  136 ;  mothers  121 ,  122 ,  123 , 
 124 ,  125 ,  128 ,  129 ;  peacebuilding 
initiatives  19 ,  117 ;  women’s 
groups  78 ;  see also  Mossarat 
Qadeem; Muslim women ; 
 Muslim women , activists;  Muslim 
women , peacebuilding initiatives ; 
 PAIMAN ;  Tolana; women’s 
human rights 
 youth  43 ;  better inclusion of youth 
 5 ,  136 ;  youth bulge  5 ,  136 
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